Barbara Milano Keenan

David Ligon sued Goochland County under the whistleblower protection provision of the Virginia Fraud Against Taxpayers Act, alleging he was terminated from his job in the county's Building and Grounds Department because he reported his supervisor's misuse of county property and employees for personal projects. The circuit court sustained the county's demurrer and dismissed the claim. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, ruling that the doctrine of sovereign immunity protects the county and its political subdivisions from liability unless a statute contains an express waiver. The court held that the VFATA lacks any such explicit waiver allowing employees of the Commonwealth or its subdivisions to sue their employers for retaliatory discharge.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved a dispute among members of an LLC formed to develop water rights, in which the plaintiffs claimed that one member's attempt to exercise an option to purchase land within a protected area breached the non-compete clause of the operating agreement. The parties' agreement required arbitration of any dispute regarding the LLC, and the arbitrators awarded the land option to the member subject to granting the LLC an easement for water rights. The circuit court confirmed the award, and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed on appeal, holding that the broad arbitration clause authorized the arbitrators to interpret the clause and that they did not exceed their powers under the Federal Arbitration Act merely by adopting a particular interpretation of its terms.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved Ronald Lee Jones's conviction for unreasonably refusing a blood or breath test under Virginia's implied consent law after his arrest for driving under the influence. The central issues were whether a defendant's refusal to perform field sobriety tests could be considered as evidence supporting probable cause for the DUI arrest and whether the evidence overall was sufficient to establish such probable cause. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the refusal was admissible as circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt and that the officer's observations—including the odor of alcohol, glassy and red eyes, slurred speech, and inconsistent statements—combined with the refusal provided probable cause. The Court reasoned that prior precedent permitted similar refusals to be treated as tacit admissions in other contexts, supporting their use in the probable cause analysis.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether Bea Antisdel, appointed as administrator of her deceased son's estate solely to pursue a wrongful death action under Virginia Code § 8.01-50, had standing to assert survival claims for personal injuries on behalf of the estate. The circuit court granted the defendants' pleas in bar, ruling that Antisdel lacked standing because her appointment order expressly limited her authority to wrongful death claims and declined to retroactively expand that authority via a nunc pro tunc order. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, holding that the clerk's appointment accurately reflected Antisdel's own limited request and oath, and that nunc pro tunc relief cannot create fiduciary powers that never existed. The Court also rejected arguments that the defendants waived the standing issue or that the clerk lacked authority to limit the appointment, noting that survival and wrongful death claims are distinct and that this action was separate from prior nonsuited proceedings.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involved Douglas Michael Brown, Jr., who was convicted of involuntary manslaughter after fleeing police in a high-speed chase following traffic violations, during which a pursuing officer's cruiser struck and killed another driver at an intersection. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the conviction on appeal from the Court of Appeals, holding that the evidence was sufficient to establish that Brown's conduct was the proximate cause of the death. The court reasoned that Brown's criminal negligence in eluding officers at speeds up to 110 mph set a foreseeable chain of events in motion, and the officer's pursuit actions were an intervening cause rather than a superseding one that would break the causal link. The analysis applied common-law elements of involuntary manslaughter without addressing the reasonableness of the police conduct itself.

criminal law

This case involved Chauncey Lamont Montague's appeal of his convictions for possession of cocaine, possession of a firearm by a felon, possession of a firearm with cocaine, and assault and battery on a law enforcement officer. Montague challenged the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained after police officers approached him at an apartment complex, asked for identifying information, and checked for outstanding warrants, arguing that the interaction constituted an unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment. He also contested the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his assault conviction. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, holding that the encounter was consensual because Montague voluntarily provided information and did not attempt to leave, and that the evidence of Montague pushing and striking an officer during the arrest was sufficient to establish assault and battery with intent to harm. The court reasoned that the officers' actions in obtaining warrant information while waiting did not transform the voluntary interaction into a seizure.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

This case involved the interpretation of an inter vivos trust agreement directing that, after the grantor's and her husband's deaths, the remaining assets be divided into equal shares for the grantor's three siblings and a church scholarship fund, with a lapse provision stating that if any sibling failed to survive the grantor, that share would go to the church. The grantor was survived by two siblings who later predeceased the husband, leading their children (the nephews) to claim the shares as heirs while the church argued the shares had lapsed. The circuit court ruled in favor of the church, finding the shares lapsed because the siblings did not survive the husband. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plain language of the trust vested the remainder interests in the siblings at the grantor's death and that the instruction to divide assets upon the husband's death fixed only the time of possession and distribution, not vesting.

property

The case involved whether a circuit court order under Code § 18.2-370.5, permitting a convicted sexually violent offender to enter public school property to attend events involving his stepson, violated Article VIII, Section 7 of the Virginia Constitution by infringing on school boards' supervisory authority over public schools. John Doe had been convicted in 1999 of taking indecent liberties with a child and sought court permission to access school grounds under specified conditions after his registration requirements were modified. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the circuit court's order granting the petition and remanded the case, holding that the statute must be interpreted to allow the court to lift the statutory ban in whole or in part but then permit the school board to decide whether and under what circumstances the offender may enter school property. The court reasoned that this construction avoids a constitutional violation by preserving the school board's authority while also respecting the statute's involvement of courts in these decisions, and it rejected constructions that would allow courts to override school board or private property owners' control.

criminal lawproperty

The case involved a dispute between adjacent landowners on Smith Mountain Lake over whether a dock and beach area constructed by the Delore family encroached on an easement granting the Anderson family a right of way to access the lake from their property. The Andersons sought an injunction requiring removal of the structures, alleging interference within their extended lot lines based on deeds from a common grantor. The circuit court denied the injunction after finding no interference with the Andersons' reasonable use of the easement, and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, holding that the Andersons failed to present evidence proving the easement's lateral dimensions or any encroachment, and that local zoning ordinances created no private right of action.

property

This case was a medical malpractice action in which plaintiff Bryan Graham alleged that orthopedic surgeon Dr. Randolph Cook negligently placed a screw into his hip joint during fracture repair surgery, causing erosion of the femoral head that required later removal and resurfacing procedures. The circuit court permitted the defense to introduce certain statements from treating physicians' records and testimony about observations and avascular necrosis, limited the plaintiff's cross-examination of one physician, and restricted closing argument that invited the jury to compare x-ray images without supporting expert testimony. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the judgment, reasoning that the challenged statements either reflected contemporaneous observations or satisfied the reasonable medical probability standard under Code § 8.01-399(B), that evidentiary and argument rulings fell within the trial court's discretion to avoid unsubstantiated inferences, and that no prejudice or error was shown.

torts & liabilityprocedurehealthcare

The case involved Fairfax County's zoning administrator seeking enforcement of a consent decree against property owners for violating a zoning ordinance by maintaining a junk yard with inoperable vehicles and debris on their land. The parties had settled the dispute with a consent decree requiring compliance within a set period and imposing $100 daily fines for violations, but after the owners complied late the circuit court reduced the fines from $20,600 to $3,500 on grounds that full payment would constitute an improper penalty. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding that the consent decree was a final judgment that became unmodifiable after 21 days under Rule 1:1 and could not be altered by the court to reduce the agreed fines.

propertyprocedure

The case involved a dispute over whether an automobile insurance policy issued by Virginia Farm Bureau allowed intrapolicy stacking of uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) bodily injury coverage across three vehicles listed in the policy. An injured minor, who qualified as a first-class insured under her father's policy, sought a declaratory judgment that she was entitled to the combined limits totaling $850,000 after an accident involving underinsured vehicles. The circuit court had ruled that coverage was limited to $550,000. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the policy's anti-stacking language was ambiguous because the declarations page listed different per-person limits for the three vehicles, and this ambiguity had to be construed in favor of the insured. As a result, the court reversed the limit imposed by the lower court and entered final judgment declaring that the total available UM/UIM coverage was $850,000.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

This case involved a legal malpractice claim brought by Leo Williams against his attorneys after they failed to timely file a personal injury lawsuit in Virginia following a 2003 car accident involving multiple drivers. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment to the defendants, ruling that Williams's decision not to pursue a possible action in Maryland was a superseding cause that broke the chain of proximate causation from the attorneys' negligence. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding that the attorneys' negligence set in motion the circumstances requiring consideration of a Maryland suit and that one of the tortfeasors could not be sued there, so Williams's inaction did not sever the causal link as a matter of law. The court remanded the case for further proceedings on remaining issues like proximate causation and mitigation of damages.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case concerned a Virginia state employee, Maynard Quesenberry, who was terminated by Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University after a Group III disciplinary notice for violating the university's Anti-Discrimination and Harassment Prevention Policy during a conversation with a female student about a non-university boxing club fundraiser. A hearing officer upheld the termination based on findings that the employee's conduct created a hostile environment by unreasonably interfering with the student's work performance. The circuit court and Court of Appeals reversed, finding the decision contradictory to law by relying on Title VII sexual harassment standards. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed those rulings, holding that judicial review under Code § 2.2-3006(B) is limited to legal errors and does not extend to factual findings or policy consistency, so no basis existed to overturn the hearing officer.

labor & employmentprocedurecivil rights

The case involved owners of a Virginia Beach entertainment club who challenged a city noise ordinance as unconstitutionally vague on its face and as applied to their business, after receiving citations for playing music at certain volumes. The circuit court upheld the ordinance, but the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding the ordinance unconstitutional. The court reasoned that the ordinance's prohibitions on "unreasonably loud, disturbing and unnecessary noise" and noise that disturbs "reasonable persons," without objective standards or clear definitions, fail to provide fair notice of prohibited conduct and grant excessive discretion to law enforcement officers. The court further concluded that the vague language permeates the entire ordinance, preventing severance of the invalid portions.

criminal law

In Murphy v. Commonwealth, the defendant faced charges for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and transporting marijuana into Virginia. He agreed to plead guilty to one charge and testify against his co-defendant at a preliminary hearing in exchange for dismissal of the transportation charge. After providing voluntary testimony, Murphy moved to dismiss his indictment under Code § 18.2-262, claiming transactional immunity. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the statute grants immunity only to witnesses whose testimony is compelled, not to those who testify voluntarily pursuant to a plea agreement, and affirmed the conviction on that basis.

criminal law

This case involved a dispute over ownership of a rare 1776 printed broadside copy of the Declaration of Independence that was discovered in an attic in Wiscasset, Maine (formerly Pownalborough). The State of Maine, on behalf of the town, claimed the document was a public record that had been wrongfully converted and sought its return from Virginia resident Richard L. Adams, who had purchased it through dealers for $475,000; Adams filed a suit to quiet title asserting his ownership. The circuit court ruled in Adams's favor, and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, holding that the broadside did not qualify as a public record under either common law or Maine statutory definitions because town clerks were not required to retain the original after transcribing its text, and that Maine failed to prove any conversion by the family in whose possession it was later found.

property

This case concerned whether a 30-year option to repurchase property, contained in a deed of trust securing a loan from AHC to the Bustilloses, qualified as a covenant running with the land enforceable against later owners. The Bustilloses refinanced the loan, after which a different lender foreclosed and Beeren & Barry Investments purchased the property at auction; B&B then sued for declaratory relief to quiet title, contending the option did not bind successors. The circuit court held the option was an enforceable restrictive covenant, but the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed. The court reasoned that the option language conditioned exercise solely on events personal to the Bustilloses—their death or election to sell to a prospective purchaser—and made no provision for foreclosure sales, indicating no intent for the right to run with the land and rendering it unenforceable against B&B.

propertyprocedure

This case involves a defamation claim brought by Cynthia Hyland against her former employer, Raytheon Technical Services Company, and its president, alleging that statements in her performance evaluation falsely blamed her for contract bid losses and financial shortfalls. After a prior appeal limited the claim to two actionable statements, the circuit court granted summary judgment to the defendants on remand, finding the statements true. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding that summary judgment was improper because Hyland had not unequivocally admitted the truth of the statements or their implications, and the question of falsity must go to a jury. The court reasoned that while judges decide if statements are opinions or facts, juries resolve factual disputes over falsity unless the plaintiff concedes the issue outright, and the statements must be considered as a whole.

torts & liabilitylabor & employmentprocedure

The case involved Richard L. Britt's conviction for grand larceny after he and an accomplice broke into a convenience store and fled with some packaged tobacco products. The sole issue on appeal was whether the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence that the value of the goods taken was at least $200, the statutory threshold separating grand larceny from petit larceny. The court held the evidence insufficient because the store owner's valuation of $410.59 included cigarette packs found on the store floor, yet the record contained no proof that Britt or his accomplice had seized or moved those items. Without evidence of asportation or dominion over the floor items, their value could not be counted toward the $200 minimum, leaving only speculation about the value of the goods actually removed from the premises. The court therefore reversed the grand larceny conviction and remanded the case for a possible new trial on petit larceny.

criminal law