William R. Moser

The case involved Christa Tackes, who was injured in a car accident caused by an underinsured driver and sued her insurance agent, Paul Albinger, and his insurer for negligently failing to recommend underinsured motorist coverage on her two vehicles. The trial court granted summary judgment to Albinger, finding no liability as a matter of law, and the appellate court affirmed. The court held that, absent special circumstances such as an express agreement, extra compensation, or the agent holding himself out as a highly skilled expert with a corresponding duty, insurance agents owe no affirmative duty to advise clients about the availability or desirability of underinsured motorist coverage. The Tackes conceded there was no express agreement or extra compensation, and the court found that Albinger's status as an independent agent, his advertisements, his professional association membership, and his other insurance recommendations did not create the required special circumstances under precedent like Nelson v. Davidson.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

The case involved Leon Jefferson, who had been found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect of battery to a law enforcement officer and was committed to the Department of Health and Social Services before being granted conditional release subject to specific rules and placement requirements. After Jefferson twice left his residential placement without permission and made threats of violence against staff and the facility, the Department petitioned to revoke the release, and the trial court found by clear and satisfactory evidence that he had violated the conditions and posed a danger to himself or others, leading to recommitment at Mendota Mental Health Institute. Jefferson appealed, arguing insufficient grounds for revocation, lack of evidence on alternative placements, and failure to order a specific alternative placement. The Court of Appeals affirmed the revocation order, holding that the statute requires only proof that release conditions were not followed and that the individual is dangerous, both of which were satisfied here, and that no additional findings regarding alternatives were needed.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a breach of contract claim where Thorp Sales Corporation sued Gyuro Grading Company for failing to provide equipment for a scheduled auction under their agreement, which called for an eight percent commission on sales without reserve. The trial court dismissed Thorp's claim for lost commissions and awarded Gyuro $1600 on a counterclaim, finding the damages too speculative. On appeal, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Gyuro was liable for breach and that Thorp could recover the commissions it would have earned, as they were ascertainable to a reasonable certainty based on evidence of the equipment's auction value. The court distinguished prior cases limiting auctioneer recovery and remanded for a damages determination, also rejecting Gyuro's entitlement to the $1600 judgment.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case involved a libel claim brought by William Denny against Orville Mertz and McGraw-Hill, Inc., stemming from a Business Week article that stated Denny had been fired from his position as general counsel at Koehring Company, when he had actually resigned. Denny had been a vocal dissident stockholder challenging Koehring's management, including Mertz, through letters, lawsuits, and contacts with the press. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, ruling that Denny was a public figure who had thrust himself into a public controversy and thus had to prove actual malice to prevail. The appellate court reversed, holding that Koehring's internal management disputes did not constitute a public controversy and that Denny remained a private figure whose stockholder activities did not elevate him to public-figure status, so the actual-malice standard did not apply.

free speechtorts & liability

In Rohl v. State, the defendant was convicted in 1972 of third-degree murder and arson based in part on testimony from a witness who later admitted to perjury in key respects; the defendant also claimed the state had withheld exculpatory evidence regarding a flashlight found at the scene. On a 1977 petition for post-conviction relief under Wis. Stat. § 974.06, the circuit court denied an evidentiary hearing and the motion. The Court of Appeals held that the use of perjured testimony and the failure to disclose material exculpatory evidence violated due process, entitling the defendant to a new trial; it reversed the orders below, set conditions for release pending retrial, and directed that the state commence a new trial within 90 days or the defendant be released.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

This case involves a dispute over whether Marilynn Schaefer, the widow and lifetime income beneficiary of a trust holding her deceased husband's partnership interest, has standing to sue her brother-in-law for a partnership accounting regarding thirteen parcels of real estate. The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing, ruling that only the estate's legal representatives could bring such an action and that the McDonald exception for antagonistic interests did not apply because one co-executor had no conflict. The appellate court reversed and remanded, holding that Mrs. Schaefer could maintain the suit because at least one executor (the surviving partner) had an adverse interest, she possesses a pecuniary interest in potential trust asset increases, and the duty to pursue the accounting had not clearly shifted to the trustee in a manner barring her claim.

family lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute over a 1975 real estate exchange contract in which plaintiff Wurtz agreed to trade his hotel property for other real estate valued at $300,000, but later demanded an additional $50,000 (or equivalent units) just before closing after multiple postponements. The trial court awarded Wurtz the units based on the modified agreement, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the demand constituted economic duress that invalidated the modification. The court reasoned that the original contract's 'time is of the essence' clause had not been waived, the parties' conduct showed continued adherence to the deal, and the last-minute demand left Fleischman with no reasonable alternative, making the extra payment unenforceable; it remanded for judgment in favor of the defendant while adopting flexible damages rules for such claims.

propertybusiness & regulatorytorts & liability

In Thieme v. State, the defendant pleaded guilty to burglary of a pharmacy and received a stayed sentence of imprisonment with probation that included conditions to pay restitution for damages and to serve time in jail. After money was withdrawn from the defendant's account to pay toward restitution before any specific amount had been ordered, his probation was revoked and he began serving his prison sentence; the court later entered an order fixing restitution at $1,746.51. The defendant challenged the withdrawal of funds and the post-revocation restitution order. The court held that funds cannot be taken toward restitution until a court order specifies the exact amount owed and that a restitution order cannot be entered once probation has been revoked and the defendant is imprisoned on the underlying offense. The court therefore reversed the order denying the defendant's motion and required refund of the withdrawn money.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved homeowners and their insurer suing General Electric after a fire destroyed their summer home, alleging that a defect in their GE television set caused the fire under a strict products liability theory. The trial court upheld the state fire marshal's invocation of a statutory privilege to prevent a deputy from testifying about the fire's cause, excluded expert testimony on whether the television was defectively designed, and instructed the jury using the "unreasonably dangerous" standard for strict liability; the jury returned a verdict for GE, and the trial court entered judgment dismissing the complaints. On appeal, the court affirmed, holding that the fire marshal's privilege under Wis. Stat. § 165.55(8) is absolute and bars compelled testimony even in private civil actions, that the trial court properly excluded the expert opinion, and that Wisconsin law requires the "unreasonably dangerous" element in strict liability instructions. The core reasoning rested on statutory interpretation of the privilege as unqualified, established precedent defining strict liability elements, and the absence of error in evidentiary rulings.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a dispute over whether an exculpatory clause in a residential lease protected a landlord from liability for damage to a tenant's property caused by water leaking from a frozen pipe above. The jury found for the tenant's insurer, State Farm, but the trial court granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict to the landlord's insurer, Home Insurance. On appeal, the court held that the clause was valid because the tenant was not in an unequal bargaining position despite signing after moving in and not reading it. However, the clause did not apply because the landlord's repeated failure to address the insulation issue after complaints constituted active negligence, which voids such clauses. The court therefore reversed the judgment and remanded for entry of judgment on the verdict.

propertytorts & liability

The case involved a juvenile delinquency proceeding against minor E.R. for armed robbery and first-degree murder, where the trial court allowed a newspaper reporter to attend despite the minor's request to exclude the media. The court of appeals addressed whether Wis. Stat. sec. 48.25(1) permitted the juvenile court judge to exercise discretion in admitting members of the press. The court affirmed the dismissal of the writ of prohibition, holding that the statute excludes only the general public but allows admission of those with a direct interest in the case or the court's work, and that the media qualifies due to its role in informing the public about juvenile court operations while protecting the child's identity. The reasoning emphasized that the legislature's primary concern was confidentiality of identities rather than a total bar on responsible reporting, and that a similar provision in the successor statute supported this interpretation.

criminal lawfree speechprocedure

This products liability case arose after a two-year-old child was severely burned when gasoline poured from a can without a child-proof cap was ignited near a furnace; the child’s guardian sued the can’s manufacturer and retailer on theories of negligence and strict liability after settling with other parties. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, but the trial court denied the motion and the appellate court affirmed. The court held that the complaint adequately alleged the elements of strict liability under Wisconsin’s adoption of Restatement § 402A, leaving the factual question of whether the product was defective and unreasonably dangerous for the jury. On the negligence claim, the court concluded that a duty existed because it was foreseeable that children might access and misuse an ordinary gasoline can stored in a home, making harm from the lack of a child-proof cap reasonably predictable. The court declined to cut off liability on public-policy grounds at the pleading stage given the complexity of the products-liability issues.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved the Village of Silver Lake and the Town of Randall appealing the Wisconsin Department of Revenue's 1975 property tax assessments for municipalities in Kenosha County, claiming that three larger municipalities were undervalued by about 20% and seeking a redetermination under sec. 70.57, Stats. The Tax Appeals Commission dismissed the appeals for lack of jurisdiction, and the circuit court affirmed that ruling. The Court of Appeals held that the statutes authorize the Department to hear complaints only from counties in county-assessor systems and provide no express or implied authority for towns or villages to appeal assessments; as a result, the Commission had no jurisdiction to order relief. The court applied strict construction to the limited statutory powers of administrative agencies, concluding that neither the Department nor the Commission could entertain the municipalities' claims.

taxespropertyprocedure