Elizabeth A. McClanahan

The case involved James Gregory Marshall, who had prior convictions for aggravated sexual battery and failure to register as a sex offender, and was charged with knowingly failing to reregister as required under Code § 18.2-472.1(B) after missing his April 2009 deadline due to travel to California. Marshall argued that the statute's use of 'knowingly' required proof of specific intent and that the evidence was insufficient to convict him. The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the conviction, holding that 'knowingly' means the defendant was aware of the registration duty but failed to fulfill it, without needing to show bad purpose or specific intent. The court reasoned from the plain statutory language, legislative intent, dictionary definitions, and federal precedents interpreting similar SORNA provisions that the law is not a specific-intent offense, and the undisputed facts established Marshall's knowledge and failure to reregister on time.

criminal law

Judy Carol Horne, a licensed real estate salesperson, appealed a circuit court order affirming sanctions imposed by the Virginia Real Estate Board for violations of two regulations related to her handling of a buyer's earnest money deposit and financing pre-approval in a residential property transaction. The Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed the circuit court's decision, holding that the Board's findings were based on arbitrary and capricious interpretations of its regulations and were not supported by sufficient evidence. The court also determined that Horne was entitled to attorney's fees for defending the two counts that were the subject of the appeal, but not for the other counts that were not appealed, and remanded the case for calculation of those fees.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In Byrd v. Commonwealth, the defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon after police stopped and searched his vehicle based on a tip from a confidential informant. Byrd appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress the evidence, claiming the stop violated his Fourth Amendment rights due to insufficient probable cause. The Court of Appeals of Virginia, sitting en banc, affirmed the trial court's ruling. The court reasoned that under the totality of the circumstances, the informant's eighteen-month history of providing reliable information, combined with the specific details in the tip and partial corroboration by police observations in a high-crime area, established probable cause for the stop and search.

criminal lawprocedure

In Merritt v. Commonwealth, Glen Patrick Merritt was convicted by a jury of possession of ecstasy with intent to distribute (second or subsequent offense), transporting ecstasy into Virginia with intent to distribute, and conspiracy to possess ecstasy with intent to distribute. The charges stemmed from a police drug interdiction at a Virginia Beach bus depot, where Merritt was observed acting suspiciously near a bus arriving from New York, in connection with other individuals who retrieved a suitcase containing the drugs. A panel of the Court of Appeals had reversed the convictions for insufficient evidence that Merritt served as the "muscle" or lookout in the scheme, but upon rehearing en banc the full court affirmed the trial court's judgment. The court held that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, a rational factfinder could conclude Merritt aided and abetted the offenses as a principal in the second degree.

criminal law

The case involved Kevin Canty appealing the revocation of his suspended sentence for heroin possession after a second probation violation hearing. The trial court had previously revoked and resuspended part of his sentence based on other violations, but at that time was unaware of Canty's possession of heroin during an arrest related to the first violation. In the second hearing, based on a new conviction for that possession, the court again revoked part of the suspension. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court could consider the unconsidered prior conduct in a subsequent revocation because it had not been addressed before, consistent with the statutory authority under Code § 19.2-306 to revoke suspension for violations during the probation period.

criminal lawprocedure

In Rix v. Commonwealth, the defendant was convicted in a bench trial of driving under the influence of alcohol (second offense) and refusing a blood or breath test (second offense) under Virginia Code §§ 18.2-266 and 18.2-268.3. She argued on appeal that the evidence was insufficient because she had merely switched into the driver's seat of a running vehicle after a traffic stop and had not manipulated any mechanical components. The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the convictions, holding that an individual is in actual physical control of a vehicle—and thus operating it—when seated behind the steering wheel of a running car on a highway, even without putting it in motion or engaging additional controls, consistent with the statutory definition of an operator and prior precedent.

criminal law