Kenny Armstrong

The case concerned a breach-of-contract claim brought by Jenny Mallery Vergos, as executrix of her late husband Nick Vergos’s estate and as his assignee, against Charles Vergos Rendezvous, Inc. (CVR). She alleged that CVR had stopped making the minimum annual $200,000 payments required by a 2006 shareholders’ agreement after Nick’s death. The suit was originally filed in Shelby County Chancery Court but was transferred to Shelby County Probate Court, which granted summary judgment to CVR; the Court of Appeals vacated that judgment. The appellate court held that the probate court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the claim was a straightforward contract action, not a matter involving the administration of the estate or the executrix’s fiduciary duties. Tennessee probate-court jurisdiction is limited to matters conferred by constitution or statute, and local ordinances cannot expand it; therefore the case must be returned to chancery court.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a dispute between the parents of a young child over the mother's proposed relocation more than 50 miles away, which triggered Tennessee’s parental relocation statute. After the father objected and sought a modified parenting plan, the trial court denied the mother’s relocation petition on best-interest grounds and, when she remained in the new location, designated the father as primary residential parent with substantially increased parenting time. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the mother had stipulated to entry of the modified plan at a March 2025 hearing, thereby relieving the trial court of any obligation to make independent best-interest findings under the statutory factors. The appellate court further noted that the original denial of relocation complied with the relocation statute’s requirements.

family law

The case arose after Shelby County terminated Stephanie Taylor’s employment in 2017; the Shelby County Civil Service Merit Board reinstated her with back pay, but the county petitioned the chancery court for judicial review and a stay via writ of certiorari. Years later, the county voluntarily dismissed its petition, prompting Taylor to file a separate petition for a writ of mandamus seeking enforcement of the Board’s order with a specific back-pay calculation. The trial court dismissed Taylor’s mandamus petition, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The appellate court held that the mandamus action was improperly joined with the county’s earlier appellate proceeding under Goodwin v. Metropolitan Board of Health and that mandamus was unavailable because the Board’s order left the back-pay amount undefined, leaving no clear ministerial duty for the court to enforce.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved Renee’ Niter-Martin, suing as next of kin for her mother Rosie Niter, who alleged that Quince Nursing and Rehabilitation Center was negligent in the decedent’s care during her stays at the facility, resulting in injuries such as pressure sores and ultimately her death; the complaint included claims for negligence and wrongful death. Quince moved to compel arbitration, asserting that the decedent had signed a binding arbitration agreement as part of her admission paperwork. The trial court denied the motion, finding that Quince had not authenticated the agreement or otherwise proven the existence of a valid contract to arbitrate. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Quince bore the burden of establishing an authenticated arbitration agreement and failed to do so, leaving no admissible evidence of a contract that would require arbitration.

healthcaretorts & liabilityprocedure

In this case, a real estate brokerage company sued a homeowner for breach of an exclusive listing agreement, seeking a 6% commission after the owner transferred his marital home by quitclaim deed to himself and another person shortly after the agreement’s expiration date and during his divorce. The trial court granted the company’s motion for summary judgment, awarding the commission plus attorney’s fees, after deeming the company’s requests for admission admitted due to the owner’s failure to respond and treating the company’s statement of undisputed facts as conceded. The Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the admitted facts did not establish a breach as a matter of law because the contract made payment of the commission contingent on a defined “Closing”—which required delivery of a warranty deed and full payment of the purchase price, execution of a deed of trust, promissory note, or 1031 exchange—none of which occurred. The court further noted that the carry-over clause was not triggered and that the post-expiration quitclaim transfers did not satisfy these conditions precedent. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

This case involves the termination of Michael S.’s parental rights to his daughter Lay’la R., who was born drug-exposed with serious medical conditions and placed in DCS custody shortly after birth. Father appealed only the juvenile court’s denial of his motion for a continuance; the Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request. Although Father did not challenge the termination itself, the appellate court reviewed and affirmed it, finding that DCS proved multiple grounds, including abandonment by an incarcerated parent through failure to visit or support and wanton disregard, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, and failure to manifest an ability or willingness to assume custody. The court also upheld the finding that termination was in the child’s best interest, citing Father’s complete lack of contact, failure to complete any required assessments or drug screens, absence of a bond with the child, and the child’s need for ongoing medical care in her stable foster placement.

family law

In this case, Marilyn Butcher and her husband sued the Shelby County Board of Education after she was seriously injured in a car accident on November 13, 2020, when a vehicle driven by Board employee Jewel Dockery, who was 100% at fault, struck her car while turning from a school driveway. The trial court denied the Board's motion to dismiss, admitted testimony from two of Butcher's treating physicians and certain medical records, found that the Board had admitted Dockery's employment status in its answer, and entered judgment for the plaintiffs. On appeal, the Board challenged the removal of its governmental immunity under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, the admission of the physicians' testimony and billing records, and the finding of causation. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Board's answer conclusively established the employment relationship needed to waive immunity, that the evidence was properly admitted, and that the remaining issues were moot or without merit; it also denied the plaintiffs' request for frivolous appeal damages.

proceduretorts & liability

In this case, a father appealed a trial court order granting a petition by the children's mother and maternal grandmother to change the minor children's surnames from his last name, based on allegations that the parents' pending criminal charges—including multiple counts of sexual abuse against the father and child neglect against the mother—had caused the children public embarrassment and humiliation in their community. The Chancery Court for Sumner County granted the name change after a hearing with testimony from the family members and admission of the indictments, finding that the change was in the children's best interests given their own stated wishes, local publicity about the charges, and minimal impact on the father-child relationship. On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals declined to address four of the father's issues due to deficiencies in his brief and, as to the remaining issue challenging the best-interests finding, noted the complete absence of a transcript or statement of the evidence from the hearing. Because of that missing record, the court presumed the trial evidence supported the lower court's conclusions and therefore affirmed the name-change order.

family lawprocedure

In this healthcare liability case, Romeashea Springfield sued Dr. Darwin Eton and his employer, UT Regional One Physicians, after complications from knee surgery resulted in the amputation of her leg, alleging negligence in the treatment of a popliteal artery injury. The trial court granted Dr. Eton’s motion to dismiss under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02 and the employer’s motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12.03, finding that Springfield failed to comply with the pre-suit notice requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121 by sending the notice letter to an address where it was not received by Dr. Eton or his authorized agent, which caused the statute of limitations to bar the claims against him. The court then applied the common-law operation-of-law exception to dismiss the vicarious liability claims against the employer once the claims against the doctor were procedurally barred. On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the statutory notice rules were not satisfied and that the exception properly precluded the remaining claims against the employer.

healthcareproceduretorts & liability

Gerald Kiner appealed from the Shelby County Chancery Court after filing multiple lawsuits under the Tennessee Public Records Act, seeking an order from the Court of Appeals to strike allegedly disparaging remarks by the trial judge from the transcript and orders, plus a letter of reprimand against the judge. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, holding that Kiner’s pro se brief failed to meet basic requirements under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27, including proper tables of contents and authorities with page numbers and an adequate statement of the case. Even setting those deficiencies aside, the court explained that it lacked authority to alter trial court records or discipline judges, as such matters fall under the jurisdiction of the Board of Judicial Conduct rather than an appellate court reviewing the case. The opinion concludes that the requested relief is unavailable, rendering the appeal moot.

procedure

This is a termination of parental rights case in which the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services petitioned to terminate Mother Teia S.’s rights to her young child Toni S. after the child was removed due to an incident of neglect involving drug use and unstable housing. The juvenile court ruled that DCS failed to prove any statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence and that termination was not in the child’s best interest. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the record did not support the trial court’s findings on either grounds or best interest. The appellate court determined that evidence of the mother’s ongoing cocaine addiction, failure to complete treatment or maintain stability, limited and disruptive visitation, lack of meaningful bond, and the child’s medical needs that require consistency all supported termination as in the child’s best interest. The case was remanded for entry of an order terminating the mother’s parental rights.

family law

Marshall Turley sued John Mendez in Shelby County Circuit Court for malicious prosecution, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress after Mendez reported an alleged assault to police in 2022, leading to Turley’s arrest and criminal charges that were later dropped via nolle prosequi. The trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, ruling that the defamation claims were time-barred and that the other claims lacked sufficient factual allegations. On appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed the case without addressing the merits. The court held that Turley’s pro se brief failed to comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 by omitting a table of contents, table of authorities, statement of the case and facts, standard of review, record citations, and any coherent legal argument supported by authority. Because pro se litigants must meet the same procedural standards as represented parties, these deficiencies resulted in waiver of all issues.

criminal lawproceduretorts & liability

In this divorce case, Kimberly Sue Speranza appealed the trial court's denial of her Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59.04 motion to alter or amend the final divorce decree, arguing that she and her husband had not reached a full agreement on dividing two marital assets—stock in his company, InsuranceAssist, Inc., and funds held by the court clerk—despite orally announcing a settlement during trial. The parties, married for 21 years, had declared themselves divorced in court and submitted competing proposed final decrees, but no written property-settlement agreement was filed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, holding that the oral announcement in open court was sufficient for the trial court to enter the decree and divide the assets as described, with the clerk's funds awarded based on the remaining balance after prior disbursements. The court also upheld the award of attorney's fees to the husband under an enforcement provision that both parties had proposed in their draft decrees.

family lawpropertyprocedure

In this second appeal, Mariah Shelton sought attorney’s fees and costs from Jessica Garvin after an earlier reversal in Garvin I, relying on Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-12-119—which awards such fees when a motion to dismiss is granted—and on the appellate mandate remanding the case “for collection of costs.” The trial court denied Shelton’s motion, which originally requested fees for the entire appellate process but was later limited to trial-court costs. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that section 20-12-119 does not apply because Shelton’s motion to dismiss had been denied in the trial court and that ruling was left undisturbed. The court further explained that the prior mandate’s reference to “costs” meant only ordinary court costs, not attorney’s fees, for which no statutory basis existed.

procedure

William Ferguson sued the State of Tennessee for damages after a University of Memphis police officer allegedly ran a red light and struck his vehicle in July 2023. He filed a claim with the Division of Claims and Risk Management, which denied it on November 2, 2023; he then mailed a notice of appeal to the Claims Commission on January 31, 2024, which was filed on February 5, 2024. The Claims Commission dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because it was filed after the 90-day statutory deadline under Tennessee Code Annotated section 9-8-402(c). The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the deadline runs from the date of the denial notice itself rather than from service or receipt, so Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 6.05’s mailing extension did not apply and the three-day delay was fatal.

proceduretorts & liability

In this post-divorce case, Kathryn Summers-O’Rourke filed a contempt petition against her former husband, Patrick O’Rourke, Jr., after he missed several transitional alimony and alimony in futuro payments required by their Marital Dissolution Agreement, which included a provision awarding reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in enforcement actions. By the time of the hearing, the husband had paid the overdue alimony, leaving only the amount of the wife’s attorney’s fees and expenses at issue; the trial court awarded her $2,500 after she sought over $14,000 in fees. The Tennessee Court of Appeals vacated that award and remanded the case, holding that the trial court had made insufficient findings and failed to apply the reasonableness factors in Rule 1.5(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct, preventing meaningful appellate review. The court also denied the husband’s request for appellate attorney’s fees.

family law

The case concerned whether a Tennessee statute capping the voting membership of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County’s legislative body at 20 members violates Article VII, section 1 of the Tennessee Constitution. That provision generally limits county legislative bodies to 25 members but expressly exempts consolidated governments such as Metro from this restriction. The majority upheld the statutory cap, concluding that the constitutional exemption merely renders the 25-member ceiling inapplicable to Metro and does not prevent the General Assembly from imposing a different, lower limit. In dissent, Judge Armstrong argued that the plain meaning of “exempt” relieves Metro from the membership restriction altogether, so the legislature may not force Metro’s body below 25 members even though the exemption permits more than 25. He reasoned that equating “exempt” with “inapplicable” negates the benefit the Constitution confers and allows the General Assembly to impose a limit from which Metro is expressly freed.

elections

The case concerned a dispute between co-trustees Amanda Hearn and Sharon Thomas over the Cooper Family Trust, in which Hearn sought to amend her earlier petition for injunctive relief to add a claim that Thomas’s separate declaratory judgment action had triggered the trust’s no-contest clause and forfeited Thomas’s beneficiary status. The trial court granted Hearn leave to amend over Thomas’s objection, later awarded partial summary judgment enforcing the clause against Thomas, and removed her as trustee. The Court of Appeals vacated the order allowing the amendment, holding that the trial court neither identified nor applied the relevant factors for deciding motions to amend—such as undue delay, prejudice, or futility—nor provided any explanation for its ruling. Without such analysis or reasoning in the record, the appellate court concluded it could not conduct meaningful review of the decision and therefore remanded the case for reconsideration and entry of a properly explained order.

procedurepropertyfamily law

This case involves a dispute between neighboring property owners in Putnam County, Tennessee, where Jeffrey Heatley and the Estate of Kathryn Heatley sued the Estate of David G. Gaither and related parties, alleging a continuing nuisance from e. coli-contaminated wastewater allegedly leaching onto their land from a dismantled septic system that once served the Gaither property. The Heatleys had previously lost a related trespass claim on appeal, which upheld an easement for the septic system. The trial court granted summary judgment to Patricia W. Gaither on the nuisance claim, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The appellate court held that the Heatleys failed to meet their burden at the summary judgment stage by presenting no evidence—beyond their own allegations and a declaration—that contaminated wastewater was actually seeping from the system after it was permanently dismantled and sealed under state supervision in 2014. Without proof of an ongoing nuisance, the claim could not proceed.

propertytorts & liability

John Schmeeckle sued Hamilton County and several officials after his eviction in a forcible entry and detainer action; the trial court dismissed the lawsuit on September 20, 2023. Schmeeckle filed a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59.04 motion to alter or amend on October 23, 2023—more than thirty days after the final judgment—which the trial court denied as untimely on February 26, 2024. He then filed a notice of appeal on March 26, 2024, seeking review of both orders. The Court of Appeals held that an untimely post-judgment motion does not toll the thirty-day deadline for filing a notice of appeal under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4, so the notice was late and the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, resulting in dismissal of the appeal.

procedureproperty