Elizabeth A. McClanahan

The case involved James Gregory Marshall, who had prior convictions for aggravated sexual battery and failure to register as a sex offender, and was charged with knowingly failing to reregister as required under Code § 18.2-472.1(B) after missing his April 2009 deadline due to travel to California. Marshall argued that the statute's use of 'knowingly' required proof of specific intent and that the evidence was insufficient to convict him. The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the conviction, holding that 'knowingly' means the defendant was aware of the registration duty but failed to fulfill it, without needing to show bad purpose or specific intent. The court reasoned from the plain statutory language, legislative intent, dictionary definitions, and federal precedents interpreting similar SORNA provisions that the law is not a specific-intent offense, and the undisputed facts established Marshall's knowledge and failure to reregister on time.

criminal law

Judy Carol Horne, a licensed real estate salesperson, appealed a circuit court order affirming sanctions imposed by the Virginia Real Estate Board for violations of two regulations related to her handling of a buyer's earnest money deposit and financing pre-approval in a residential property transaction. The Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed the circuit court's decision, holding that the Board's findings were based on arbitrary and capricious interpretations of its regulations and were not supported by sufficient evidence. The court also determined that Horne was entitled to attorney's fees for defending the two counts that were the subject of the appeal, but not for the other counts that were not appealed, and remanded the case for calculation of those fees.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In Byrd v. Commonwealth, the defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon after police stopped and searched his vehicle based on a tip from a confidential informant. Byrd appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress the evidence, claiming the stop violated his Fourth Amendment rights due to insufficient probable cause. The Court of Appeals of Virginia, sitting en banc, affirmed the trial court's ruling. The court reasoned that under the totality of the circumstances, the informant's eighteen-month history of providing reliable information, combined with the specific details in the tip and partial corroboration by police observations in a high-crime area, established probable cause for the stop and search.

criminal lawprocedure

In Merritt v. Commonwealth, Glen Patrick Merritt was convicted by a jury of possession of ecstasy with intent to distribute (second or subsequent offense), transporting ecstasy into Virginia with intent to distribute, and conspiracy to possess ecstasy with intent to distribute. The charges stemmed from a police drug interdiction at a Virginia Beach bus depot, where Merritt was observed acting suspiciously near a bus arriving from New York, in connection with other individuals who retrieved a suitcase containing the drugs. A panel of the Court of Appeals had reversed the convictions for insufficient evidence that Merritt served as the "muscle" or lookout in the scheme, but upon rehearing en banc the full court affirmed the trial court's judgment. The court held that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, a rational factfinder could conclude Merritt aided and abetted the offenses as a principal in the second degree.

criminal law

The case involved Kevin Canty appealing the revocation of his suspended sentence for heroin possession after a second probation violation hearing. The trial court had previously revoked and resuspended part of his sentence based on other violations, but at that time was unaware of Canty's possession of heroin during an arrest related to the first violation. In the second hearing, based on a new conviction for that possession, the court again revoked part of the suspension. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court could consider the unconsidered prior conduct in a subsequent revocation because it had not been addressed before, consistent with the statutory authority under Code § 19.2-306 to revoke suspension for violations during the probation period.

criminal lawprocedure

In Rix v. Commonwealth, the defendant was convicted in a bench trial of driving under the influence of alcohol (second offense) and refusing a blood or breath test (second offense) under Virginia Code §§ 18.2-266 and 18.2-268.3. She argued on appeal that the evidence was insufficient because she had merely switched into the driver's seat of a running vehicle after a traffic stop and had not manipulated any mechanical components. The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the convictions, holding that an individual is in actual physical control of a vehicle—and thus operating it—when seated behind the steering wheel of a running car on a highway, even without putting it in motion or engaging additional controls, consistent with the statutory definition of an operator and prior precedent.

criminal law

This case involved four nursing home facilities operated by Avante appealing decisions by the Virginia Department of Medical Assistance Services (DMAS) that denied additional Medicaid reimbursements for respiratory therapy services provided to eligible patients in fiscal years 2002 and 2003. The facilities had contracted with an outside provider for these ancillary services and sought year-end settlement adjustments based on actual costs. The Court of Appeals of Virginia held that DMAS erred in its interpretation and application of federal and state regulations governing reasonable cost reimbursements, particularly by improperly using a survey to reject the salary equivalency rate and failing to recognize the costs as reasonable per se under the applicable rules. The court reversed the circuit court's affirmance of DMAS's decisions and remanded the case for reconsideration consistent with the proper regulatory application.

healthcarebusiness & regulatory

The case involved a challenge by commercial waterman Robert Hollowell to a Virginia Marine Resources Commission (VMRC) regulation, 4 VAC 20-1140-20, that prohibited crab dredging in state waters indefinitely. The circuit court ruled that the regulation exceeded the authority granted to VMRC under Code § 28.2-707, which permits seasonal adjustments to the crab dredging season but not a permanent ban, and it set aside part of the regulation while denying Hollowell's request for attorney's fees. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Virginia dismissed as moot Hollowell's claim that the entire regulatory scheme should have been invalidated, but held that he was entitled to attorney's fees under Code § 2.2-4030 because he substantially prevailed and VMRC's position was not substantially justified. The court remanded the fee determination to the circuit court. The core reasoning focused on the plain language of the enabling statute limiting VMRC's power to temporary seasonal modifications rather than an ongoing prohibition.

business & regulatoryenvironment

In Felton v. Commonwealth, Travis Jerome Felton appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine and marijuana, arguing that the trial court should have suppressed the evidence found during a search of an apartment because the warrant, which included an "all persons present" clause, was executed twelve days after issuance and thus was stale. The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the convictions. The court reasoned that Felton had conceded probable cause still existed to search the apartment itself at the time of execution, and because he did not challenge the magistrate's determination that anyone present would likely be engaged in drug activity, the officers were authorized to search all persons present as the warrant directed. The opinion emphasized that the "forthwith" execution requirement under Virginia law focuses on both reasonable dispatch and the continued existence of probable cause.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Marcus Darius Ford's appeal of his jury convictions for transporting more than five pounds of marijuana into Virginia with intent to distribute and for possessing more than five pounds of marijuana with intent to distribute. Ford challenged the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from his home via an anticipatory search warrant and the denial of his motions to strike and set aside the verdict on the transporting charge. The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the convictions, holding that the anticipatory warrant was properly executed after a controlled delivery of the package and that sufficient evidence connected Ford to the package, including his surveillance behavior and acceptance of the delivery, to support the transporting conviction under Code § 18.2-248.01.

criminal law

The case involved Johnny Edward Lawson, who was convicted of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute after police stopped his vehicle, detained him for a drug-sniffing dog, and found cocaine. Lawson argued on appeal that the stop violated his Fourth Amendment rights because it occurred away from his apartment while officers were executing a search warrant there. The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the conviction, holding that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop and detain Lawson based on surveillance observations of suspected drug activity, independent of the warrant. The court reasoned that the twenty to twenty-five minute detention while awaiting the canine unit was reasonable under Terry v. Ohio standards and did not exceed the scope of a lawful investigatory stop.

criminal lawcivil rights

This case involved John Gordon's appeal from the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Commission’s dismissal of his 2006 application for disability benefits as untimely under the two-year statute of limitations in Code § 65.2-708(A). The Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, affirmed the commission’s decision, holding that the tolling provision in subsection C, which deems wages from light-duty work as compensation for up to twenty-four consecutive months, applies only once per compensable injury. Gordon had returned to light-duty work earning at or above pre-injury wages in 2000, triggering the tolling period that ended in 2002, and with his last compensation payment in 2003, his application filed in 2006 was outside the limitations period. The court reasoned that the statutory language specifying “a period” not exceeding twenty-four consecutive months indicates a single, non-renewable extension.

labor & employmentprocedure

In Rivera-Padilla v. Commonwealth, the defendant appealed her conviction for welfare fraud, arguing that the trial court should have suppressed statements she made to Virginia Department of Social Services agents during an interview because they were coerced in violation of her Fifth Amendment rights. The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the conviction, holding that the statements were voluntary. The court reasoned that the agents did not condition the continuation of benefits on a waiver of her Fifth Amendment privilege or threaten to disqualify her for asserting the privilege, distinguishing the case from precedents like Garrity v. New Jersey where such penalties were imposed.

criminal lawprocedure

Lindsay Alan Bly was convicted after a bench trial of distributing an imitation controlled substance and methamphetamine based on purchases made by a confidential informant working with a drug task force. On appeal, Bly argued that the Commonwealth violated Brady v. Maryland by failing to disclose impeachment evidence about the informant and that he was entitled to a new trial. A panel of the Court of Appeals initially reversed, but upon rehearing en banc the court affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion for a new trial. The court concluded that the nondisclosure did not prejudice Bly or undermine confidence in the verdict.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Jack Edward Carter's appeal of his grand larceny conviction arising from a scheme in which he and an accomplice removed paint from a Home Depot shelf, placed it in a cart, and attempted to obtain a cash refund by falsely claiming it had been previously purchased. The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the conviction. The court held that the evidence was sufficient because Carter had taken possession of the paint and moved it within the store with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of the property, as demonstrated by the plan to obtain a fraudulent refund; asportation from the premises was not required, and the trial court could infer the requisite intent from the facts. The court rejected Carter's argument that he only intended a temporary taking or return of the paint.

criminal law

In Atkins v. Commonwealth, Marcus Atkins appealed his conviction for obstruction of justice under Virginia Code § 18.2-460 after he fled from police officers investigating a stolen license plate on his vehicle and later provided a false name when confronted. The Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed the conviction, holding that the evidence was insufficient to prove a violation of either subsection A or D of the statute. The court reasoned that mere flight from officers does not amount to obstruction under subsection A, which requires direct opposition or resistance, and that subsection D applies only when false statements are made during an investigation of a crime committed by someone other than the defendant. Because the police were investigating crimes committed by Atkins himself, the false name did not trigger liability under subsection D.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a divorce between Julie Ann Layton Doering and Neal Joseph Doering, where the wife appealed the trial court's refusal to incorporate their property settlement agreement (PSA) into the final divorce decree and its reduction of spousal support payments. The PSA specified that spousal support of $4,000 per month could be modified upon a material change in circumstances. The trial court found the PSA valid but declined incorporation because the husband lacked the financial ability to meet the obligations due to a significant reduction in his income, and it modified the support accordingly. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed, holding that the PSA expressly permitted modification and that the court was not required to incorporate the agreement before ruling on the modification request under Virginia Code provisions.

family law

Steven Lamont Joel Scott was convicted in a Virginia trial court of multiple offenses and sentenced to imprisonment with a suspended portion conditioned on probation. After his probation supervision was transferred to Ohio under the Interstate Compact, an Ohio court convicted him of new crimes and also found him in violation of his Virginia probation, imposing a concurrent sentence. Scott argued that the Ohio judgment barred further action in Virginia under the Full Faith and Credit Clause and Virginia Code § 53.1-172. The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the trial court's revocation of probation, reasoning that the Ohio court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of the Virginia probation violation or impose a sentence for it, as its authority under the Compact was limited to a preliminary determination of probable cause for retaking the probationer.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves a second appeal by Lucian Dabney Robinson challenging the spousal support awarded to his ex-wife Susan Beller Robinson in their divorce. The Court of Appeals of Virginia reviewed the trial court's detailed findings on the factors under Code § 20-107.1(E), including the wife's income from assets and her needs to maintain her standard of living. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding $5,000 per month in spousal support and affirmed the decision. It also granted the wife's request for attorney's fees on appeal.

family law

The case involved Eric Ghameshlouy, who was convicted of a local misdemeanor under a Virginia Beach city ordinance for failing to provide correct identification to police, as well as related state-law offenses including cocaine possession. Ghameshlouy appealed both the misdemeanor and a state felony conviction but named only the Commonwealth of Virginia as the appellee in his notice of appeal and did not identify the City of Virginia Beach as a party. The Court of Appeals of Virginia dismissed the appeal of the misdemeanor conviction, holding that it lacked jurisdiction because the City was an indispensable prosecuting party that must be named to perfect an appeal under Rule 5A:6 and related precedent. The court reasoned that failure to join an indispensable party constitutes a jurisdictional defect requiring dismissal, and Ghameshlouy had not filed a timely notice naming the correct party within 30 days of the final order on the local charge.

criminal lawprocedure