David William Evans

This case is an original mandamus proceeding in which Palm Harbor Homes and Palm Harbor Village sought to overturn trial court orders denying their motions to compel arbitration under agreements signed during the Ripples' purchase of a manufactured home. The underlying dispute involved claims for breach of contract, warranty, and violations of the Residential Construction Liability Act based on alleged defects in the home. The court found that an opt-out provision in one arbitration agreement rendered it invalid and unconscionable as to the Manufacturer but valid as to the Retailer, which had no such option. Because the claims against both parties were based on the same operative facts and were inherently inseparable, the court held that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to compel arbitration of all claims under the Federal Arbitration Act. It therefore would reverse the denial and order arbitration to proceed.

procedure

This case was an interlocutory appeal by Capital One challenging a trial court's certification of two nationwide classes of credit card holders in a suit alleging breach of the customer agreement through the bank's policies on late fees (for payments received after a cutoff time on the due date) and recurring overlimit fees (charged each billing period the balance remained over the limit). The trial court had certified an Overlimit Fee Class and a Late Fee Class under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 42. The appellate court reversed the certification order after reviewing the requirements from Southwestern Refining Co. v. Bernal and Intratex Gas Co. v. Beeson, concluding that the classes failed to meet standards such as predominance of common issues and that individual differences in claims could not be resolved through class-wide evidence like statistics. The case was remanded with instructions to decertify both classes, without prejudice to further consideration of certification.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involved an appeal from a take-nothing summary judgment on a cross-claim for breach of a one-year sales agency agreement. After appellee acquired the original company and continued the appellant's role as an independent sales representative, the parties exchanged letters and engaged in discussions about the terms of the ongoing relationship; appellee later terminated the arrangement, leading to the lawsuit. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's summary judgment and remanded for trial, holding that the summary judgment evidence raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the parties intended to form an enforceable one-year contract. The court examined the original written agreement's provisions on termination and transfer upon sale, along with subsequent correspondence referencing continued representation for at least a year, to reach this conclusion.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a personal injury suit by Marian Armstrong against Nissan after her 1986 Nissan 300ZX experienced unintended acceleration in a parking lot, causing crashes that injured her foot and led to reflex sympathetic dystrophy. The jury found Nissan liable on multiple grounds including negligence, design/manufacturing/marketing defects, and gross negligence, awarding substantial actual and punitive damages, though the trial court granted JNOV on fraud, misrepresentation, warranty, and DTPA claims. On appeal, Nissan challenged the sufficiency of evidence for defects and punitive damages, a negligence per se instruction, and admission of other similar incidents. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, holding that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the products liability findings, that similar-incident evidence was properly admitted to show knowledge of the risk, and that the trial court properly ordered remittitur on punitive damages.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a dispute between Westchester Fire Insurance Company, an excess insurer, and its insured Stewart & Stevenson Services over whether the Westchester policy was required to drop down and cover a $1.148 million settlement in an employment lawsuit after the primary Lloyds policy's aggregate limits were allegedly exhausted. The trial court granted summary judgment to Stewart & Stevenson, but the appellate court reversed, holding that the Westchester policy was not triggered. The court reasoned that the Westchester policy's EPI endorsement expressly excluded defense costs from the definition of covered "loss," unlike the Lloyds EPI endorsement, and that a non-drop down endorsement prevented coverage when underlying limits were exhausted by payments not covered under the Westchester policy; as a result, the aggregate limits of the Lloyds policy were not properly exhausted for purposes of triggering excess coverage.

business & regulatory

The case concerned whether Dallas Fire Insurance Company had a duty under a commercial general liability policy to defend its insured, Carlyle King d/b/a Tiedown Construction Company, in a personal injury suit filed by Greg Jankowiak. Jankowiak alleged that King's employee intentionally assaulted him and that King was vicariously liable and also negligent in hiring, training, and supervising the employee. The trial court granted summary judgment for the insurer on the ground that no duty to defend existed, and the court of appeals affirmed. The court held that the assault did not qualify as an 'occurrence' or 'accident' under the policy because the resulting injury was the expected result of intentional conduct, and the separation-of-insureds clause did not alter this conclusion when the claim was viewed from the standpoint of the employee-insured. The court further concluded that the policy's intentional-injury exclusion applied.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

Triad Home Renovators sued to enforce a mechanic's lien against property owner Dickey for renovation work performed on leased premises occupied by tenant Platter, Inc., and also asserted claims for quantum meruit and unjust enrichment based on an alleged agency relationship between Dickey and the tenant. The trial court granted summary judgment for Dickey, declaring the lien invalid, clearing title, and denying Triad's claims, including an award of attorney's fees. On appeal, the court affirmed, holding that the lease expressly disclaimed any agency between landlord and tenant, that Dickey provided uncontroverted evidence of no involvement or holding out of authority, and that Triad failed to properly raise discovery issues or support its other claims. The decision rested on the absence of any genuine issue of material fact regarding agency or the validity of the lien affidavit.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

In Brown v. State, appellant Koretta L. Brown pleaded guilty without a recommendation to aggravated robbery, after which the trial court deferred a guilt finding, reviewed a presentence investigation report, heard sentencing testimony, found her guilty, and imposed an eight-year prison sentence. Brown argued on appeal that the trial court erred by not sua sponte withdrawing her guilty plea as involuntary, citing her sentencing testimony that a co-defendant forced her participation and that she lacked intent to commit the offense. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that receipt of statutory plea admonishments provided prima facie evidence of a knowing and voluntary plea and that precedents such as Moon v. State and Solis v. State establish no duty for the trial court to withdraw a guilty plea on its own when a defendant has waived a jury. The core reasoning was that the trial judge, as fact-finder, may weigh any post-plea evidence of innocence or coercion without needing to enter a not-guilty plea, and Brown had not requested withdrawal of her plea.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the Hamptons suing the University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center for medical malpractice after Jerry Hampton fell from his hospital bed following surgery, alleging the hospital failed to secure bed rails and activate an alarm. The hospital, as a governmental unit, asserted sovereign immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act. The trial court granted the hospital's plea to the jurisdiction, but the appellate court reversed, holding that the allegations of providing a defective bed lacking essential safety components and misusing the property by not activating them stated a claim within the Act's waiver of immunity for injuries caused by the condition or use of tangible personal property. The court reasoned that this was not mere non-use but a failure to properly use the safety features, distinguishing it from cases of complete non-use.

torts & liabilityhealthcareprocedure

This case involves a dispute over the interpretation of a will provision distributing an estate to "nieces and nephews" after the testator's wife predeceased him. The plaintiffs, the testator's blood relatives, sought a declaratory judgment that the term referred only to them, not to the wife's relatives, and obtained summary judgment in the trial court. The appellate court reversed, holding that the plaintiffs failed to conclusively establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding the testator's intent, given evidence that the couple treated all nieces and nephews equally and executed similar wills. The court remanded the case for further proceedings to resolve the ambiguity in the will's language.

family lawproperty

This case arose from a fatal head-on collision in a reversible HOV lane on Highway 290, where a wrong-way driver struck the plaintiffs' vehicle; the plaintiffs sued TxDot, Metro, and others under the Texas Tort Claims Act alleging negligence in the design and operation of the transitway system. The jury found Metro 50 percent negligent, found that Metro and TxDot were engaged in a joint enterprise, and awarded damages, leading the trial court to enter judgment against TxDot for the statutory cap. TxDot appealed, arguing that sovereign immunity barred liability for Metro's negligence and that the Act does not impose vicarious responsibility. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the Transitways Agreement established a joint enterprise so that TxDot could be held liable for Metro's negligence regarding the premises under the Act's waiver provisions. The court also found any evidentiary error harmless and noted that TxDot had waived its damages challenge.

torts & liability

This case is an appeal by R. Palmer Beasley from the trial court's denial of his motion for summary judgment in a suit by Dorothy Clark alleging wrongful termination, negligent hiring, and intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from her employment at the University of Texas Health Science Center. The court reversed the trial court's order and rendered a take-nothing judgment for Beasley in both his individual and official capacities. The core reasoning is that a prior judgment in favor of the governmental entity on claims under the Texas Tort Claims Act involving the same subject matter bars further action against the employee under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.106, following the Texas Supreme Court's holding in Newman v. Obersteller.

proceduretorts & liability

This case is a breach of contract action in which Sonitrol of Houston sued Ahmed Rabie on a personal guaranty and obtained a summary judgment after Rabie filed only a general denial and did not respond to the motion. Rabie moved for a new trial, supported by his affidavit stating he never received the motion or any certified-mail notice from the post office. The trial court denied the motion, but the appeals court reversed and remanded, holding that the postal notations on the returned envelope did not controvert Rabie's sworn statement and therefore failed to satisfy the service requirements of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 21a. Because Rabie established lack of notice, he was not required to satisfy the Craddock factors for granting a new trial.

procedure

In Crow v. State, the defendant sought habeas corpus relief after a mistrial was declared in his murder trial when the prosecutor slapped him on the back during closing arguments, arguing that double jeopardy under the U.S. and Texas constitutions barred retrial. The trial court denied relief, and the appellate court affirmed that decision. The court reviewed evidence from the habeas hearing, including testimony that the prosecutor acted spontaneously for dramatic emphasis without intending to cause a mistrial and did not anticipate one would be granted. Applying the relevant standards, the court found no intent to provoke a mistrial under federal law and no reckless disregard under state law, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved Marcy Rogers appealing a summary judgment dismissing her libel claims and other causes of action against the Dallas Morning News, reporter Olive Talley, and related defendants. Rogers alleged that twelve 1991 articles falsely portrayed her management of the International Craniofacial Foundation, including issues with fundraising, finances, and board operations following her divorce and departure from a prior charity. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, holding that Rogers failed to raise fact issues on falsity, defamation, actual malice, or lack of privilege, and that the trial court properly denied her motion for continuance while also rejecting her non-libel claims.

free speechtorts & liability

In Jobe v. Penske Truck Leasing Corp., the plaintiff was injured when a defective roll-up cargo door on a rented truck sprang upward, jammed, and caused an unsecured latch to smash his thumb. He sued Penske under a strict products liability theory, alleging a marketing defect for failure to warn users to fully secure the latch mechanism. The trial court granted Penske a directed verdict on the marketing defect claim and refused to submit it to the jury. The appellate court reversed, holding that Jobe had introduced evidence sufficient to raise fact issues on each required element, including the existence of a foreseeable risk, Penske's knowledge or constructive knowledge, the product's unreasonable danger without a warning, and causation based on Jobe's testimony that he would have followed an adequate warning.

torts & liability

This case involved plaintiffs Dyson Descendant Corporation and related individuals suing Sonat Exploration Company and Sonat Minerals, Inc. for a declaratory judgment asserting an ownership interest or right of reverter in mineral estates within the James Dyson League in Orange County, Texas, on the grounds that 1837 deeds to Whiting and Runnells were void due to alleged fraud and other defects. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, quieting title in Sonat Minerals based on the validity of those deeds and a later conveyance to Sonat, and also imposed sanctions on the plaintiffs and their attorney. On appeal, the court held that the plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding the deeds' validity or any subsequent reacquisition of title by the Dyson line, affirming the summary judgment on the merits. However, it reversed the sanctions award, finding it improper, and remanded the issue of attorney fees. The decision rested on established standards for summary judgment review and the absence of evidence challenging the recorded chain of title.

propertyprocedure

This case involved the appeal of Judy Lynn Crawford's conviction for capital murder after a jury found she had hired two men to kill her husband. The trial court sentenced her to life imprisonment following the guilty verdict. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the evidence, including accomplice testimony from the two men involved, was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Crawford had orchestrated the murder. The court addressed issues related to the reliability of the accomplices' accounts and rejected claims that additional evidence, such as a Crime Stoppers report, required reversal.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved five Beaumont police officers who claimed they were demoted or constructively discharged by city officials in retaliation for reporting violations of the City Charter's local hiring preference rules. The officers sued the City of Beaumont and officials under the Texas Whistleblower Act (Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6252-16a), also alleging violations of their rights to free speech and assembly. After two jury trials, the trial court entered judgment for the plaintiffs awarding damages, reinstatement-related relief, and attorney fees. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the City Charter qualifies as "law" under the Whistleblower Act and that the evidence supported the awards.

labor & employmentfree speechcivil rights

This case concerned whether insurance companies had a duty to defend their insureds in a third-party lawsuit alleging violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, common law fraud, and negligence, along with a request for declaratory relief. The underlying complaint involved the sale of land that was later placed in a flood control district, resulting in higher taxes and reduced property value, but no work was done on the purchased tracts. The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurers, finding no duty to defend as a matter of law, and the appellate court affirmed. The court reasoned that the policies covered only bodily injury or property damage (defined as physical injury to tangible property or loss of use caused by an occurrence), and the factual allegations in the complaint described only economic harms like increased ad valorem taxes and unsalability, not covered property damage. The decision focused strictly on the allegations in the petition without regard to their truth.

propertybusiness & regulatorytorts & liability