This case involved a wrongful death lawsuit brought by the family of a patient who died after suffering oxygen deprivation during outpatient shoulder surgery at a hospital. The hospital had contracted with two professional associations (Battaglia P.A. and Polk P.A.) to operate its anesthesia service, and the suit alleged direct negligence by those associations in supervising nurse anesthetists and staffing, separate from claims against the individual physicians. The Supreme Court of Texas held that the professional associations could be held directly liable for negligence and jointly and severally liable based on a joint venture, even though the trial court had directed a verdict for one physician individually and the jury did not find the other negligent in his individual capacity, and that there was legally sufficient evidence to support those findings. The court further held that the trial court had miscalculated prejudgment interest under the applicable statute (former article 4590i) when accounting for prior settlements by other parties. It therefore reversed the court of appeals in part and remanded for recalculation of interest.
The case involved two sisters who were raped and assaulted by a monk at a California Buddhist temple and sued the temple's operator (Theravada Buddhist Corp.), two monks (including Chon Tri), and a related Houston center on theories of negligence and conspiracy. The jury found negligence by some defendants and conspiracy by all but one, but the trial court awarded damages only for negligence against the corporation (10%) and one monk (5%), with none for conspiracy or individual liability against Chon Tri. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that omitted elements of conspiracy are deemed found by the court under Tex. R. Civ. P. 279 to support the judgment, and the record showed no error in imposing liability only on the corporation for its agent's negligence rather than on the agent individually.
The case involved a mandamus petition by the Texas Association of School Boards and its Risk Management Fund to transfer a breach-of-contract and related claims suit filed by Benavides Independent School District from Duval County to Travis County. The relators relied on a venue clause in an interlocal participation agreement providing risk coverage, arguing that the agreement qualified as a "major transaction" under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 15.020 and therefore required suit in Travis County. The trial court and court of appeals declined to enforce the clause. The Texas Supreme Court denied mandamus relief, holding that section 15.020 did not apply because the agreement was not a major transaction; the consideration exchanged was the school district's annual contribution of roughly $42,000, not the $17 million in coverage limits, and therefore fell below the statute's $1 million threshold.
This case involves a worker employed by a temporary employment agency who was injured while assigned to perform tasks at a client company's facility and subsequently sued both the agency and the client under common-law theories. The trial court granted summary judgment to both defendants on the ground that the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act’s exclusive remedy provision barred the claims, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the judgment as to the temporary employment agency because it had obtained workers’ compensation coverage and the worker conceded its employer status. However, the Court reversed as to the client company and remanded, holding that the client failed to conclusively establish it was “covered by workers’ compensation insurance coverage” as required by the Act’s exclusive remedy provision, even assuming it qualified as a co-employer under the Wingfoot precedent. The decision turns on the statutory requirement that an employer must show actual coverage to invoke the bar on tort claims.
The case concerned whether a statutory probate court in Hidalgo County could use its discretionary transfer authority under section 5B of the Texas Probate Code to bring a wrongful death and survival action from a Harris County district court into itself, where the estate of the deceased worker was being administered, or whether section 15.007 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code barred the transfer. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals and held that section 15.007 controls, so the probate court could not effectuate the transfer unless venue in Hidalgo County would independently satisfy the general venue rules of section 15.002. The Court reasoned that the plain language of section 15.007 expressly provides that chapter 15 venue provisions prevail over conflicting Probate Code venue rules in suits for personal injury, death, or property damage brought by or against an executor or administrator. It further concluded that allowing the transfer would improperly override the mandatory venue limitations designed to prevent forum shopping in such tort actions.
This habeas corpus case arose from a divorce judgment that awarded the wife post-divorce spousal maintenance, which the husband failed to pay. While the divorce decree was on appeal and had not been superseded, the trial court held the husband in both civil and criminal contempt and issued a commitment order. The court of appeals later reversed the spousal maintenance award on the ground that the wife had not rebutted the statutory presumption against maintenance. The Texas Supreme Court held that both the trial court and court of appeals had authority to enforce the unsuperseded final judgment during the appeal, but the reversal of the underlying award rendered further enforcement of the contempt provisions improper. The Court therefore vacated the commitment order and granted habeas relief, while noting that the trial court retained discretion to impose criminal contempt for violations occurring before the reversal.