This case involved a consumer's claims against debt collection companies under the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and two Connecticut statutes, based on a letter sent in 2007 that listed a current balance without disclosing accruing interest. The court granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiff on the FDCPA claim, ruling that the letter did not clearly state the amount of the debt as required by the statute because it omitted information about potential increases due to interest. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the state claims, finding that the plaintiff had not shown an ascertainable loss under CUTPA and that the CCPA provided no private right of action for claims accruing before July 2007. The analysis relied on an objective standard of how the least sophisticated consumer would interpret the notice.
This case involves a copyright infringement claim by Peter and David Currin against Arista Records and Sony BMG, alleging that Pharrell Williams' song "Frontin'" infringes their copyrighted song "I’m Frontin’". The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The decision was based on the finding that, even assuming access to the plaintiffs' work, no reasonable jury could conclude the songs are substantially similar. The plaintiffs' objections regarding expert testimony, factual disputes, and credibility issues were deemed insufficient to overcome this determination.
In Moroch v. United States, plaintiff Laurie Moroch sued the IRS for a declaration that she holds real property and a 10% interest in future sale proceeds free of federal tax liens filed against her ex-husband Todd for unpaid taxes from 2001-2003. The court granted the IRS's summary judgment motion in part and denied it in part. It held that the 2001 lien attached to the real property because Laurie did not qualify as a judgment lien creditor under 26 U.S.C. § 6323(a) and IRS regulations, as her divorce judgment did not create a lien for a specific sum or designated property. However, the court denied summary judgment on the liens' validity against the 10% sale proceeds interest, finding that Laurie qualified as a purchaser for value and that the IRS failed to show proper recording of the liens with the Connecticut Secretary of State as required by state and federal law.
This case involves a federal habeas corpus petition by a Connecticut inmate serving a sixty-year sentence for murder, claiming that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach the state's main witness with a prior sworn statement and that his appellate counsel was ineffective for not challenging the trial court's handling of the prosecutor's closing argument. The petitioner had previously raised these ineffective assistance claims in state habeas proceedings, where they were denied on the merits under Strickland v. Washington. The federal court dismissed the petition, concluding that the petitioner failed to show the state court applied Strickland in an objectively unreasonable manner as required for federal habeas relief under AEDPA standards.
In Stas v. Lynch, a former Connecticut State Police trooper brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against a high-ranking CSP official, claiming a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment under a 'class of one' theory. The plaintiff alleged he received harsher discipline than similarly situated employees solely due to personal malice. The defendant moved for summary judgment. The court granted the motion, holding that such claims are no longer viable in the public employment context following the Supreme Court's ruling in Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agriculture, which recognized that discretionary employment decisions inherently allow for differential treatment without violating equal protection.
In this case, a former police officer at Eastern Connecticut State University sued the university and her supervisor under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging that she was sexually harassed by her immediate supervisor over several months, that her internal complaint led to retaliation by the supervisor's daughter (a coworker), and that the resulting hostile environment forced her constructive discharge. The university moved for summary judgment based on the affirmative defense established in Ellerth, Faragher, and Suders, asserting that it maintained and disseminated an anti-harassment policy and took prompt remedial action once notified of the conduct. The court granted summary judgment to the university, holding that the plaintiff was aware of the reporting procedures but delayed reporting the harassment for months, and that once informed the university promptly investigated, reassigned the supervisor, and ensured no further harassment occurred.
