Priscilla Richman Owen

This case involved a wrongful death lawsuit brought by the family of a patient who died after suffering oxygen deprivation during outpatient shoulder surgery at a hospital. The hospital had contracted with two professional associations (Battaglia P.A. and Polk P.A.) to operate its anesthesia service, and the suit alleged direct negligence by those associations in supervising nurse anesthetists and staffing, separate from claims against the individual physicians. The Supreme Court of Texas held that the professional associations could be held directly liable for negligence and jointly and severally liable based on a joint venture, even though the trial court had directed a verdict for one physician individually and the jury did not find the other negligent in his individual capacity, and that there was legally sufficient evidence to support those findings. The court further held that the trial court had miscalculated prejudgment interest under the applicable statute (former article 4590i) when accounting for prior settlements by other parties. It therefore reversed the court of appeals in part and remanded for recalculation of interest.

healthcaretorts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved two sisters who were raped and assaulted by a monk at a California Buddhist temple and sued the temple's operator (Theravada Buddhist Corp.), two monks (including Chon Tri), and a related Houston center on theories of negligence and conspiracy. The jury found negligence by some defendants and conspiracy by all but one, but the trial court awarded damages only for negligence against the corporation (10%) and one monk (5%), with none for conspiracy or individual liability against Chon Tri. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that omitted elements of conspiracy are deemed found by the court under Tex. R. Civ. P. 279 to support the judgment, and the record showed no error in imposing liability only on the corporation for its agent's negligence rather than on the agent individually.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a mandamus petition by the Texas Association of School Boards and its Risk Management Fund to transfer a breach-of-contract and related claims suit filed by Benavides Independent School District from Duval County to Travis County. The relators relied on a venue clause in an interlocal participation agreement providing risk coverage, arguing that the agreement qualified as a "major transaction" under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 15.020 and therefore required suit in Travis County. The trial court and court of appeals declined to enforce the clause. The Texas Supreme Court denied mandamus relief, holding that section 15.020 did not apply because the agreement was not a major transaction; the consideration exchanged was the school district's annual contribution of roughly $42,000, not the $17 million in coverage limits, and therefore fell below the statute's $1 million threshold.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involves a worker employed by a temporary employment agency who was injured while assigned to perform tasks at a client company's facility and subsequently sued both the agency and the client under common-law theories. The trial court granted summary judgment to both defendants on the ground that the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act’s exclusive remedy provision barred the claims, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the judgment as to the temporary employment agency because it had obtained workers’ compensation coverage and the worker conceded its employer status. However, the Court reversed as to the client company and remanded, holding that the client failed to conclusively establish it was “covered by workers’ compensation insurance coverage” as required by the Act’s exclusive remedy provision, even assuming it qualified as a co-employer under the Wingfoot precedent. The decision turns on the statutory requirement that an employer must show actual coverage to invoke the bar on tort claims.

labor & employment

The case concerned whether a statutory probate court in Hidalgo County could use its discretionary transfer authority under section 5B of the Texas Probate Code to bring a wrongful death and survival action from a Harris County district court into itself, where the estate of the deceased worker was being administered, or whether section 15.007 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code barred the transfer. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals and held that section 15.007 controls, so the probate court could not effectuate the transfer unless venue in Hidalgo County would independently satisfy the general venue rules of section 15.002. The Court reasoned that the plain language of section 15.007 expressly provides that chapter 15 venue provisions prevail over conflicting Probate Code venue rules in suits for personal injury, death, or property damage brought by or against an executor or administrator. It further concluded that allowing the transfer would improperly override the mandatory venue limitations designed to prevent forum shopping in such tort actions.

proceduretorts & liability

This habeas corpus case arose from a divorce judgment that awarded the wife post-divorce spousal maintenance, which the husband failed to pay. While the divorce decree was on appeal and had not been superseded, the trial court held the husband in both civil and criminal contempt and issued a commitment order. The court of appeals later reversed the spousal maintenance award on the ground that the wife had not rebutted the statutory presumption against maintenance. The Texas Supreme Court held that both the trial court and court of appeals had authority to enforce the unsuperseded final judgment during the appeal, but the reversal of the underlying award rendered further enforcement of the contempt provisions improper. The Court therefore vacated the commitment order and granted habeas relief, while noting that the trial court retained discretion to impose criminal contempt for violations occurring before the reversal.

family lawprocedure

The case concerned two partial assignees under a 1937 oil and gas lease covering adjacent tracts, where Ridge Oil shut in the producing wells on its tract for about ninety days, obtained new leases from the mineral owners of that tract effective March 1998, and thereby sought to terminate the old lease as to both tracts. Guinn Investments, the assignee for the adjoining tract, sued to quiet title, declare the lease still valid, and recover damages or a constructive trust, alleging tortious interference and fraud. The Texas Supreme Court held that the temporary-cessation doctrine applies to multiple lessees under one lease, that production permanently ceased when the new leases became effective, that Guinn was not conducting operations sufficient to sustain the lease, and that Guinn therefore had no viable claims; it reversed the court of appeals and rendered judgment for Ridge.

propertytorts & liability

This case involved a challenge by electric utilities CenterPoint Energy and AEP to a Texas Public Utility Commission rule on recovering carrying costs for stranded costs after the 1999 partial deregulation of the electric power industry under PURA. The utilities argued that interest on uneconomic generation assets should accrue from the start of competition on January 1, 2002, rather than from the later date of final true-up proceedings as set by the Commission's Rule 25.263(l)(3). The court examined the statutory scheme allowing full recovery of net stranded costs, including financing costs during the recovery period, and the Legislature's intent to compensate utilities for investments made under prior regulation. It addressed related issues like mitigation efforts but focused on interpreting when carrying costs become recoverable to align with the transition to a competitive market.

business & regulatory

The case involved a dispute over insurance coverage for environmental contamination claims against Louis Dreyfus Natural Gas Corp., a subsidiary insured under a pollution liability policy issued by AIU Insurance Company. Dreyfus sued AIU in Hidalgo County, Texas, for declaratory judgment, breach of contract, and related claims, despite a forum-selection clause in the policy requiring all litigation to occur in New York under New York law. The trial court denied AIU's motion to dismiss based on the clause, and the court of appeals denied mandamus relief. The Texas Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus, ordering dismissal of the Texas suit, because the undisputed facts showed the trial court clearly abused its discretion in refusing to enforce the clause. The court's reasoning relied on U.S. Supreme Court precedents establishing that forum-selection clauses are enforceable absent fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining power, and it found no such exception applied here.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This Texas Supreme Court case consolidated nine condemnation proceedings in which gas utility companies sought to acquire pipeline easements across private land under eminent domain authority. The central issues were whether the statutory requirement in Texas Property Code section 21.012 that a condemnor must be 'unable to agree' with the owner on damages before filing suit is jurisdictional, and whether the companies had met that requirement by making multiple offers based on appraisals that the landowners rejected or countered with much higher demands. The court held that the 'unable to agree' provision is not jurisdictional and that the companies satisfied it through evidence of failed negotiations focused on the amount of compensation. The decision affirmed some lower court rulings upholding the proceedings, reversed others, and remanded certain cases for further action consistent with the opinion.

propertyprocedure

In Binur v. Jacobo, a medical malpractice suit, plaintiff Donna Jacobo alleged that physician Nir Binur failed to obtain her informed consent for a prophylactic bilateral mastectomy because he told her she would definitely develop breast cancer. After a jury mistrial, the trial court granted summary judgment for Binur; the court of appeals reversed, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed that decision and rendered judgment for Binur. The Court held that while an erroneous prognosis might support a negligence claim, it cannot serve as the basis for an informed consent claim, which is limited to whether the physician disclosed the risks of the procedure itself, and Jacobo had not pursued any other claims.

healthcaretorts & liability

In this case, successors to the original lessors under three oil and gas leases from the 1920s and 1930s sued the current lessees, claiming the leases had terminated because of intermittent periods of non-production lasting 30 to 153 days. The Supreme Court of Texas assumed without deciding that the leases terminated but held that the lessees nonetheless acquired identical fee simple determinable interests in the mineral estates by adverse possession. The court reasoned that the lessees' open and continuous production and operation of the wells for the statutory periods satisfied the requirements for adverse possession of the mineral interests even after any automatic termination of the leases, and it therefore reversed the lower courts' judgments for the lessors.

property

The case concerned a franchise ordinance under which the City of Edinburg granted Rio Grande Valley Gas Company (later merged into Southern Union) the right to operate natural gas pipelines and sell gas in exchange for a 4% tax on gross income from gas sales within city limits. After deregulation allowed affiliated companies to sell spot-market gas directly to large consumers in the city, the City sought to collect the tax on those sales by arguing that the franchisee and its affiliates constituted a single business enterprise. The Texas Supreme Court held that the tax did not apply to the affiliates' direct sales. It reasoned that the ordinance taxed only the franchisee's own gross income from its sales, and Texas corporate law (including the Business Corporation Act) does not permit treating separate entities as one for tax purposes absent the specific conditions for veil-piercing.

business & regulatorytaxes

This case arose from a product liability suit in which Ronald Jackson was injured when a compound hunting bow manufactured by Golden Eagle Archery struck him in the eye, causing fractures, vision loss, and other harm; the jury found inadequate warnings but no design defect and awarded damages for medical care, pain and anguish, vision impairment, disfigurement, and lost earnings, but zero for physical impairment other than loss of vision. Jackson appealed the zero award as against the great weight of the evidence, and the court of appeals ordered a new trial. The Texas Supreme Court reversed that decision and remanded for a new factual sufficiency review, holding that the lower court had not properly applied the standard from Pool v. Ford Motor Co. when damage categories may overlap and the jury was instructed not to duplicate awards. The Court emphasized that appellate courts must detail relevant evidence, consider the jury's credibility determinations, and avoid substituting their judgment, while accounting for the possibility that other awarded categories already compensated for overlapping losses.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved Marleny Alvarado, who was hired by Tandem Staffing, a temporary employment agency, and assigned to work at Web Assembly, where she was injured operating a machine despite Tandem's policy against it. Alvarado received workers' compensation benefits under Tandem's policy and then sued Tandem for negligence, but Tandem sought summary judgment under the Texas Workers' Compensation Act's exclusive remedy provision. The trial court granted summary judgment to Tandem, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that a worker can have only one employer. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, concluding that an employee can have more than one employer under the Act when both entities exercise control and maintain coverage, so Tandem was protected as Alvarado's employer or co-employer.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

This case involved whether an auto insurance policy provided liability coverage for an accident involving a vehicle taken without permission from its owner as a temporary substitute for the insured's disabled truck. The Supreme Court of Texas held that there was no coverage under the policy. The court reasoned that the policy's exclusion for using a vehicle without a reasonable belief of entitlement to do so applied, and the definition of a "temporary substitute" vehicle required that it be used with permission or a reasonable belief thereof, consistent with prior standard policy forms and common understanding. The trial court's ruling denying coverage was reinstated, resulting in the plaintiff receiving no benefits from the policy.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

This case concerned the termination of both parents' rights to three young children after the Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services removed them from the home and a jury trial was held. The trial court entered judgment terminating the parent-child relationships, but a divided court of appeals reversed on the ground that the jury charge omitted an instruction requiring a finding that termination was in the children's best interest and treated the omission as fundamental error that could be raised for the first time on appeal. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and rendered judgment terminating the rights, holding that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 279 required supplying the omitted best-interest finding in support of the judgment because it was either express or deemed, that the concept of fundamental error could not bypass the procedural rule, and that applying the rule did not violate due process. The Court further concluded that other claimed errors in the charge and claims of ineffective assistance of counsel did not require reversal.

family lawprocedure

This case concerned Monsanto's employee stock option incentive plans and whether the sale of its wholly-owned subsidiary Fisher to another company constituted a 'termination of employment' for Fisher workers who remained in their jobs. The employees sued for breach of contract, conversion, and fraud after Monsanto determined that the sale ended their eligibility under the plans, causing some options to expire or require exercise within shortened timeframes. The trial court granted summary judgment to Monsanto, but the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court held that the plan language was unambiguous, defining termination as discontinuance of employment other than by transfer, and that the sale triggered termination because the workers were no longer employed by Monsanto or a subsidiary. It therefore rendered judgment for Monsanto on the contract claim while remanding the conversion and fraud claims.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

This case involved a law firm suing its former associate and another lawyer after the associate referred a large personal injury matter arising from a helicopter crash to the other lawyer, who then split fees with a third firm, without disclosing personal connections or securing the firm's involvement. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants on all claims, but the court of appeals reversed in part on breach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud. The Texas Supreme Court held that a law firm associate owes a fiduciary duty to the employer not to personally profit from referring a matter to another firm or lawyer absent the employer's agreement, and affirmed the reversal while remanding those claims. The court reasoned that the duty arises from the employment relationship and prevents the associate from realizing financial gain or advantage through such referrals without consent.

business & regulatorylabor & employmenttorts & liability

The case concerned whether a term life insurance policy obtained through an ERISA-governed employee benefit plan was community property under Texas law and whether ERISA preempted a surviving spouse's claims that her deceased husband committed constructive fraud on the community by changing the beneficiary designation and that a constructive trust should be imposed on the proceeds. The Supreme Court of Texas held that the policy was community property but that ERISA preempted the wife's state-law fraud and constructive-trust claims, reversing the portion of the court of appeals' judgment that permitted her to recover the proceeds. The court reasoned that ERISA's broad preemption of state laws relating to employee benefit plans, as confirmed by Supreme Court precedent such as Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, displaced the wife's community-property remedies even though the policy premiums were paid with community funds during the marriage.

family lawpropertyfederal power