William R. Moser

The case involved Christa Tackes, who was injured in a car accident caused by an underinsured driver and sued her insurance agent, Paul Albinger, and his insurer for negligently failing to recommend underinsured motorist coverage on her two vehicles. The trial court granted summary judgment to Albinger, finding no liability as a matter of law, and the appellate court affirmed. The court held that, absent special circumstances such as an express agreement, extra compensation, or the agent holding himself out as a highly skilled expert with a corresponding duty, insurance agents owe no affirmative duty to advise clients about the availability or desirability of underinsured motorist coverage. The Tackes conceded there was no express agreement or extra compensation, and the court found that Albinger's status as an independent agent, his advertisements, his professional association membership, and his other insurance recommendations did not create the required special circumstances under precedent like Nelson v. Davidson.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

The case involved Leon Jefferson, who had been found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect of battery to a law enforcement officer and was committed to the Department of Health and Social Services before being granted conditional release subject to specific rules and placement requirements. After Jefferson twice left his residential placement without permission and made threats of violence against staff and the facility, the Department petitioned to revoke the release, and the trial court found by clear and satisfactory evidence that he had violated the conditions and posed a danger to himself or others, leading to recommitment at Mendota Mental Health Institute. Jefferson appealed, arguing insufficient grounds for revocation, lack of evidence on alternative placements, and failure to order a specific alternative placement. The Court of Appeals affirmed the revocation order, holding that the statute requires only proof that release conditions were not followed and that the individual is dangerous, both of which were satisfied here, and that no additional findings regarding alternatives were needed.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a breach of contract claim where Thorp Sales Corporation sued Gyuro Grading Company for failing to provide equipment for a scheduled auction under their agreement, which called for an eight percent commission on sales without reserve. The trial court dismissed Thorp's claim for lost commissions and awarded Gyuro $1600 on a counterclaim, finding the damages too speculative. On appeal, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Gyuro was liable for breach and that Thorp could recover the commissions it would have earned, as they were ascertainable to a reasonable certainty based on evidence of the equipment's auction value. The court distinguished prior cases limiting auctioneer recovery and remanded for a damages determination, also rejecting Gyuro's entitlement to the $1600 judgment.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case involved a libel claim brought by William Denny against Orville Mertz and McGraw-Hill, Inc., stemming from a Business Week article that stated Denny had been fired from his position as general counsel at Koehring Company, when he had actually resigned. Denny had been a vocal dissident stockholder challenging Koehring's management, including Mertz, through letters, lawsuits, and contacts with the press. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, ruling that Denny was a public figure who had thrust himself into a public controversy and thus had to prove actual malice to prevail. The appellate court reversed, holding that Koehring's internal management disputes did not constitute a public controversy and that Denny remained a private figure whose stockholder activities did not elevate him to public-figure status, so the actual-malice standard did not apply.

free speechtorts & liability

In Rohl v. State, the defendant was convicted in 1972 of third-degree murder and arson based in part on testimony from a witness who later admitted to perjury in key respects; the defendant also claimed the state had withheld exculpatory evidence regarding a flashlight found at the scene. On a 1977 petition for post-conviction relief under Wis. Stat. § 974.06, the circuit court denied an evidentiary hearing and the motion. The Court of Appeals held that the use of perjured testimony and the failure to disclose material exculpatory evidence violated due process, entitling the defendant to a new trial; it reversed the orders below, set conditions for release pending retrial, and directed that the state commence a new trial within 90 days or the defendant be released.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

This case involves a dispute over whether Marilynn Schaefer, the widow and lifetime income beneficiary of a trust holding her deceased husband's partnership interest, has standing to sue her brother-in-law for a partnership accounting regarding thirteen parcels of real estate. The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing, ruling that only the estate's legal representatives could bring such an action and that the McDonald exception for antagonistic interests did not apply because one co-executor had no conflict. The appellate court reversed and remanded, holding that Mrs. Schaefer could maintain the suit because at least one executor (the surviving partner) had an adverse interest, she possesses a pecuniary interest in potential trust asset increases, and the duty to pursue the accounting had not clearly shifted to the trustee in a manner barring her claim.

family lawprocedure