Deference to government powerSkepticism of government power
Requires IRS to provide statutory notice before summoning third-party records, limiting government investigative reach without procedural compliance [8]. Viewtech, Inc. v. United States ↗
In Vegas Diamond Properties, LLC v. FDIC, two Nevada property owners sued La Jolla Bank (later placed in FDIC receivership) after obtaining loans allegedly used in a fraudulent scheme tied to an unrelated development project; they sought a temporary restraining order in state court to block a trustee's sale of their properties, and the FDIC moved to dissolve it after removal to federal court. The district court granted the FDIC's motion under FIRREA's anti-injunction provision, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(j), and the owners appealed. The Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot because the properties were sold during the proceedings, holding that no live controversy remained and that the case did not meet narrow exceptions such as issues "capable of repetition yet evading review," since the plaintiffs could still pursue damages claims through the administrative process.
business & regulatorypropertyprocedurefederal power
The case involved the IRS issuing a summons to Wells Fargo Bank for records related to Viewtech, Inc.'s bank account as part of efforts to collect approximately $3 million in unpaid federal income taxes assessed against Jung Kwak. Viewtech and Kwak filed a motion to quash the summons, arguing that 26 U.S.C. § 7609 required the IRS to provide them notice, which would have allowed them to challenge it in court. The district court dismissed the motion for lack of standing under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Applying the framework from Ip v. United States, the court held that exceptions under § 7609(c)(2)(D) applied because of Kwak's substantial ownership interest in Viewtech, his role as an officer and employee, and the significant financial intertwining between them, including transfers of funds, meaning neither was entitled to notice. As a result, Viewtech and Kwak lacked standing to quash the summons.
The case concerned Fulton Leroy Washington, who was convicted in 1996 of federal drug offenses involving PCP manufacturing and sentenced to life imprisonment based on judicial fact-finding at sentencing. After an unsuccessful direct appeal and two prior motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, Washington filed a new motion styled as a Rule 60(b)(4) challenge claiming defects in his original habeas proceedings, including Confrontation Clause violations and actual innocence. The Ninth Circuit held that the motion was in substance a successive § 2255 petition that did not satisfy the gatekeeping requirements of § 2255(h) for new evidence or new constitutional rules, and therefore the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider it. The court vacated the district court's denial and remanded with instructions to dismiss the motion.
The case involved plaintiffs Cecil Ingram, a disabled tenant in a wheelchair, and the Fair Housing Council suing landlord Armine Oroudjian and manager Antony Abelyan under the Fair Housing Act and California law, alleging discrimination after an eviction attempt via unlawful detainer proceedings that Ingram ultimately won in state court. The parties settled the federal claims for modest payments, after which plaintiffs moved for attorney fees of over $88,000; the district court awarded about $30,000 after reducing hours for certain work and lowering requested rates. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, ruling that the district court did not abuse its discretion by considering settlement negotiations to assess success, disallowing fees for unnecessary briefing on Younger abstention, and determining reasonable hourly rates based on market evidence and its own familiarity with local fees.
Federal prisoner Gerson Nunez filed a pro se Bivens action alleging that a random strip search conducted by prison staff violated his Fourth Amendment rights and that related grievances implicated his First Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding that Nunez had not exhausted administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act and, alternatively, that the Fourth Amendment claim lacked merit. The Ninth Circuit held that exhaustion was excused for the Fourth Amendment claim because prison officials failed to provide a requested program statement needed to prepare a proper grievance, but concluded that the claim failed on the merits because the search was reasonable under the circumstances. The court assumed without deciding that Nunez had alleged a First Amendment claim but held that he had not exhausted administrative remedies for it and affirmed dismissal on that basis.
In Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, Claude Cassirer sued Spain and the Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation to recover a Camille Pissarro painting allegedly confiscated from his grandmother by Nazi agents in 1939 and later acquired by the Foundation for display in Spain. The Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal regarding challenges to personal jurisdiction, standing, and justiciability due to lack of appellate jurisdiction. However, it exercised jurisdiction over the sovereign immunity issue under the collateral order doctrine and held that the expropriation exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act applies even when the defendant foreign state did not itself expropriate the property, and that the defendants' commercial activities in the United States satisfied the statute's requirements. The court remanded the case to the district court to determine whether an exhaustion requirement should be imposed.
propertyprocedurefederal power
Affiliations
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit — appointed by George W. Bush
