This case is an original mandamus proceeding in which Palm Harbor Homes and Palm Harbor Village sought to overturn trial court orders denying their motions to compel arbitration under agreements signed during the Ripples' purchase of a manufactured home. The underlying dispute involved claims for breach of contract, warranty, and violations of the Residential Construction Liability Act based on alleged defects in the home. The court found that an opt-out provision in one arbitration agreement rendered it invalid and unconscionable as to the Manufacturer but valid as to the Retailer, which had no such option. Because the claims against both parties were based on the same operative facts and were inherently inseparable, the court held that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to compel arbitration of all claims under the Federal Arbitration Act. It therefore would reverse the denial and order arbitration to proceed.
This case was an interlocutory appeal by Capital One challenging a trial court's certification of two nationwide classes of credit card holders in a suit alleging breach of the customer agreement through the bank's policies on late fees (for payments received after a cutoff time on the due date) and recurring overlimit fees (charged each billing period the balance remained over the limit). The trial court had certified an Overlimit Fee Class and a Late Fee Class under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 42. The appellate court reversed the certification order after reviewing the requirements from Southwestern Refining Co. v. Bernal and Intratex Gas Co. v. Beeson, concluding that the classes failed to meet standards such as predominance of common issues and that individual differences in claims could not be resolved through class-wide evidence like statistics. The case was remanded with instructions to decertify both classes, without prejudice to further consideration of certification.
This case involved an appeal from a take-nothing summary judgment on a cross-claim for breach of a one-year sales agency agreement. After appellee acquired the original company and continued the appellant's role as an independent sales representative, the parties exchanged letters and engaged in discussions about the terms of the ongoing relationship; appellee later terminated the arrangement, leading to the lawsuit. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's summary judgment and remanded for trial, holding that the summary judgment evidence raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the parties intended to form an enforceable one-year contract. The court examined the original written agreement's provisions on termination and transfer upon sale, along with subsequent correspondence referencing continued representation for at least a year, to reach this conclusion.
The case involved a personal injury suit by Marian Armstrong against Nissan after her 1986 Nissan 300ZX experienced unintended acceleration in a parking lot, causing crashes that injured her foot and led to reflex sympathetic dystrophy. The jury found Nissan liable on multiple grounds including negligence, design/manufacturing/marketing defects, and gross negligence, awarding substantial actual and punitive damages, though the trial court granted JNOV on fraud, misrepresentation, warranty, and DTPA claims. On appeal, Nissan challenged the sufficiency of evidence for defects and punitive damages, a negligence per se instruction, and admission of other similar incidents. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, holding that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the products liability findings, that similar-incident evidence was properly admitted to show knowledge of the risk, and that the trial court properly ordered remittitur on punitive damages.
This case involved a dispute between Westchester Fire Insurance Company, an excess insurer, and its insured Stewart & Stevenson Services over whether the Westchester policy was required to drop down and cover a $1.148 million settlement in an employment lawsuit after the primary Lloyds policy's aggregate limits were allegedly exhausted. The trial court granted summary judgment to Stewart & Stevenson, but the appellate court reversed, holding that the Westchester policy was not triggered. The court reasoned that the Westchester policy's EPI endorsement expressly excluded defense costs from the definition of covered "loss," unlike the Lloyds EPI endorsement, and that a non-drop down endorsement prevented coverage when underlying limits were exhausted by payments not covered under the Westchester policy; as a result, the aggregate limits of the Lloyds policy were not properly exhausted for purposes of triggering excess coverage.
The case concerned whether Dallas Fire Insurance Company had a duty under a commercial general liability policy to defend its insured, Carlyle King d/b/a Tiedown Construction Company, in a personal injury suit filed by Greg Jankowiak. Jankowiak alleged that King's employee intentionally assaulted him and that King was vicariously liable and also negligent in hiring, training, and supervising the employee. The trial court granted summary judgment for the insurer on the ground that no duty to defend existed, and the court of appeals affirmed. The court held that the assault did not qualify as an 'occurrence' or 'accident' under the policy because the resulting injury was the expected result of intentional conduct, and the separation-of-insureds clause did not alter this conclusion when the claim was viewed from the standpoint of the employee-insured. The court further concluded that the policy's intentional-injury exclusion applied.