Carl J. Barbier

The case involved the Louisiana Crisis Assistance Center (LCAC), a nonprofit representing indigent capital defendants, suing its former unpaid law clerk, Alexandria Marzano-Lesnevich, for breach of fiduciary duty and contract after she published essays and planned a novel drawing on her experiences at LCAC, which allegedly disclosed confidential client information. The defendant filed a special motion to strike under Louisiana's anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that her writings constituted protected speech on public issues like the death penalty and that the plaintiff could not show a probability of success on the merits, including because an injunction would be an unconstitutional prior restraint. The court denied the motion, finding that the defendant had made a prima facie showing of protected speech but that the plaintiff had met its burden by demonstrating that at least some of the published information was confidential and not publicly known, thus establishing a probability of success without violating First Amendment principles.

free speechprocedure

This case involves a contractual dispute between Carleton Construction, the prime subcontractor on a Louisiana apartment project, and Southern States Plumbing, its plumbing subcontractor. After Southern States' sub-subcontractor failed to pay prevailing wages, the Department of Labor assessed penalties under the Davis-Bacon Act; Carleton paid a portion of the assessments and then sued Southern States and its owner to recover those payments plus fees under indemnity clauses in both the original Subcontract and a later Compromise Agreement. Carleton moved for summary judgment, arguing the indemnity provisions applied and had not been released. The court granted the motion, holding that the Subcontract's indemnity rights were expressly preserved by the Compromise Agreement and that Southern States' defenses under Louisiana contract law lacked merit.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

The case involves a motion by defendants Gregory D. Frost and Breazeale, Sachse & Wilson, LLP to withdraw an adversary proceeding from bankruptcy court to the U.S. District Court. The underlying claims, brought by the disbursing agent on behalf of a debtor healthcare company, allege legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, fraud, and conspiracy related to the handling of the debtor's assets before and after its Chapter 11 filing. The district court granted the motion to withdraw the reference, holding that the claims constitute non-core proceedings with no inherent connection to bankruptcy administration. The court reasoned that the defendants are entitled to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment, which bankruptcy courts cannot conduct, and that judicial efficiency supports district court resolution of both core and non-core claims to avoid de novo review.

procedurebusiness & regulatorytorts & liability

In Lonatro v. Orleans Levee District, landowners on Bellaire Drive sued the Orleans Levee District and the Southeast Louisiana Flood Protection Authority-East after the defendants removed fences, trees, and other items from their properties to enable U.S. Army Corps of Engineers flood control work on the 17th Street Canal levee following Hurricane Katrina; the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and compensation in consolidated state court suits that were later removed to federal court. The defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), contending that a St. Julien servitude over the levee gave them authority to grant rights-of-entry and barred the claims, and alternatively invoking res judicata or law of the case. The court denied the motion, holding that even if a servitude existed it was unclear whether it extended onto the plaintiffs' land six feet from the theoretical toe of the levee, leaving open the possibility that the plaintiffs could still state a viable claim.

propertyenvironment

This case involved claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) brought by various plaintiffs, including property owners, business owners, and fishermen, against BP in connection with the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. The plaintiffs alleged that BP engaged in racketeering activity by defrauding government regulators regarding the safety of its drilling operations and its ability to respond to spills, which proximately caused their economic and property losses. BP moved to dismiss the claims, arguing primarily that the plaintiffs failed to plead proximate causation because the alleged fraud targeted regulators rather than the plaintiffs directly, making the causal chain too attenuated. The court granted BP's motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiffs' theory of causation was insufficient under RICO precedents, as the direct victim of the fraud was the government, not the plaintiffs.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatoryenvironmentproperty

This case involves claims for injunctive relief by plaintiffs against BP and Transocean following the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. The plaintiffs alleged violations of the Clean Water Act, CERCLA, EPCRA, Endangered Species Act, and related state laws, seeking to prevent future violations. The court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss the D1 Master Complaint. The core reasoning was that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing because the oil release occurred in the past, with no ongoing or continuing violation that an injunction could redress, as the well had been capped and sealed.

environmentprocedure

This case involves a Jones Act and general maritime law claim by plaintiff Kenneth Mercer, a mate on a tugboat, who suffered a foot amputation while securing a barge; he alleges the injury resulted from fatigue caused by the captain working in excess of the 12-hour limit under 46 U.S.C. § 8104(h). Defendant Chem Carriers moved in limine to exclude evidence or testimony suggesting a statutory violation, arguing that the 24-hour period for the limit should be measured by calendar day rather than a rolling period immediately preceding the injury. The court denied the motion, holding that the statute's plain language, supported by Coast Guard guidance and prior precedent, permits evidence based on a consecutive 24-hour period ending at the time of the incident, while noting a factual dispute remains over the captain's actual hours worked and applicability of the Pennsylvania rule.

labor & employmentproceduretorts & liability

This Jones Act case involved a wrongful death claim by Amanda Beech, on behalf of herself and her minor son, against Hercules Drilling Company for the 2009 death of her husband Keith Beech, a crane operator on a stacked jack-up drilling rig who was accidentally shot by a co-worker's handgun. Prior summary judgment rulings had dismissed claims for punitive damages, unseaworthiness, emotional distress, and conscious pain and suffering, leaving only negligence and vicarious liability for trial. Following a bench trial, the court found that Hercules was negligent in failing to effectively enforce its clear no-weapons policy, as searches were rarely conducted despite the known risks on the isolated rig, and it awarded only pecuniary damages including $969,329 for loss of support, $150,000 for household services, and $75,000 for loss of nurture and guidance.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

The case involved the State of Louisiana filing suit in state court against BP entities, alleging violations of state wildlife protection laws stemming from the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill that killed or injured aquatic life and wildlife in Louisiana waters. BP removed the case to federal court, asserting original jurisdiction under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 43 U.S.C. § 1349(b)(1), and Louisiana moved to remand, arguing that its complaint pled only state-law claims, disclaimed any federal causes of action, and that the Eleventh Amendment barred removal. The court denied the motion to remand, holding that OCSLA confers federal jurisdiction over actions arising from or in connection with operations on the outer continental shelf, that the well-pleaded complaint rule does not preclude removal under this statute, and that the Eleventh Amendment does not prevent removal when the state is the plaintiff. The court further rejected arguments based on admiralty jurisdiction as a bar to removal.

environmentbusiness & regulatoryfederal powerprocedure

This case involves a citizen suit brought by the Louisiana Environmental Action Network against Sun Drilling Products Corporation under the Clean Water Act, alleging ongoing illegal discharges of pollutants from the company's manufacturing facility into the Mississippi River. The defendant moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality's investigation and compliance order barred the suit under 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6) and rendered the claims moot. The court denied the motion, holding that the state enforcement action had not commenced prior to the plaintiff's notice of intent to sue, as required to trigger the statutory bar. The court further found the case was not moot because the defendant admitted that violations continued despite the compliance order, applying either applicable mootness standard.

environmentprocedure

In Lightell v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., homeowners who suffered property damage from Hurricane Katrina sued their insurer for additional benefits under a homeowner's policy covering wind damage, after already receiving payments under a separate flood policy. The insurer moved for summary judgment on grounds of estoppel based on the flood claims, the plaintiffs' inability to meet their burden of proving covered losses, and the plaintiffs' failure to timely file witness and exhibit lists. The court partially denied the motion, ruling that plaintiffs were not estopped from pursuing wind claims as long as total recovery did not exceed property value, that the insurer bears the burden of proving policy exclusions so plaintiffs need not segregate wind and flood damages, and that the witness-list issue was moot due to prior leave and case consolidation. However, the court granted summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' claim for additional living expenses due to insufficient evidence.

propertyprocedure

This case involved the sentencing of Vincent Henderson, who pleaded guilty to four counts of distributing cocaine base (crack) in violation of federal law after selling drugs to undercover agents. The court decided to reject the standard 100:1 sentencing ratio between crack and powder cocaine, adopting instead a 1:1 ratio based on Supreme Court rulings in Kimbrough and Spears that allow judges to vary from the guidelines on policy grounds. The court reasoned that the 100:1 ratio lacks empirical basis, disproportionately affects certain offenders, and undermines the goals of the sentencing commission. After calculating a lower guideline range under the 1:1 ratio and considering factors like the defendant's criminal history and need for public protection, the court imposed a sentence of 72 months.

criminal law

The case concerns defendant Clifford Clayton's opposition to the government's writ of garnishment against his assets, including retirement benefits from the New Orleans Baton Rouge Steamship Pilots Association, to collect the remaining $533,727 balance of criminal restitution owed to the IRS under the MVRA after his guilty plea to three misdemeanor counts of failing to file tax returns. Clayton argued that the sentencing court's judgment and commitment order, which required an initial $75,000 lump-sum payment followed by $5,000 monthly installments, controlled the timing and amount of payments and barred the government from seeking immediate full collection via garnishment before any default. The court analyzed the MVRA, FDCPA, CCPA, and precedents such as United States v. Roush and United States v. Ekong, concluding that the statutory framework permits the government to execute on the restitution judgment by garnishing retirement benefits at 100% while limiting garnishment of earnings to 25%, and that the judgment's payment schedule did not preclude such enforcement actions.

criminal lawtaxes

This case is an interpleader action brought by escrow agent Chaffe McCall, LLP, concerning $600,000 deposited by Full Spectrum of New York, L.L.C., pursuant to an Escrow Agreement tied to a failed lease proposal for long-term redevelopment of the World Trade Center building in New Orleans. After lease negotiations collapsed, Full Spectrum demanded return of the funds, but objections from other parties led to disputes, parallel state-court litigation, and Chaffe's deposit of the money into federal court; Full Spectrum then asserted counterclaims against Chaffe for breach of the Escrow Agreement by allegedly failing to return the funds or timely institute a concursus proceeding. The court granted Chaffe's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the counterclaims, holding that the agreement expressly limited the escrow agent's liability to acts of bad faith, that no such bad faith was plausibly alleged, and that the agent's actions complied with the agreement's terms regarding disbursement and interpleader. The court also addressed Full Spectrum's motion for leave to amend its counterclaim but found the proposed amendments insufficient to state a claim.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case concerns federal civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986, along with related state-law tort claims, brought by Shawn Lockett and his wife after his July 2008 traffic stop and arrest by Louisiana National Guard members assisting the New Orleans Police Department. The State Defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) and for summary judgment, raising issues of sovereign immunity, qualified immunity, and the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the stop, the officers’ conduct, and Lockett’s statements about being affiliated with the FBI. The court examined the conflicting accounts of the traffic violations, the escalation during the stop, the decision to arrest, and the applicability of state emergency powers and statutory immunities to the National Guard defendants acting under gubernatorial order.

civil rightscriminal lawtorts & liabilityprocedure

In Hall v. Horace Mann Insurance, homeowners sued their insurer after a pipe leak caused mold damage that forced them to relocate for nearly a year, seeking additional living expenses (ALE) under their homeowners policy along with other damages. The insurer moved for partial summary judgment to cap ALE recovery at $10,000 under a mold endorsement in the policy. The court granted the motion and dismissed claims for ALE in excess of that amount caused by mold. The core reasoning was that the endorsement's plain language limits all covered costs—including the necessary increase in expenses to maintain a normal standard of living when premises are unfit due to mold—to a total of $10,000, and the ALE at issue matched this definition.

propertybusiness & regulatory

This case arose from a 2006 maritime salvage operation in the Gulf of Mexico to recover hurricane-damaged platforms, during which diver Chandon McGrath was fatally injured and divers Brian Bradford and Jason Pope were hurt while attempting a rescue; consolidated lawsuits followed against multiple contractors and vessel operators, with some claims later settling. Global Enterprises and Maritime Management Services moved for partial summary judgment on their cross-claims, seeking to compel International Subsea to defend and indemnify them against Bradford's remaining claims under indemnity clauses in a time charter that incorporated SUPPLYTIME 89 terms. The court denied the motion, concluding that material factual disputes existed over whether Subsea had sublet, assigned, or loaned the vessel to Rowan via the master service agreement (triggering Clause 17(a)'s deeming provision) and whether Global had given the required approval, and that Clause 17(a) on its face applied only to contractors rather than subcontractors like Bradford's employer.

torts & liabilityprocedurebusiness & regulatory

This case concerns a maritime personal injury lawsuit brought by a vessel captain against the vessel owner for injuries from a slip and fall in the rope locker, with the owner then bringing third-party claims against the vessel builder for allegedly failing to install proper sealing components on the hatch cover. The builder moved for summary judgment on the third-party claims, arguing that inspector testimony establishes the assembly was correctly installed at delivery. The court reviewed deposition evidence from Coast Guard and independent inspectors, some of whom specifically recalled seeing the gasket and strongback in place, while others indicated reliance on standard procedures rather than specific memory, to determine if material facts remain in dispute.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This maritime contract dispute arose from ship repair work that Malin performed for Veolia on a chartered vessel under an oral agreement billed on a time-and-materials basis, resulting in unpaid invoices totaling over $1.2 million. After a bench trial, the court entered judgment for Malin on the principal amount plus interest and costs, and later addressed Malin's entitlement to attorney's fees under the invoices' collection provisions. Malin sought $79,837.75 in fees via post-trial motion, which Veolia opposed on grounds including lack of trial evidence, duplicative work by two counsel, excessive rates, and overbilling, while also moving for a new trial or amended judgment. The court granted the full fee award and denied Veolia's motion, reasoning that the parties had been on notice fees would be resolved post-trial, that fees continued to accrue through trial, and that the court's customary practice of separating merits and fee issues applied in this non-jury case.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case concerns post-conviction garnishment proceedings under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act and Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act, in which the government obtained a writ to garnish pension funds held by the Louisiana Sheriffs Pension and Relief Fund for defendants Kerry Decay and Stanford Barre in order to collect on a joint-and-several restitution judgment exceeding $1 million. The Fund, Barre, and Decay moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 to alter or amend the garnishment order, arguing among other things that future pension benefits were not addressed, that the Consumer Credit Protection Act limited garnishment of defined-benefit-plan payments to 25 percent, and that community-property protections barred or reduced the garnishment. The district court denied all three motions, holding that the arguments were either raised for the first time on reconsideration and therefore improper or were unavailing under federal law that treats restitution orders like tax debts and preempts contrary state-law exemptions.

criminal lawprocedurefederal power