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Campbell v. City of Springboro, Ohio
District Court, S.D. Ohio · 2011-04-26 · cited 15×
In this case, plaintiffs Samuel Campbell and Chelsie Gemperline sued the City of Springboro, its police chief, city manager, and Officer Nick Clark after being injured by the same police dog during separate arrests, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force and failure to train or supervise, along with related state-law claims. The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motions for summary judgment and addressed related motions to strike expert affidavits. It denied summary judgment on the excessive force claims against Officer Clark under the Fourth Amendment, the assault and battery claims under Ohio law, and the § 1983 failure-to-train claims against the City and Chief Kruithoff. Summary judgment was granted to defendants on all remaining claims.
civil rightscriminal lawproceduretorts & liability
Garr v. WARDEN, DAYTON CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION
District Court, S.D. Ohio · 2011-03-17
This case involves a federal habeas corpus petition filed by an Ohio prisoner challenging his 2006 state conviction for cocaine trafficking as a first-degree felony and major drug offender specification under Ohio Rev. Code § 2925.03(C)(4)(g). The petitioner argued that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence of the identity and weight of the drug, as the case relied solely on circumstantial evidence from an offer to sell without recovering any actual substance. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, denying the petition with prejudice after finding that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements proven beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence presented at trial. The court held that the state courts' adjudication was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of the Jackson v. Virginia standard and was based on a reasonable determination of the facts.
criminal lawprocedure
Lewis v. CSX Transportation, Inc.
District Court, S.D. Ohio · 2011-03-10 · cited 10×
This case involves plaintiff Leandrew Lewis, a long-time railroad track department employee, who sued defendant CSX Transportation under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) for wrist injuries that allegedly developed into carpal tunnel syndrome due to his operation of a ballast regulator machine and other job duties. After discovery, CSX moved for summary judgment, arguing insufficient evidence of negligence, along with related motions to strike certain depositions and an expert report. The court granted CSX's motion for summary judgment, finding that Lewis failed to present evidence that CSX breached its duty of care by not addressing known risks of carpal tunnel syndrome in his work environment, though it did not reach the issue of causation. The court denied the motion to strike the depositions as moot in light of its ruling and denied the causation opinion motion as moot.
labor & employmenttorts & liability
United States v. Bold
District Court, S.D. Ohio · 2011-01-05 · cited 1×
This case concerns a request for criminal restitution by Price Hill Will, a nonprofit community organization, against defendant Ronald Trester following his conviction for participating in a mortgage fraud scheme that led to foreclosures on numerous homes in Cincinnati neighborhoods. The court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, declining to order Trester to pay restitution to Price Hill Will or affected communities. The core reasoning is that Price Hill Will and the neighborhoods do not qualify as direct 'victims' under the Victim and Witness Protection Act or Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, as the claimed harms involve diffuse property value declines rather than losses to specific, identifiable victims, and the statutes do not recognize such indirect community impacts for restitution purposes. Other defendants' restitution claims were resolved through civil settlements and withdrawn.
criminal lawproperty
Sheerer v. Hamilton County Board of Health
District Court, S.D. Ohio · 2010-09-24 · cited 7×
In Sheerer v. Hamilton County Board of Health, plaintiff Tyree Sherrer sued her former employer under the Americans with Disabilities Act, alleging that her supervisor improperly disclosed her confidential medical information about a breast lump to coworkers and that the employer retaliated against her after she filed an EEOC charge by imposing unreasonable work expectations upon her return from medical leave for cancer treatment. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the illegal disclosure claim but denied it on the retaliation claim. The disclosure claim failed because the information was not obtained through a prohibited medical inquiry under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4), and any sharing was limited and not shown to violate the statute's confidentiality rules. On the retaliation claim, disputed facts remained regarding whether the employer's post-leave consultation requirements and other actions constituted adverse employment actions motivated by the EEOC filing.
civil rightslabor & employmenthealthcare
Spencer v. National City Bank
District Court, S.D. Ohio · 2010-08-05 · cited 3×
Jeanne Spencer sued her former employer National City Bank and its parent company for age discrimination under the ADEA and Ohio law, disability discrimination under the ADA and Ohio law, FMLA interference and retaliation, and defamation per se, after she resigned in lieu of termination at age 61 due to repeated cash balancing shortages while working as a teller despite her Meniere’s Disease. The defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims. The court granted the motion as to the FMLA interference and defamation claims, which the plaintiff did not oppose, but denied it as to the age discrimination, disability discrimination, and FMLA retaliation claims. The court reasoned that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a reasonable jury could find the employer’s stated reasons for its actions to be pretextual.
labor & employmentcivil rights
Coffman v. Ford Motor Co.
District Court, S.D. Ohio · 2010-06-10 · cited 5×
This case involved Jami L. Coffman suing her former employer, Ford Motor Company, alleging that Ford terminated her in retaliation for taking medical leave protected by the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). Ford moved for summary judgment, arguing both on the merits and that the FMLA's two-year statute of limitations barred the claims. The court granted Ford's motion, finding that Coffman failed to submit timely medical certification forms as required, resulting in her being classified as absent without leave (AWOL) multiple times and subjected to progressive discipline under the collective bargaining agreement, culminating in her termination at a July 2005 hearing. The decision rested on the absence of evidence that Ford's actions were pretextual or retaliatory rather than based on her failure to comply with documentation requirements, and Coffman did not qualify for FMLA leave in the relevant periods due to insufficient hours worked.
labor & employmentprocedure
BENCH BILLBOARD CO. v. City of Cincinnati
District Court, S.D. Ohio · 2010-06-08 · cited 5×
This case concerned Bench Billboard Company's challenge to the City of Cincinnati's municipal code provisions regulating the placement of commercial advertising benches in public rights-of-way and on private property, following the city's repeal of a 1996 special ordinance that had granted the company preferential permits. The plaintiff alleged violations of the First Amendment (free speech), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection and due process), and related state laws, stemming from prior disputes and the city's enforcement of general rules limiting bench placements near bus stops. The court granted the city's motion for summary judgment on the remaining claims, denied the plaintiff's motion, and dismissed certain claims as moot due to lack of standing after the repeal of the specific ordinance. Core reasoning included findings that the regulations were reasonable, content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions; that Bench Billboard lacked standing to challenge the repealed provisions; and that there was no equal protection violation because similarly situated entities were treated alike under the revised code.
free speechcivil rightsbusiness & regulatory
Mincy v. Cincinnati Children's Hospital Medical Center
District Court, S.D. Ohio · 2010-05-26
This case involves an employment discrimination lawsuit brought by Marie Mincy against her former employer, Cincinnati Children's Hospital Medical Center, where she worked as a Mental Health Specialist on a psychiatric unit. Mincy alleged claims including FMLA retaliation, disability discrimination under the ADA, race discrimination and hostile work environment, retaliation, wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, and defamation, arising from disputes over attendance, an added auditing task, comments about her mental health, and her eventual termination for alleged negligent room checks and charting. The court granted summary judgment to the defendant on the race discrimination/hostile work environment claim, the discriminatory treatment public policy claim, and the defamation claim, as those lacked supporting evidence or were abandoned. The court denied summary judgment on the remaining claims, finding genuine issues of material fact in dispute as to whether the hospital's actions were pretextual or retaliatory.
labor & employmentcivil rights
Board of Trustees of the Plumbers v. Campbell's Ready-To-Go Excavation
District Court, S.D. Ohio · 2010-04-30
This case involved employee benefit trust funds suing an excavation company under ERISA and the Labor Management Relations Act for failing to pay required fringe benefit contributions on behalf of working contractors and for the full term of a collective bargaining agreement that bound the defendant through May 31, 2009. The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment based on the CBA's express terms requiring contributions and prior notification for working contractors, supported by audit findings showing deficiencies. The defendant did not respond to the motion or show cause order, and its counsel moved to withdraw with the client's consent. The court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation, granted the withdrawal, granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the undisputed facts, and closed the case.
labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory
Perrea v. Cincinnati Public Schools
District Court, S.D. Ohio · 2010-04-20 · cited 1×
This case involved a Cincinnati Public Schools teacher who challenged district guidelines requiring racial balancing of staff when making surplussing and transfer decisions under a collective bargaining agreement, along with claims of race discrimination and First Amendment retaliation. The court granted the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment, ruling that the racial balance guidelines violated the Equal Protection Clause because they used race as a factor in employment decisions without a compelling justification. It granted in part and denied in part the defendants' summary judgment motion, finding no First Amendment retaliation, no adverse employment action for Title VII or related statutory claims, and qualified immunity for one defendant, but leaving factual disputes unresolved on the equal protection claim. The reasoning drew on precedents holding that racial classifications aimed at achieving balance are unconstitutional absent specific remedial needs.
civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure
Brinkman v. Budish
District Court, S.D. Ohio · 2010-02-17 · cited 11×
In Brinkman v. Budish, plaintiffs including a former Ohio state legislator and an advocacy group challenged the constitutionality of Ohio Revised Code § 102.03(A)(4), a revolving door statute that bars former General Assembly members from representing any person or organization before the legislature or its committees for one year after leaving office. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, permanently enjoined enforcement of the statute against the plaintiffs and similarly situated individuals, and denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The ruling addressed claims that the law violated the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause both facially and as applied, following an earlier preliminary injunction, with the court determining that the one-year lobbying restriction was unconstitutional.
free speechcivil rights
Gadberry v. BETHESDA, INC.
District Court, S.D. Ohio · 2009-02-12 · cited 3×
The case involves a former employee who received long-term disability benefits under an ERISA plan administered through Bethesda, Inc. and later TriHealth, Inc., but whose benefits were terminated by insurer UNUM; the plaintiff sued the plans and administrators under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) seeking reinstatement and related relief. The TriHealth defendants moved to dismiss on grounds they were not proper parties. The court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation, denying dismissal of the Bethesda, Inc. Long Term Disability Plan but granting dismissal of the plan administrators and TriHealth plan, because ERISA benefits claims may proceed against the plan itself while administrators require evidence of their role in the benefits decision, which was absent from the record.
labor & employmenthealthcareprocedure
United States v. Lee
District Court, S.D. Ohio · 2009-02-06
The case concerned defendant David Lee's motion to suppress evidence in his federal prosecution for being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922. Police responded to multiple 911 reports of shots fired, approached a vehicle on the scene, observed Lee exit it suspiciously, and later saw a loaded rifle in plain view on the car's rear floor after Lee voluntarily came out of a nearby house. The court denied the motion, holding that the rifle seizure was lawful under the plain view doctrine during a valid investigatory stop and that Lee's post-Miranda statements were admissible because he understood his rights yet answered questions without invoking silence, constituting an implied waiver. The core reasoning relied on the officer's observations tied to the shots-fired calls, the Sixth Circuit's standard for implied Miranda waiver, and the absence of any coercive circumstances.
criminal lawgunsprocedure
Evans v. Midland Funding LLC
District Court, S.D. Ohio · 2008-08-28 · cited 13×
This case involved two plaintiffs, Evans and Faulk, who sued debt collection companies Midland Funding and MRC, along with their law firm and attorneys, alleging violations of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act based on state court lawsuits the defendants filed to collect credit card debts. The court addressed motions to sever the plaintiffs' claims and for judgment on the pleadings. It denied severance, finding the claims arose from similar transactions with common legal and factual questions. It granted judgment on the pleadings in part by dismissing the claims that defendants mischaracterized the debts as loans, but denied it as to the remaining claims, including those alleging suits on nonexistent or discharged debts and against the individual attorneys, because the allegations were sufficient to state claims under the statutes.
business & regulatoryprocedure
United States v. Rozin
District Court, S.D. Ohio · 2008-02-27 · cited 1×
This case involves federal criminal charges against several defendants, including Leif Rozin and Burton Kallick, for conspiracy to defraud the United States and the IRS, filing false tax returns, and attempted tax evasion, stemming from an investigation into unreported kickbacks and large insurance deductions on corporate tax returns from the late 1990s. The defendants moved to preclude the testimony of Alan Koehler, who had served as in-house counsel for Rozin, Inc., or alternatively to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the government's multiple interviews with Koehler violated attorney-client privilege. The court denied the motion, holding that any privilege was not violated because the government may inquire into an attorney's possible involvement in the illegal tax activities under investigation and that Rozin had implicitly waived the privilege by failing to object during or after Koehler's initial 2000 interview, at which his counsel was present.
criminal lawtaxesprocedure
Pikas v. Williams Companies, Inc.
District Court, S.D. Ohio · 2008-02-08 · cited 6×
This case involves a class action ERISA claim by Joseph Pikas, a retired employee, against The Williams Companies and its pension plan, alleging that lump-sum pension distributions improperly excluded automatic cost-of-living adjustments. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction over Williams, failure to state a claim, and improper venue in the Southern District of Ohio, or alternatively to transfer the case. The court denied all dismissal motions, finding that ERISA's nationwide service-of-process provision conferred personal jurisdiction and that Williams was a proper defendant. It granted the motion to transfer venue to the Northern District of Oklahoma, where the plan is administered, as being in the interest of justice under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).
labor & employmentprocedure
Moore v. Mitchell
District Court, S.D. Ohio · 2008-01-18 · cited 9×
This case involves a federal habeas corpus petition filed by Lee E. Moore challenging his Ohio state convictions for aggravated murder, kidnapping, and aggravated robbery, along with his death sentence, arising from the 1994 abduction and shooting of Melvin Olinger. The district court reviewed magistrate judge reports and recommendations, along with objections from the petitioner and the warden, addressing multiple constitutional claims such as alleged Batson violations in jury selection and other trial errors. The court decided to conditionally grant the supplemental petition in part and deny it in part, granting relief on certain claims while rejecting others. The core reasoning was that some claims established violations of clearly established federal law warranting conditional habeas relief, while others did not meet the standards for overturning the state court's judgments after reviewing the full record and procedural history.
criminal lawcivil rightsprocedurefederal power
Saint Torrance v. Firstar
District Court, S.D. Ohio · 2007-11-30 · cited 16×
The case involved a pro se plaintiff's claims against U.S. Bank (as successor to Firstar), Helvey & Associates, the City of Cincinnati, and others arising from a 2002 foreclosure on his Cincinnati property, subsequent bankruptcy proceedings, and the failure to transfer utility billing responsibility after the sheriff's sale and deed transfer to the bank. The plaintiff alleged fraud, libel, slander, bankruptcy violations, and intentional tort based on continued utility charges in his name and related credit reporting issues. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendations, granting U.S. Bank's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to failure to exhaust remedies before the Ohio Public Utilities Commission and preemption of state claims by the Fair Credit Reporting Act, granting summary judgment to Helvey & Associates, granting judgment on the pleadings to the City, and dismissing the complaint in full against all defendants.
propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatorytorts & liability
Morrison v. Board of Trustees of Green Tp.
District Court, S.D. Ohio · 2007-11-29 · cited 13×
This case arose from an October 2002 incident in which Green Township and Hamilton County officers responded to a 911 call reporting that nineteen-year-old Amanda Morrison was threatening suicide with a knife; after conflicting accounts of whether she ran or walked away, one officer tackled and handcuffed her, leading to claims of injury. Amanda Morrison, her father Dennis, and her mother Cynthia sued the officers, their departments, and related entities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force and seizure without probable cause, plus state-law tort claims including assault, battery, false arrest, and emotional distress. The court denied both sides’ motions to strike evidence, granted full summary judgment to the Hamilton County defendants, and granted summary judgment in part and denied it in part to the Green Township defendants. The core reasoning was that the officers had statutory authority under Ohio Rev. Code § 5122.01(B) to detain Amanda for a mental-health evaluation, but genuine factual disputes remained about the reasonableness of the force used by Officer Celender, while the Hamilton County officers were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all claims.
civil rightscriminal lawproceduretorts & liability