The case involved the Louisiana Crisis Assistance Center (LCAC), a nonprofit representing indigent capital defendants, suing its former unpaid law clerk, Alexandria Marzano-Lesnevich, for breach of fiduciary duty and contract after she published essays and planned a novel drawing on her experiences at LCAC, which allegedly disclosed confidential client information. The defendant filed a special motion to strike under Louisiana's anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that her writings constituted protected speech on public issues like the death penalty and that the plaintiff could not show a probability of success on the merits, including because an injunction would be an unconstitutional prior restraint. The court denied the motion, finding that the defendant had made a prima facie showing of protected speech but that the plaintiff had met its burden by demonstrating that at least some of the published information was confidential and not publicly known, thus establishing a probability of success without violating First Amendment principles.
This case involves a contractual dispute between Carleton Construction, the prime subcontractor on a Louisiana apartment project, and Southern States Plumbing, its plumbing subcontractor. After Southern States' sub-subcontractor failed to pay prevailing wages, the Department of Labor assessed penalties under the Davis-Bacon Act; Carleton paid a portion of the assessments and then sued Southern States and its owner to recover those payments plus fees under indemnity clauses in both the original Subcontract and a later Compromise Agreement. Carleton moved for summary judgment, arguing the indemnity provisions applied and had not been released. The court granted the motion, holding that the Subcontract's indemnity rights were expressly preserved by the Compromise Agreement and that Southern States' defenses under Louisiana contract law lacked merit.
The case involves a motion by defendants Gregory D. Frost and Breazeale, Sachse & Wilson, LLP to withdraw an adversary proceeding from bankruptcy court to the U.S. District Court. The underlying claims, brought by the disbursing agent on behalf of a debtor healthcare company, allege legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, fraud, and conspiracy related to the handling of the debtor's assets before and after its Chapter 11 filing. The district court granted the motion to withdraw the reference, holding that the claims constitute non-core proceedings with no inherent connection to bankruptcy administration. The court reasoned that the defendants are entitled to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment, which bankruptcy courts cannot conduct, and that judicial efficiency supports district court resolution of both core and non-core claims to avoid de novo review.
In Lonatro v. Orleans Levee District, landowners on Bellaire Drive sued the Orleans Levee District and the Southeast Louisiana Flood Protection Authority-East after the defendants removed fences, trees, and other items from their properties to enable U.S. Army Corps of Engineers flood control work on the 17th Street Canal levee following Hurricane Katrina; the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and compensation in consolidated state court suits that were later removed to federal court. The defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), contending that a St. Julien servitude over the levee gave them authority to grant rights-of-entry and barred the claims, and alternatively invoking res judicata or law of the case. The court denied the motion, holding that even if a servitude existed it was unclear whether it extended onto the plaintiffs' land six feet from the theoretical toe of the levee, leaving open the possibility that the plaintiffs could still state a viable claim.
This case involved claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) brought by various plaintiffs, including property owners, business owners, and fishermen, against BP in connection with the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. The plaintiffs alleged that BP engaged in racketeering activity by defrauding government regulators regarding the safety of its drilling operations and its ability to respond to spills, which proximately caused their economic and property losses. BP moved to dismiss the claims, arguing primarily that the plaintiffs failed to plead proximate causation because the alleged fraud targeted regulators rather than the plaintiffs directly, making the causal chain too attenuated. The court granted BP's motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiffs' theory of causation was insufficient under RICO precedents, as the direct victim of the fraud was the government, not the plaintiffs.
This case involves claims for injunctive relief by plaintiffs against BP and Transocean following the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. The plaintiffs alleged violations of the Clean Water Act, CERCLA, EPCRA, Endangered Species Act, and related state laws, seeking to prevent future violations. The court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss the D1 Master Complaint. The core reasoning was that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing because the oil release occurred in the past, with no ongoing or continuing violation that an injunction could redress, as the well had been capped and sealed.
