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Powell Ex Rel. Kelley v. Bank of Am.
Court of Appeals of South Carolina · 2008-06-20 · cited 21×
This case arose from the mishandling of life insurance proceeds belonging to a minor child, Cody, after his father's death; his aunt Karen, acting as co-conservator, deposited the funds into her personal accounts at Bank of America, withdrew them, and used them for personal purposes, leading to a lawsuit by Cody and his mother Elizabeth against Karen, the Bank, and others, with some funds later placed in escrow. After Elizabeth obtained a judgment against Karen, the parties severed an equitable action to apportion the escrowed funds between Cody and Elizabeth, and the Bank moved to sever and participated in that proceeding. The trial court apportioned the funds, but the Bank appealed the apportionment order, and Elizabeth challenged the Bank's standing. The South Carolina Court of Appeals dismissed the Bank's appeal, holding that the Bank had no legal interest in the interpleaded funds, was not a party to the severed equitable action, and therefore was not an aggrieved party entitled to appeal under Rule 201(b), SCACR; as a result, the remainder of Elizabeth's cross-appeal was deemed moot.
procedurepropertyfamily law
State v. Williams
Court of Appeals of South Carolina · 2008-06-12 · cited 2×
In State v. Williams, the defendant was convicted of two counts of assault of a high and aggravated nature, attempted escape, and two counts of kidnapping, and he appealed on the basis that the trial court erred by granting the State's Batson motion and seating a juror whom the defense had struck. The defense had exercised a peremptory challenge against Juror 78, a white male whose wife was unemployed, offering the race-neutral explanation that it preferred jurors whose spouses were also employed; the trial court rejected this as pretextual after comparing the juror to another white male who was unemployed. The South Carolina Court of Appeals held that the proffered reason was valid, that no similarly situated juror of a different race had been seated, and that seating the challenged juror on the convicting jury required reversal and remand for a new trial.
criminal lawprocedurecivil rights
Collins v. Frasier
Court of Appeals of South Carolina · 2008-05-06 · cited 2×
This case involves a lawsuit by Calvin and Faye Collins against Mark Frasier for injuries and loss of consortium stemming from a car accident in which Frasier's vehicle crossed the centerline. The jury returned a verdict for Frasier based on his defense of sudden, unforeseeable incapacity to operate the vehicle. The Collinses appealed the trial court's denial of their motions for directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, new trial, and to alter or amend the verdict. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Frasier presented sufficient evidence—including his own testimony and expert medical testimony regarding hypoglycemia—to create a jury question on the defense, consistent with precedent in Boyleston v. Baxley. The court noted that issues of credibility and weight of evidence are for the jury to resolve.
torts & liabilityprocedure
Thomas v. Dootson
Court of Appeals of South Carolina · 2008-03-13 · cited 10×
This case involved a medical malpractice claim by Kelvin Thomas against Dr. Jeffrey Dootson after Thomas suffered a severe burn to his mouth from an allegedly defective surgical drill during oral surgery. The trial court granted a directed verdict for Dr. Dootson at the close of Thomas's case, finding insufficient evidence on whether the doctor had notice of the drill's defect. The South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, holding that testimony from surgical staff established a jury issue on notice because witnesses stated Dr. Dootson had been warned the drill was overheating and had used it anyway, and the doctor's own concessions at trial eliminated any need for expert testimony on the standard of care. The court also ruled that certain statements about prior warnings were improperly excluded as hearsay since they were offered only to prove notice, not the truth of the defect. The case was remanded for a new trial.
torts & liabilityhealthcareprocedure
Watters v. TERMINIX SERVICE, INC.
Court of Appeals of South Carolina · 2008-02-25
This case involves a 2002 lawsuit by Timothy Watters against home seller John Furlow and Terminix Service, Inc., alleging fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and related claims for failing to disclose moisture damage to a home purchased in 1997, after Terminix provided a termite inspection report at closing noting inactive fungi and recommending further structural evaluation. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants on statute of limitations grounds, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Under South Carolina law, actions for damage to real property must be filed within three years, subject to the discovery rule that starts the clock when the plaintiff knew or should have known of a potential claim through reasonable diligence. The court held that Watters had sufficient notice by May 1997 (after his attorney's letter referencing unreported damage) or at latest August 1998 (after his expert's report on the moisture issues), making the 2002 filing untimely regardless of any estoppel arguments.
propertyproceduretorts & liability
Lowcountry Open Land Trust v. Charleston Southern University
Court of Appeals of South Carolina · 2008-01-16 · cited 17×
This case involved a contract between Charleston Southern University and Lowcountry Open Land Trust for the purchase of approximately 63 acres of real property in Dorchester County, South Carolina, where the University held only an undivided 61.7% interest and numerous other owners held the remainder. After the projected closing date passed without a closing due to unresolved title issues with the other owners, the University attempted to terminate the contract, prompting the Buyer to file suit seeking specific performance. The master-in-equity granted specific performance and ordered the parties to renegotiate an extension agreement, but on appeal the court affirmed only the specific performance as to the University's interest and reversed the renegotiation requirement. The core reasoning was that the contract expressly permitted the Buyer to accept a deed for the University's undivided interest alone if full title could not be obtained, the agreement lacked a "time is of the essence" provision, and courts cannot impose new contract terms on the parties.
property
James v. South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole & Pardon Services
Court of Appeals of South Carolina · 2008-01-10 · cited 4×
In this case, inmate Isiah James, Jr., sued the South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services after being denied parole following a 2005 hearing, claiming the denial was improper and that the Department's policy of reviewing his case every two years rather than annually violated the ex post facto clause. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the Department. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that inmates have no protected liberty interest in being granted parole, only in access to a parole hearing, so the denial itself presented no cognizable claim. The court further held there was no ex post facto violation because the biennial review schedule was consistent with the law in effect at the time of James's 1978 offenses, and that James should have pursued review through the Administrative Law Court under established procedures rather than filing in circuit court.
criminal lawprocedure
Linda Mc Company, Inc. v. Shore
Court of Appeals of South Carolina · 2007-11-02 · cited 5×
The case involved James and Jan Shore appealing a trial court order authorizing execution and levy on a 1995 judgment by confession for unpaid sales commissions owed to Linda Mc Company. The Shores argued the judgment was void for lack of a required affidavit, had lost enforceability after ten years, and had been satisfied by accord and satisfaction through partial payments and a voicemail proposing modified terms. The court affirmed the order, finding the judgment complied with statutory requirements, there was no meeting of the minds to support an accord and satisfaction, and issues regarding the judgment's expiration were not preserved for appeal.
business & regulatoryprocedure
State v. Avery
Court of Appeals of South Carolina · 2007-06-21 · cited 3×
In State v. Avery, Jeremy Avery appealed his convictions for murder, armed robbery, and carjacking, along with his sentences, arguing that the trial court erred in denying motions for change of venue due to pretrial publicity, severance, and suppression of his voluntary statements to police, and that the family court improperly transferred jurisdiction to the circuit court without considering all factors and in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding that the trial court conducted adequate voir dire to ensure jurors could remain impartial despite publicity exposure, that the statements were voluntary after Miranda waivers, and that the family court properly evaluated the Kent factors with emphasis on the serious nature of the offenses before transferring the case. The court further rejected the constitutional claim because Avery received a thirty-five-year sentence rather than life without parole, and Roper v. Simmons did not apply. The opinion emphasizes that mere exposure to publicity does not require a venue change absent demonstrated juror prejudice, and that appellate review is limited to abuse of discretion.
criminal lawprocedurefamily law
Rhodes v. Benson Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.
Court of Appeals of South Carolina · 2007-05-31 · cited 20×
In Rhodes v. Benson Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the plaintiff sued the defendant car dealership for breach of contract over the purchase of a vehicle that was allegedly stolen and damaged rather than the properly titled model promised. The defendant answered by noting an arbitration clause in the contract but then engaged in extensive discovery, including written interrogatories, document requests, five depositions, and court-assisted subpoenas, before filing a motion to compel arbitration ten months after the suit began and shortly before trial. The circuit court denied the motion, finding waiver, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a party waives arbitration rights by delaying the demand while conducting discovery that prejudices the opposing party, with the extent of discovery and case status providing evidence of such prejudice here.
procedure
Stearns Bank National Ass'n v. Glenwood Falls, LP
Court of Appeals of South Carolina · 2007-04-09 · cited 20×
This case concerned a motion to set aside a default judgment in a cross-claim for foreclosure of a mechanic's lien on real property owned by Glenwood Falls, LP, filed by contractor DC Development in an underlying mortgage foreclosure action by Stearns Bank. The master denied relief, ruling that the court had personal jurisdiction because Glenwood Falls made a voluntary appearance through its attorney's November 9 letter acknowledging representation and the cross-claim, and that there was no excusable neglect from alleged attorney abandonment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion because the letter and surrounding circumstances constituted a voluntary appearance waiving service objections under South Carolina procedural rules, and the record did not support setting aside the judgment.
propertyprocedure
State v. Ladson
Court of Appeals of South Carolina · 2007-04-09 · cited 16×
In State v. Ladson, the defendant was convicted of first-degree burglary and sentenced to twenty-five years in prison, but the court reporter lost the trial transcript, preventing a direct appeal. The parties attempted to reconstruct the record over a year later through witness affidavits, summaries, and recollections from the trial judge and counsel, but the resulting materials were conclusory and incomplete, omitting key details about testimony, objections, and jury proceedings. The South Carolina Court of Appeals held that the reconstructed record was insufficient to permit meaningful appellate review of the defendant's claims. It therefore reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.
criminal lawprocedure
Forrest v. A.S. Price Mechanical
Court of Appeals of South Carolina · 2007-04-02 · cited 10×
In this workers’ compensation case, Cally R. Forrest, Jr. sustained a work-related fall while employed part-time by A.S. Price Mechanical, resulting in paraplegia, and the employer conceded his entitlement to lifetime medical and indemnity benefits. The dispute centered on the Workers’ Compensation Commission’s calculation of Forrest’s average weekly wage at $532.72 (incorporating earnings from multiple concurrent employers), its finding that he had reached maximum medical improvement, and its admission of his vocational expert’s report. The court affirmed the Commission’s rulings, concluding that they were supported by substantial evidence under the Administrative Procedures Act’s standard of review and that doctrines such as estoppel and laches did not bar adjustment of the wage rate prior to final determination.
labor & employment
Altman v. Griffith
Court of Appeals of South Carolina · 2007-02-05 · cited 26×
This case involves a custody dispute between unmarried parents over their minor son. The family court found both parents fit and awarded custody to the father, leading the mother to appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, emphasizing deference to the family court's assessment of witness credibility and demeanor in determining the child's best interests between two fit parents. The ruling rests on the principle that appellate courts should not substitute their judgment for that of the trial judge in such matters.
family law
Commissioners of Public Works v. South Carolina Department of Health & Environmental Control
Court of Appeals of South Carolina · 2007-01-23 · cited 14×
This case involved challenges by wastewater treatment operators to flow limits and seasonal ultimate oxygen demand (UOD) load limits imposed by DHEC in renewed NPDES discharge permits for effluent released into the Cooper River and Charleston Harbor. The operators contested the limits before an ALJ, who removed the flow limits for lack of statutory or regulatory authority and necessity, and removed UOD limits for certain "shoulder months" under the 0.1 Rule because no natural dissolved oxygen depression occurred then; the DHEC Board affirmed removal of flow limits but adopted a broader year-round application of the 0.1 Rule once triggered and remanded for new UOD limits without relying on an unpromulgated TMDL. On appeal, the circuit court held DHEC lacked authority to impose flow limits, while the reviewing court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded, focusing on statutory interpretation of the South Carolina Pollution Control Act and regulation 61-68(D)(4)(a) to determine the proper scope of DHEC's permitting powers and the 0.1 Rule's seasonal applicability.
environmentbusiness & regulatory
Ex Parte Johnson
Court of Appeals of South Carolina · 2006-12-18 · cited 1×
This case involved a foreclosure action in which the court-ordered sale of property explicitly required the successful bidder to pay outstanding property taxes and assessments, resulting in surplus funds after the $2.2 million sale. The successful bidder, Bruce Johnson, moved post-sale under section 12-49-60 to have the taxes paid from the surplus instead, arguing the statute mandated this approach. The Master denied the motion, and the court affirmed, holding that the foreclosure order, sale notices, and deed all clearly placed tax liability on the purchaser, with all bidders participating on that basis. The court reasoned that allowing the statute to override these terms after the sale would be inequitable to other bidders and alter the agreed conditions. The decision distinguished prior case law where such a motion did not change the sale terms relied upon by participants.
propertytaxesprocedure
Query v. Burgess
Court of Appeals of South Carolina · 2006-11-13 · cited 20×
This case involved a declaratory judgment action by O. Grady Query against Carmen Burgess and the State of South Carolina to establish title to marshlands abutting Query's Folly Beach property. Query claimed ownership based on 1696 and 1786 grants to his predecessors in title, but the master ruled that the State held fee simple title to the marshlands under the public trust doctrine. On appeal, the court affirmed, holding that the grants and accompanying plat lacked the specific language or detail necessary to overcome the presumption that the State owns land below the high water mark of tidal navigable waterways. The core reasoning was that grants by the State must clearly indicate an intent to convey title below the high water mark, which these documents did not.
propertyenvironment
Albertson v. Robinson
Court of Appeals of South Carolina · 2006-10-16 · cited 11×
This case concerned a claim by judgment creditors Nathan and Amanda Albertson to void as fraudulent a March 2002 conveyance of Brian Robinson's one-half interest in the couple's marital home to his then-wife Maureen Robinson. The underlying dispute arose from Robinson's breach of a 2000 contract to build the Albertsons a pool, which led to a default judgment against him for over $42,000. The trial court denied relief, finding no indebtedness at the time of transfer, adequate consideration, and no intent to defraud. The appellate court reversed, holding that the Albertsons were existing creditors because the debt arose from the 2000 breach, the transfer was voluntary, and Robinson failed to retain sufficient assets afterward, rendering the conveyance void under South Carolina's Statute of Elizabeth.
propertyprocedure
Grant v. Mount Vernon Mills, Inc.
Court of Appeals of South Carolina · 2006-06-12 · cited 17×
This case involved a breach of contract claim by Cynthia Grant against her former employer, Mount Vernon Mills, after her termination as a salaried Pension Benefits Manager. Grant argued that the company's employee handbook created an enforceable contract limiting terminations to specific procedures for cause. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the employer, which the appellate court affirmed. The court held that the handbook's termination policy applied only to hourly nonexempt employees and did not cover salaried workers like Grant. Even if applicable, the policy language was permissive rather than mandatory and did not modify the at-will employment relationship.
labor & employmentprocedure
State v. Cochran
Court of Appeals of South Carolina · 2006-05-30 · cited 25×
In State v. Cochran, two black defendants were convicted by a jury of first-degree burglary, with one also convicted of assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature, after the trial court granted the State's Batson motion, quashed the initial jury panel selected by the defendants, and seated a second jury. The defendants appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly handled the Batson challenge regarding their peremptory strikes of potential jurors. The Court of Appeals of South Carolina reversed the convictions, holding that the trial court failed to follow the required three-step Batson procedure from Purkett v. Elem and State v. Adams by not requiring the State to prove purposeful racial discrimination after the defendants offered race-neutral explanations for their strikes. As a result, the defendants were tried by a jury that improperly included jurors they had been barred from striking. The court emphasized that this procedural error mandated reversal without needing to show prejudice.
criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure