The case concerned Donald Fell's federal convictions in Vermont for capital kidnapping and carjacking resulting in death after he and an accomplice killed three people, including an interstate kidnapping and murder of a New York victim. A jury imposed the death penalty, the Second Circuit panel affirmed the judgment, and the en banc court denied rehearing. The concurring opinion reasoned that the Sixth Amendment requires only an impartial jury drawn from the district of the crime, with no additional federalism-based adjustments needed for Vermont's lack of a state death penalty, and that traditional rules governed the jury selection and sentencing-phase evidence issues raised. Dissenting opinions argued that federalism principles warranted further review of how local values and the absence of state capital punishment should affect federal death penalty proceedings.
This case involved a breach of contract claim by the Trust (as assignee of UBS) against Love Funding for alleged violations of representations and warranties in a 1999 mortgage-loan-purchase agreement governing commercial loans, including one secured by the Arlington Apartments. The district court, after a bench trial, ruled that the assignment of UBS's rights to the Trust was void as champertous under New York Judiciary Law § 489(1) because the primary purpose was to enable litigation, and thus entered judgment for Love Funding. On appeal, the Second Circuit determined that the outcome turned on unresolved questions of New York champerty doctrine, particularly how it applies to assignments arising in complex commercial transactions and settlements, and therefore certified those questions to the New York Court of Appeals while retaining jurisdiction. The core reasoning was that New York precedent left unclear whether an assignment made primarily to pursue indemnification or breach claims in a business context is prohibited.
This case involves David Tucker's petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his 1991 New York convictions for second-degree murder, first-degree attempted robbery, and weapons possession arising from a robbery and shooting. Tucker claimed violations of his Sixth Amendment right to confront the medical examiner who prepared the victim's autopsy report and his due process right to a fair trial based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct, improper jury instructions, and limits on cross-examination of witnesses. The district court denied the petition after reviewing the state court record, concluding that the claims lacked merit because the state courts' evidentiary and procedural rulings did not violate federal constitutional standards and the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions.
Michael Bisnett was convicted in 1986 after a jury trial in Kings County of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the first degree, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, for which he received concurrent prison sentences. He petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, asserting that he was denied due process when the trial court found him competent to stand trial despite his obstructive sleep apnea that caused him to fall asleep during proceedings, and that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of trial counsel. After reviewing the state court record, the district court denied the petition as without merit.
The case involves Humberto Herrera's pro se motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his 1999 conviction and 121-month sentence for conspiring to distribute cocaine. Herrera argued that his sentence violated Apprendi v. New Jersey because the indictment did not allege a specific drug quantity and the jury did not find quantity beyond a reasonable doubt, and that his trial and sentencing counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to pursue certain claims or a safety-valve reduction. The court denied the motion, holding that the Apprendi claim was procedurally defaulted because it was not raised on direct appeal and that Teague v. Lane barred retroactive application of the new rule on collateral review; the ineffective-assistance claims were similarly defaulted or failed for lack of prejudice, as Herrera did not show he would have qualified for relief. The court granted a certificate of appealability only on the Apprendi issues.
The case involved plaintiff Charles Flynn suing his former union local, its officers, the parent international union, and pension fund trustees under ERISA, claiming he was entitled to continued pension and annuity contributions from the local after he accepted a position with the international union in 1977 based on an alleged oral agreement. Flynn also brought state law claims against the local. The court denied Flynn's motion for partial summary judgment on an unpleaded equitable restitution claim and granted summary judgment to all defendants on the federal ERISA claims. It dismissed the state law claims as preempted by ERISA. The decision rested on findings that no ERISA fiduciary breach occurred, the alleged arrangement was not properly authorized under the plans or by the trustees, and individual restitution claims against multi-employer funds were not viable.
