Alvin W. Thompson

This case involved a bankruptcy debtor's appeal from the bankruptcy court's denial of his motion for sanctions against a creditor and the creditor's attorney, as well as his request for a criminal referral to the U.S. Attorney. The debtor argued that the creditor's proof of claim for a prior judgment and subsequent pro se motion to vacate an order disallowing the claim were fraudulent or improper. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision, holding that the filings were not frivolous or filed for an improper purpose under Bankruptcy Rule 9011 and related statutes, and that the bankruptcy judge properly exercised discretion in declining to make a criminal referral under 18 U.S.C. § 3057 given the lack of reasonable grounds for believing a violation had occurred.

criminal lawprocedure

The SEC sued Joseph Apuzzo, former CFO of Terex Corporation, alleging he aided and abetted securities fraud committed by URI and its CFO through two equipment sale-leaseback transactions in 2000 and 2001 that involved hidden indemnification agreements and inflated invoices to mislead URI's auditor and overstate profits. Apuzzo moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court granted the motion, holding that the allegations showed only Apuzzo's awareness and participation in the underlying transactions on behalf of Terex, not that he substantially assisted the primary violation by URI. The court reasoned that Apuzzo had no duty to disclose the true structure to URI's auditor, did not authorize URI's conduct or enter arrangements on URI's behalf, and that mere approval of the scheme was insufficient to establish proximate causation under the aiding-and-abetting standard.

business & regulatory

In this securities litigation, plaintiffs alleged that Xerox misrepresented the negative impacts of its 1998 worldwide restructuring and related Customer Business Organization reorganization, which allegedly inflated the company's stock price. The court addressed the lead plaintiffs' motion to exclude the expert report and testimony of Professor David Denis, who offered analysis of corporate restructurings, comparisons of Xerox's performance to peer companies, and critiques of another expert's methodology. The court denied the motion to exclude, concluding that the testimony met the reliability and relevance requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert, as it addressed the materiality of the alleged misstatements and provided useful background on operational restructurings unfamiliar to jurors. The court further found that the probative value was not substantially outweighed by any risk of prejudice, which could be addressed through a limiting instruction if needed.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves a securities class action alleging that Xerox misrepresented the effects of its 1998 restructuring and Customer Business Organization reorganization, which plaintiffs claim artificially inflated the company's stock price. The court addressed a motion to exclude expert testimony from Anthony Saunders, Lee Buchwald, and Charles Drott under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert standards. The court granted the motion in part by excluding Buchwald's testimony entirely and barring Saunders and Drott from offering opinions on scienter or corporate state of mind, while denying the motion as to the remainder of Saunders's and Drott's proposed testimony. The core reasoning was that expert opinions must rest on reliable methods and facts, assist the trier of fact, and avoid direct conclusions about mental states that are reserved for the jury, with Buchwald's exclusion tied to disclosure or qualification issues.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved McCrae Associates, LLC suing Universal Capital Management, Inc. and its officers and directors over the defendants' refusal to reissue stock certificates for 300,000 shares that had been issued to McCrae in 2004 in exchange for a nominal payment and alleged promises by McCrae's principal to provide services such as identifying acquisition targets and raising funds. The defendants moved for partial summary judgment on claims including statutory theft, breach of fiduciary duty by officers and directors, civil conspiracy, and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act. The court granted the motion on all counts except the breach of fiduciary duty claims against defendant Queen, reasoning that there were no genuine issues of material fact supporting the theft, conspiracy, and CUTPA claims, that the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine barred the conspiracy counts, and that disputed facts remained regarding whether Queen's actions in withholding the shares breached his fiduciary duties.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

This case involved Scottsdale Insurance Company seeking a declaratory judgment against R.I. Pools, Inc. and related parties that it had no duty to defend or indemnify under commercial general liability policies for claims by swimming pool owners alleging cracking and deterioration due to defective concrete supplied by a subcontractor. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Scottsdale. It reasoned that the underlying complaints alleged damages from faulty workmanship by R.I. Pools, which does not constitute an "occurrence" or "accident" under the policies, as faulty workmanship alone is not accidental, and any related damages from repairs or loss of use also do not qualify. The policies therefore provided no coverage for the claims or potential claims.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case involves the Connecticut Office of Protection and Advocacy for Persons With Disabilities (OPA) and several individual plaintiffs suing state officials on behalf of over 200 people with mental illness residing in or at risk of entering three nursing homes. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated the Americans with Disabilities Act and related laws by failing to provide services in the most integrated community settings, inform individuals of available community options, and administer programs without discriminatory effects. The court denied the defendants' motions to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1), finding that the complaint stated viable claims and that the plaintiffs had standing. It also granted the motion for class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) except as to one named representative, concluding that the proposed class satisfied numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, and the requirements for injunctive relief based on an alleged systemic policy or practice.

civil rightshealthcare

In this case, plaintiff Tina Pacheco brought a claim under the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act against defendant Paul Miller, a debt collector who had acquired her debts and attempted to collect them through Joseph McMahon Corporation. The court granted Pacheco's motion for summary judgment, awarding her $1,000 in statutory damages plus attorneys' fees and costs. The decision was based on Miller's March 11, 2009 email, which the court found violated the FDCPA by falsely stating that disputing the debt would cost a fortune in legal fees—when Connecticut law caps such fees at 15%—and by misrepresenting Miller's affiliation with the licensed collection agency United Obligations.

business & regulatory

This case concerns a motion by bankruptcy debtors Vincent and Robert Andrews for a stay pending appeal of a bankruptcy court order granting summary judgment to judgment creditors McCarron and Pincay. The bankruptcy court had held that state-law fraud judgments against the debtors were nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) due to collateral estoppel from prior California district court findings of actual fraud and justifiable reliance. The district court reviewed the stay motion de novo, applying the four-factor test of likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable injury, harm to other parties, and public interest, and denied the stay after concluding the debtors failed to satisfy the criteria.

procedurecriminal lawtorts & liability

In this case, plaintiff C-BASS filed a federal action seeking foreclosure on the defendants' real property and possession, based on an alleged mortgage default stemming from disputes over payment amounts and servicing after the loan was transferred. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that parallel state court foreclosure and related claims actions, which had been consolidated and involved the same property and parties, warranted abstention. The court granted the motion under the Colorado River doctrine. Its reasoning centered on the state court's prior exercise of jurisdiction over the res (the property), the risk of piecemeal litigation if the federal case proceeded, and the sequence in which the actions were filed, while finding that other factors did not outweigh these considerations.

propertyprocedure

The State of Connecticut sued Moody's, Fitch, and McGraw-Hill in state court under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, alleging the defendants engaged in unfair and deceptive practices by assigning lower credit ratings to public bonds than to comparable corporate debt, which increased borrowing costs for municipalities and taxpayers. The defendants removed the actions to federal court on diversity grounds, and the State moved to remand. The court granted the motions to remand, holding that the State was the real party in interest because it was exercising its sovereign authority to enforce CUTPA through claims for injunctive relief, civil penalties, restitution, and disgorgement, rather than acting merely as a nominal representative of private parties. Because a state is not a citizen for diversity jurisdiction purposes, the federal court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves plaintiffs suing multiple mortgage-related entities, including Deutsche Bank as assignee of a loan on a Hartford property, alleging violations of RESPA, CROA, and CUTPA along with common-law claims of negligent misrepresentation and fraud based on alleged misstatements in loan applications and property management promises. Deutsche Bank moved to dismiss the three claims naming it under Rule 12(b)(6). The court granted the motion, holding that the complaint contained no specific factual allegations of misconduct by Deutsche Bank itself and that an assignee does not assume direct liability for the assignor's alleged fraud, misrepresentation, or unfair practices absent an express assumption of obligations or defensive use in a suit initiated by the assignee.

business & regulatorypropertytorts & liability

The case involved a former City of West Haven Finance Director who sued the mayor, union officials, and other city employees under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, alleging that they conspired to force her removal from office by making false complaints and threats in retaliation for her implementation of new financial controls, payroll systems, and anti-fraud measures that affected their interests. The court granted motions to dismiss all claims against most defendants and dismissed the liberty deprivation and § 1985 claims against the remaining two defendants. It allowed only the substantive due process claim to proceed against two union officials, reasoning that the plaintiff adequately alleged intentional and malicious fabrications that violated a clearly established constitutional right at the time of the events, precluding qualified immunity. The dismissals were based on the absence of a protected property interest in her position, insufficient allegations of a liberty interest, and failure to state claims against the other parties.

civil rightsprocedurelabor & employment

In this case, plaintiff D. Brian Radecki sued his former employer GlaxoSmithKline, alleging that his termination violated the Family and Medical Leave Act by retaliating against him for taking medical leave and also violated Connecticut public policy. The case proceeded to trial on the FMLA and public policy claims after summary judgment was granted on a separate speech claim. During testimony about his efforts to mitigate damages, Radecki stated that he had stopped job searching because he had stage III prostate cancer with a metastatic brain lesion, a claim that had not been disclosed in discovery and that led the court to declare a mistrial due to unfair prejudice. After review of medical records showed the cancer testimony was false, the court determined that Radecki had committed perjury and concluded that dismissal with prejudice was the appropriate sanction to address the affront to the judicial process rather than lesser penalties like costs or fees.

labor & employmentprocedure

In Delise v. Metro-North Railroad, the plaintiff brought claims under the FMLA (including interference and retaliation), FELA (for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress and negligent supervision), and related state law, arising from alleged workplace issues that the plaintiff linked to the employee's suicide after requesting FMLA leave. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment in part, dismissing the FMLA interference claim because the employee received the requested leave and suffered no prejudice, the FELA intentional infliction claim (which was conceded), and the common law negligent infliction claim; it denied summary judgment on the FMLA retaliation claim and FELA negligent supervision claim due to genuine issues of material fact regarding constructive discharge, retaliatory intent, foreseeability, and whether employer negligence played any part in the death. The court also rejected arguments that the claims were preempted by the Railway Labor Act, finding they existed independently of any collective bargaining agreement, and addressed but did not fully resolve hearsay objections to the plaintiff's evidence. The decision applied standards from cases like Ragsdale v. Wolverine and Rogers v. Missouri Pacific to assess prejudice, adverse actions, and the low threshold for jury questions under FELA.

labor & employmenttorts & liabilityprocedure

Lina Lorenzi sued the Connecticut Judicial Branch and two supervisors, alleging race and national origin discrimination under Title VII against the employer, plus race discrimination under §1981, equal protection under §1983, state-law retaliation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against the individuals. The defendants moved to dismiss the §1981 claim and the emotional distress claim. The court granted the motion, dismissing the §1981 count with leave to replead and dismissing the emotional distress count in full. It reasoned that the alleged workplace conduct—such as micromanagement, demeaning comments, unfair evaluations, and denial of promotions—did not meet Connecticut’s high threshold for extreme and outrageous behavior required to state an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.

labor & employmentcivil rightstorts & liability

The case involves BNY AIS Nominees Limited, acting on behalf of several Gottex Funds, suing Marlon Quan and Stewardship Investment Advisors, LLC, in connection with the Funds' purchase of shares in a Bermuda-incorporated hedge fund managed by the defendants. The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) for improper venue based on a forum selection clause in the share application agreements requiring that any disputes be resolved exclusively in Bermuda. The court granted the motion, holding that the clause applied to the plaintiffs' claims against the defendants (despite their non-signatory status) because the claims arose out of or related to the agreements, and enforcement was not unreasonable or unjust given the parties' sophistication and the availability of a Bermuda forum.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involves a profoundly deaf special education student who sued two local boards of education and state education defendants, alleging that the schools failed to provide captioning for daily morning announcements as required under his individualized education plan. The plaintiff brought eight claims under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the First Amendment via Section 1983, and the Connecticut Constitution, stemming from due process proceedings that were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over standalone Section 504 issues. The court granted the state defendants' motion to dismiss the three IDEA-related claims against them (with leave to amend the systemic violation claim) and granted the town defendants' motion to dismiss the First Amendment claim, while denying dismissal of the remaining IDEA and state constitutional claims. The core reasoning centered on statutory limits on administrative hearing jurisdiction under the IDEA, the scope of pendent state claims, and whether the complaints adequately stated viable causes of action.

civil rightsprocedure

The case involved Susan Zipoli, as administrator of John Zipoli Jr.'s estate, suing Hartford police officers Nestor Caraballo, Edward Foster, and Jose Santiago under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs after Zipoli was shot and killed during execution of a search warrant at his apartment. The plaintiff had withdrawn claims of unreasonable use of force and claims against the City of Hartford, leaving only the medical indifference claim against the individual officers. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding no genuine issue of material fact. The undisputed facts showed that officers radioed for an ambulance immediately after the shooting, secured the scene within minutes, requested medical assistance as soon as possible, and ensured Zipoli was transported to the hospital about 14 minutes later, with no evidence of refusal to provide care or unreasonable delay attributable to the defendants.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

The case involves Arrigoni Enterprises' challenge to the Town of Durham's denial of zoning permits and variances needed to develop its industrially zoned property, including excavation and rock crushing for light industrial buildings. Arrigoni brought federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including a regulatory takings claim in Count Three alleging inverse condemnation without compensation. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss Count Three for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding the claim unripe under the Williamson County test because Arrigoni had not first pursued an available state-law inverse condemnation action under Article First, section 11 of the Connecticut Constitution to seek just compensation. The opinion notes that state administrative appeals do not substitute for such a compensation action, and Connecticut law permits an independent civil suit for takings claims.

propertyprocedurecivil rights