The case concerned a breach-of-contract claim brought by Jenny Mallery Vergos, as executrix of her late husband Nick Vergos’s estate and as his assignee, against Charles Vergos Rendezvous, Inc. (CVR). She alleged that CVR had stopped making the minimum annual $200,000 payments required by a 2006 shareholders’ agreement after Nick’s death. The suit was originally filed in Shelby County Chancery Court but was transferred to Shelby County Probate Court, which granted summary judgment to CVR; the Court of Appeals vacated that judgment. The appellate court held that the probate court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the claim was a straightforward contract action, not a matter involving the administration of the estate or the executrix’s fiduciary duties. Tennessee probate-court jurisdiction is limited to matters conferred by constitution or statute, and local ordinances cannot expand it; therefore the case must be returned to chancery court.
The case involved a dispute between the parents of a young child over the mother's proposed relocation more than 50 miles away, which triggered Tennessee’s parental relocation statute. After the father objected and sought a modified parenting plan, the trial court denied the mother’s relocation petition on best-interest grounds and, when she remained in the new location, designated the father as primary residential parent with substantially increased parenting time. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the mother had stipulated to entry of the modified plan at a March 2025 hearing, thereby relieving the trial court of any obligation to make independent best-interest findings under the statutory factors. The appellate court further noted that the original denial of relocation complied with the relocation statute’s requirements.
The case arose after Shelby County terminated Stephanie Taylor’s employment in 2017; the Shelby County Civil Service Merit Board reinstated her with back pay, but the county petitioned the chancery court for judicial review and a stay via writ of certiorari. Years later, the county voluntarily dismissed its petition, prompting Taylor to file a separate petition for a writ of mandamus seeking enforcement of the Board’s order with a specific back-pay calculation. The trial court dismissed Taylor’s mandamus petition, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The appellate court held that the mandamus action was improperly joined with the county’s earlier appellate proceeding under Goodwin v. Metropolitan Board of Health and that mandamus was unavailable because the Board’s order left the back-pay amount undefined, leaving no clear ministerial duty for the court to enforce.
The case involved Renee’ Niter-Martin, suing as next of kin for her mother Rosie Niter, who alleged that Quince Nursing and Rehabilitation Center was negligent in the decedent’s care during her stays at the facility, resulting in injuries such as pressure sores and ultimately her death; the complaint included claims for negligence and wrongful death. Quince moved to compel arbitration, asserting that the decedent had signed a binding arbitration agreement as part of her admission paperwork. The trial court denied the motion, finding that Quince had not authenticated the agreement or otherwise proven the existence of a valid contract to arbitrate. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Quince bore the burden of establishing an authenticated arbitration agreement and failed to do so, leaving no admissible evidence of a contract that would require arbitration.
In this case, a real estate brokerage company sued a homeowner for breach of an exclusive listing agreement, seeking a 6% commission after the owner transferred his marital home by quitclaim deed to himself and another person shortly after the agreement’s expiration date and during his divorce. The trial court granted the company’s motion for summary judgment, awarding the commission plus attorney’s fees, after deeming the company’s requests for admission admitted due to the owner’s failure to respond and treating the company’s statement of undisputed facts as conceded. The Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the admitted facts did not establish a breach as a matter of law because the contract made payment of the commission contingent on a defined “Closing”—which required delivery of a warranty deed and full payment of the purchase price, execution of a deed of trust, promissory note, or 1031 exchange—none of which occurred. The court further noted that the carry-over clause was not triggered and that the post-expiration quitclaim transfers did not satisfy these conditions precedent. The case was remanded for further proceedings.
This case involves the termination of Michael S.’s parental rights to his daughter Lay’la R., who was born drug-exposed with serious medical conditions and placed in DCS custody shortly after birth. Father appealed only the juvenile court’s denial of his motion for a continuance; the Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request. Although Father did not challenge the termination itself, the appellate court reviewed and affirmed it, finding that DCS proved multiple grounds, including abandonment by an incarcerated parent through failure to visit or support and wanton disregard, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, and failure to manifest an ability or willingness to assume custody. The court also upheld the finding that termination was in the child’s best interest, citing Father’s complete lack of contact, failure to complete any required assessments or drug screens, absence of a bond with the child, and the child’s need for ongoing medical care in her stable foster placement.