The case involved the EEOC suing on behalf of Lisa Harrison's estate, alleging that her employer, Resources for Human Development, Inc., violated the ADA by terminating her from her position at a residential treatment facility due to severe obesity, which the employer allegedly regarded as a disability. Harrison, who weighed over 500 pounds at the time of her 2007 termination, had performed her duties without issue for nearly eight years. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that obesity does not qualify as a disability under the ADA and that Harrison was not a qualified individual. The court denied both motions, finding genuine disputes of material fact on whether severe obesity constitutes an impairment that substantially limits major life activities, whether the employer regarded Harrison as disabled, and whether she could perform essential job functions with or without accommodation. The decision relied on ADA definitions, EEOC guidelines treating severe obesity as a potential impairment, and the need to construe facts in favor of the non-moving party.
This case involves a personal injury claim under general maritime law and Texas law by plaintiff Henry Lee Dennis, who allegedly slipped and fell on oil while working as a fire watcher on an offshore platform owned by Energy XXI that was being dismantled. Plaintiff sued the platform owner and various contractors, after which Energy XXI filed third-party claims against American Fire seeking defense, indemnity, and insurance coverage under a Master Service Agreement. The court denied Energy XXI's motion for summary judgment on its own liability without prejudice due to incomplete discovery, granted in part and denied in part the motions regarding the enforceability of the indemnity and insurance provisions, and held that the insurance clause requiring Energy XXI to be named as an additional insured was valid and separate from any indemnity obligations limited by the Texas Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act. The reasoning applied the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act to invoke Texas substantive law, including Chapter 95 requirements for owner control and actual knowledge of hazards, along with case law distinguishing insurance provisions from unenforceable indemnity agreements.
This case arose from the death of worker Andre Magee Jr., who fell while employed as a rigger on a partially constructed barge at a shipyard in Mississippi. Plaintiffs, acting on behalf of Magee's minor children and father, sued the shipbuilder and barge owner under general maritime law and the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act section 905(b), claiming vessel negligence, with diversity jurisdiction pled in the alternative. The court granted defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that an incomplete barge under construction was not a vessel for purposes of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction. It also granted partial summary judgment dismissing the father's mental anguish claim under Mississippi law because he did not contemporaneously witness the accident.
In Stabler v. United States, the plaintiff challenged the government's sale of property subject to a federal tax lien, asserting a wrongful levy claim under 26 U.S.C. § 7426 and a refund claim under 26 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) after the property was sold to satisfy tax liabilities. The district court granted the United States' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The court reasoned that a wrongful levy action does not apply because the sale occurred through a judicial lien foreclosure proceeding under 26 U.S.C. § 7403 rather than an administrative levy under 26 U.S.C. § 6331, and that § 7426 provides the exclusive remedy for third-party claims, precluding a separate refund action. The court further noted that the plaintiff's interests should have been litigated in the prior foreclosure action in the Southern District of Alabama.
This case involves claims by the EEOC on behalf of employee Kerry Woods against Boh Bros. Construction Co. for same-sex sexual harassment and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Woods alleged that his supervisor subjected him to derogatory name-calling such as 'faggot' and 'princess,' simulated sex acts, and other conduct because he did not conform to masculine stereotypes, and that he suffered adverse actions after reporting the behavior. The district court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment on both claims, concluding that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether the harassment occurred because of sex, was severe or pervasive, and whether the employer's response amounted to retaliation. The court also denied without prejudice the defendant's attempt to raise the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense at the summary judgment stage.
The case concerned a mortgage foreclosure dispute between Colonial Mortgage and Loan Corporation and debtor Marshall Ellzey following the completion of Ellzey's Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan. Colonial filed a proof of claim for $9,634.02 but later sought additional amounts through state court foreclosure proceedings after the debtor's discharge, leading the bankruptcy court to rule that the proof of claim amount controlled and to dismiss claims against the debtor. This court affirmed that decision and denied Colonial's motion for rehearing, which argued that the confirmed Chapter 13 plan should dictate the debt amount based on a recent Supreme Court ruling. The court reasoned that a proof of claim provides prima facie evidence of the claim's validity and amount unless properly objected to, that the Supreme Court precedent did not apply because Colonial's proof of claim did not align with the plan, and that Colonial, as a participating creditor, could not challenge the amount after failing to amend its claim.
