Reena Raggi

The case concerned Donald Fell's federal convictions in Vermont for capital kidnapping and carjacking resulting in death after he and an accomplice killed three people, including an interstate kidnapping and murder of a New York victim. A jury imposed the death penalty, the Second Circuit panel affirmed the judgment, and the en banc court denied rehearing. The concurring opinion reasoned that the Sixth Amendment requires only an impartial jury drawn from the district of the crime, with no additional federalism-based adjustments needed for Vermont's lack of a state death penalty, and that traditional rules governed the jury selection and sentencing-phase evidence issues raised. Dissenting opinions argued that federalism principles warranted further review of how local values and the absence of state capital punishment should affect federal death penalty proceedings.

criminal lawfederal power

This case involved a breach of contract claim by the Trust (as assignee of UBS) against Love Funding for alleged violations of representations and warranties in a 1999 mortgage-loan-purchase agreement governing commercial loans, including one secured by the Arlington Apartments. The district court, after a bench trial, ruled that the assignment of UBS's rights to the Trust was void as champertous under New York Judiciary Law § 489(1) because the primary purpose was to enable litigation, and thus entered judgment for Love Funding. On appeal, the Second Circuit determined that the outcome turned on unresolved questions of New York champerty doctrine, particularly how it applies to assignments arising in complex commercial transactions and settlements, and therefore certified those questions to the New York Court of Appeals while retaining jurisdiction. The core reasoning was that New York precedent left unclear whether an assignment made primarily to pursue indemnification or breach claims in a business context is prohibited.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves David Tucker's petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his 1991 New York convictions for second-degree murder, first-degree attempted robbery, and weapons possession arising from a robbery and shooting. Tucker claimed violations of his Sixth Amendment right to confront the medical examiner who prepared the victim's autopsy report and his due process right to a fair trial based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct, improper jury instructions, and limits on cross-examination of witnesses. The district court denied the petition after reviewing the state court record, concluding that the claims lacked merit because the state courts' evidentiary and procedural rulings did not violate federal constitutional standards and the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions.

criminal lawprocedure

Michael Bisnett was convicted in 1986 after a jury trial in Kings County of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the first degree, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, for which he received concurrent prison sentences. He petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, asserting that he was denied due process when the trial court found him competent to stand trial despite his obstructive sleep apnea that caused him to fall asleep during proceedings, and that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of trial counsel. After reviewing the state court record, the district court denied the petition as without merit.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

The case involves Humberto Herrera's pro se motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his 1999 conviction and 121-month sentence for conspiring to distribute cocaine. Herrera argued that his sentence violated Apprendi v. New Jersey because the indictment did not allege a specific drug quantity and the jury did not find quantity beyond a reasonable doubt, and that his trial and sentencing counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to pursue certain claims or a safety-valve reduction. The court denied the motion, holding that the Apprendi claim was procedurally defaulted because it was not raised on direct appeal and that Teague v. Lane barred retroactive application of the new rule on collateral review; the ineffective-assistance claims were similarly defaulted or failed for lack of prejudice, as Herrera did not show he would have qualified for relief. The court granted a certificate of appealability only on the Apprendi issues.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved plaintiff Charles Flynn suing his former union local, its officers, the parent international union, and pension fund trustees under ERISA, claiming he was entitled to continued pension and annuity contributions from the local after he accepted a position with the international union in 1977 based on an alleged oral agreement. Flynn also brought state law claims against the local. The court denied Flynn's motion for partial summary judgment on an unpleaded equitable restitution claim and granted summary judgment to all defendants on the federal ERISA claims. It dismissed the state law claims as preempted by ERISA. The decision rested on findings that no ERISA fiduciary breach occurred, the alleged arrangement was not properly authorized under the plans or by the trustees, and individual restitution claims against multi-employer funds were not viable.

labor & employmentfederal power

James Webb, a New York state prisoner convicted of rape and other crimes, brought a § 1983 action against district attorneys, parole officers, prison officials, and a doctor, claiming violations of his constitutional rights stemming from the investigation and prosecution, including improper handling of his medical records via subpoena and a negligent physical examination. The court dismissed the federal claims against the moving defendants, concluding they were either premature under Heck v. Humphrey, failed to state a claim, or barred by qualified immunity. It transferred the inadequate medical treatment claims against Sullivan Correctional Facility staff to the Southern District of New York for improper venue and declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, directing their transfer to New York Supreme Court for Kings County.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

In Torgerson v. Writsel, plaintiff Ralph Torgerson brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against his neighbor Michael Writsel for false arrest and malicious prosecution arising from a July 1994 neighborhood dispute that led to Torgerson's arrest on harassment and menacing charges, which were later dismissed. The court granted summary judgment to Writsel, holding that the claims failed as a matter of law because there was no evidence that Writsel, a private citizen, acted under color of state law. The core reasoning was that merely providing information to police or prosecutors does not establish the joint action or conspiracy with state officials required for § 1983 liability, and none of the plaintiff's additional theories, such as links to a deceased relative's alleged false claims of police status or prior unrelated events, demonstrated the necessary state action.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

In Pollack v. Hobbs, Sanford Pollack, previously convicted after a guilty plea to federal arson along with conspiracy and mail fraud charges tied to kickback schemes involving union pension funds and his labor law practice, filed a pro se § 2241 petition seeking to vacate the arson conviction on the ground that the burned Florida vacation home lacked a sufficient interstate commerce nexus for federal jurisdiction. The district court denied the petition, holding it procedurally barred by the plea agreement's appeal waiver and by Pollack's failure to raise the issue on direct appeal, and also without merit because the property was used in interstate commerce as an extension of his nationwide law practice and corporate affairs. The court relied on Pollack's sworn allocution admitting the property's commercial use and on pretrial evidence of its role in his business dealings.

criminal lawprocedurefederal power

The case concerns a bankruptcy trustee's action to recover two assets—a house and a $61,824 check—that the debtor John Corcoran allegedly transferred to Mary Sullivan shortly before filing for bankruptcy while facing large environmental judgments. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's grant of summary judgment to the trustee on the check transfer, which occurred without consideration and left creditors unable to recover, under New York fraudulent conveyance law. It vacated the judgment as to the house, however, because disputed facts existed regarding the purchase price, mortgage payments, and whether adequate consideration was provided. The court applied summary judgment standards, viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and noted that the transfers were governed by state law rather than the Bankruptcy Code's one-year limit.

propertyprocedure

In Evans v. Artuz, a pro se petitioner serving sentences for second-degree murder and second-degree weapon possession sought federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, claiming he was denied the right to be present during portions of jury selection, that the trial court gave inaccurate jury instructions, and that prosecutorial statements in summation denied him a fair trial. The district court denied the petition on the merits after remand from the Second Circuit, which had vacated an earlier dismissal on timeliness grounds. The court reasoned that the absence from sidebar conferences during voir dire did not violate due process where defense counsel was present and no objection was raised, that the jury charge on justification and related defenses accurately reflected state law, and that the prosecutor's comments on the defendant's testimony did not constitute impermissible burden-shifting or tailoring arguments that rose to the level of a constitutional violation.

criminal lawprocedure

In Soares v. United States, the petitioner, serving a 188-month sentence after his 1994 conviction for conspiring and attempting to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate the conviction. He alleged ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, violations of Brady and Giglio disclosure obligations, government misconduct denying a fair trial, and intimidation of defense witnesses, all after an unsuccessful direct appeal. The court granted discovery and reviewed extensive submissions before rejecting the claims. It held that the claims were either procedurally barred or lacked merit based on the trial record, witness testimony, and prior appellate findings.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association (PBA) seeking to limit grand jury testimony by three union officials subpoenaed in a federal investigation of possible criminal conduct by New York City police officers. The PBA argued that conversations between the officials and officers were protected by attorney-client privilege or a broader union-member privilege, even though the officials were not attorneys, because the union had arranged legal representation for some officers. The court denied the motion to preclude all questioning about these conversations. It reasoned that federal courts recognize privileges only in exceptional circumstances where they serve a public interest outweighing the duty to provide evidence, no precedent supported a union privilege, and the communications did not qualify under attorney-client rules since the officials lacked legal training or involvement in providing legal services.

criminal lawprocedurelabor & employment

In Metts v. Miller, petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his 1989 New York state conviction for second-degree murder and related weapons and endangerment charges arising from a shooting at a Brooklyn residence. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and denied the petition along with a certificate of appealability. The court found that the trial judge's jury instructions regarding the unavailability of witness Lisa Mena sufficiently protected the defense, that the prosecution had no constitutional or statutory duty to disclose witness identities pretrial without a court order, and that the remaining claims did not establish a violation of federal rights warranting habeas relief.

criminal lawprocedure

Donovan Spence petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after a sentencing judge imposed a term of eight and one-third to twenty-five years for his 1992 armed robbery guilty plea, finding that his rearrest for a second robbery violated the no-arrest condition of his plea agreement that had contemplated probation upon compliance. Spence, who was later acquitted of the second robbery, argued that due process required the court to find by a preponderance of the evidence that he committed the new crime before enforcing the condition, that the sentence violated the Eighth Amendment, and that the plea agreement should be read to prohibit only further criminal conduct rather than mere rearrest. The court denied the petition, ruling that the plea interpretation claim was procedurally barred from federal review, that the due process claim sought a new procedural rule that could not be applied retroactively under Teague v. Lane, and that the Eighth Amendment claim lacked merit.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

In this case, plaintiff Mark Paz, who prevailed in New York state court on employment discrimination and retaliation claims under state law and received damages, filed a federal lawsuit seeking attorney’s fees under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Paz had never filed a complaint with the EEOC or pursued any Title VII claim in federal or state proceedings. The court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, holding that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) authorizes fees only for actions or proceedings brought under Title VII itself. The court reasoned that the statutory language limits fee recovery to Title VII claims and distinguished the Supreme Court’s decision in New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, which involved fees for state proceedings referred pursuant to a Title VII filing.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case involved patients who received care at Kings County Hospital Center suing New York state health officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the officials violated the Medicaid Act by failing to enforce state health standards at the hospital as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(9). The court had previously dismissed similar claims against the hospital and city defendants. On the state defendants' motion for summary judgment, the court granted it and denied the plaintiffs' cross-motion. The decision rested on the conclusion that the cited Medicaid provisions do not unambiguously confer privately enforceable federal rights against the state officials and that surveys and enforcement actions did not establish a basis for § 1983 liability.

healthcarefederal powercivil rights

The Brooklyn Bridge Park Coalition sued the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey to block its lease of Pier 3 to the Strober Organization for use as a building supply warehouse and headquarters, seeking declarations that the Port Authority must comply with federal environmental statutes like NEPA and CZMA as a federal agency, with New York state environmental and waterfront laws as a state agency, and that the lease exceeded the agency's powers under its interstate compact, along with related injunctions. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss all federal claims for failure to state a claim, denied the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on the ultra vires claim, and dismissed the remaining state-law claims for lack of federal jurisdiction. It reasoned that the Port Authority is a bi-state entity created by compact, not a federal agency subject to NEPA or CZMA, and that its lease for continued terminal/warehouse purposes fell within the broad powers granted by the compact without requiring additional approvals. The opinion also noted that the Port Authority was not directly subject to the cited New York state environmental review statutes in this context and that no federal agency approval was needed for the lease.

environmentfederal powerbusiness & regulatory

In this case, plaintiff Ye Wen Hong, proceeding pro se, sought the return of approximately $16,000 in currency and jewelry seized by DEA agents during her 1993 arrest on drug charges. The government had initiated administrative forfeiture proceedings against the currency under 21 U.S.C. § 881 after providing notice by certified mail to her place of incarceration and by publication, and declared the currency forfeited when no timely claim was filed. Plaintiff challenged the forfeiture on due process grounds, arguing inadequate notice and lack of a hearing, and also raised Double Jeopardy and Excessive Fines claims. The court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation to grant the government's motion to dismiss the currency claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding the administrative forfeiture procedurally proper, while directing the return of the unforfeited jewelry upon provision of an address.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

In Pitter v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of America, plaintiff George Pitter, a sales representative, sued his employer Prudential for race discrimination under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging he was denied promotions due to his race. Prudential moved to stay the federal action and compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act, citing the arbitration clause in Pitter's NASD Uniform Application for Securities Industry Registration (U-4) form and the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure, which covers disputes arising from employment with a member firm. The court granted the motion to compel arbitration, reasoning that Pitter had agreed to arbitrate such claims by signing the U-4, the NASD rules (both pre- and post-1993 amendments) require arbitration of employment disputes between associated persons and members, and the FAA mandates enforcement of this agreement, which is not an employment contract exempt under FAA § 1.

civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure