In this case, plaintiffs Samuel Campbell and Chelsie Gemperline sued the City of Springboro, its police chief, city manager, and Officer Nick Clark after being injured by the same police dog during separate arrests, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force and failure to train or supervise, along with related state-law claims. The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motions for summary judgment and addressed related motions to strike expert affidavits. It denied summary judgment on the excessive force claims against Officer Clark under the Fourth Amendment, the assault and battery claims under Ohio law, and the § 1983 failure-to-train claims against the City and Chief Kruithoff. Summary judgment was granted to defendants on all remaining claims.
This case involves a federal habeas corpus petition filed by an Ohio prisoner challenging his 2006 state conviction for cocaine trafficking as a first-degree felony and major drug offender specification under Ohio Rev. Code § 2925.03(C)(4)(g). The petitioner argued that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence of the identity and weight of the drug, as the case relied solely on circumstantial evidence from an offer to sell without recovering any actual substance. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, denying the petition with prejudice after finding that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements proven beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence presented at trial. The court held that the state courts' adjudication was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of the Jackson v. Virginia standard and was based on a reasonable determination of the facts.
This case involves plaintiff Leandrew Lewis, a long-time railroad track department employee, who sued defendant CSX Transportation under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) for wrist injuries that allegedly developed into carpal tunnel syndrome due to his operation of a ballast regulator machine and other job duties. After discovery, CSX moved for summary judgment, arguing insufficient evidence of negligence, along with related motions to strike certain depositions and an expert report. The court granted CSX's motion for summary judgment, finding that Lewis failed to present evidence that CSX breached its duty of care by not addressing known risks of carpal tunnel syndrome in his work environment, though it did not reach the issue of causation. The court denied the motion to strike the depositions as moot in light of its ruling and denied the causation opinion motion as moot.
This case concerns a request for criminal restitution by Price Hill Will, a nonprofit community organization, against defendant Ronald Trester following his conviction for participating in a mortgage fraud scheme that led to foreclosures on numerous homes in Cincinnati neighborhoods. The court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, declining to order Trester to pay restitution to Price Hill Will or affected communities. The core reasoning is that Price Hill Will and the neighborhoods do not qualify as direct 'victims' under the Victim and Witness Protection Act or Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, as the claimed harms involve diffuse property value declines rather than losses to specific, identifiable victims, and the statutes do not recognize such indirect community impacts for restitution purposes. Other defendants' restitution claims were resolved through civil settlements and withdrawn.
In Sheerer v. Hamilton County Board of Health, plaintiff Tyree Sherrer sued her former employer under the Americans with Disabilities Act, alleging that her supervisor improperly disclosed her confidential medical information about a breast lump to coworkers and that the employer retaliated against her after she filed an EEOC charge by imposing unreasonable work expectations upon her return from medical leave for cancer treatment. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the illegal disclosure claim but denied it on the retaliation claim. The disclosure claim failed because the information was not obtained through a prohibited medical inquiry under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4), and any sharing was limited and not shown to violate the statute's confidentiality rules. On the retaliation claim, disputed facts remained regarding whether the employer's post-leave consultation requirements and other actions constituted adverse employment actions motivated by the EEOC filing.
Jeanne Spencer sued her former employer National City Bank and its parent company for age discrimination under the ADEA and Ohio law, disability discrimination under the ADA and Ohio law, FMLA interference and retaliation, and defamation per se, after she resigned in lieu of termination at age 61 due to repeated cash balancing shortages while working as a teller despite her Meniere’s Disease. The defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims. The court granted the motion as to the FMLA interference and defamation claims, which the plaintiff did not oppose, but denied it as to the age discrimination, disability discrimination, and FMLA retaliation claims. The court reasoned that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a reasonable jury could find the employer’s stated reasons for its actions to be pretextual.
