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Powell Ex Rel. Kelley v. Bank of Am.
Court of Appeals of South Carolina · 2008-06-20 · cited 21×
This case arose from the mishandling of life insurance proceeds belonging to a minor child, Cody, after his father's death; his aunt Karen, acting as co-conservator, deposited the funds into her personal accounts at Bank of America, withdrew them, and used them for personal purposes, leading to a lawsuit by Cody and his mother Elizabeth against Karen, the Bank, and others, with some funds later placed in escrow. After Elizabeth obtained a judgment against Karen, the parties severed an equitable action to apportion the escrowed funds between Cody and Elizabeth, and the Bank moved to sever and participated in that proceeding. The trial court apportioned the funds, but the Bank appealed the apportionment order, and Elizabeth challenged the Bank's standing. The South Carolina Court of Appeals dismissed the Bank's appeal, holding that the Bank had no legal interest in the interpleaded funds, was not a party to the severed equitable action, and therefore was not an aggrieved party entitled to appeal under Rule 201(b), SCACR; as a result, the remainder of Elizabeth's cross-appeal was deemed moot.
procedurepropertyfamily law
State v. Williams
Court of Appeals of South Carolina · 2008-06-12 · cited 2×
In State v. Williams, the defendant was convicted of two counts of assault of a high and aggravated nature, attempted escape, and two counts of kidnapping, and he appealed on the basis that the trial court erred by granting the State's Batson motion and seating a juror whom the defense had struck. The defense had exercised a peremptory challenge against Juror 78, a white male whose wife was unemployed, offering the race-neutral explanation that it preferred jurors whose spouses were also employed; the trial court rejected this as pretextual after comparing the juror to another white male who was unemployed. The South Carolina Court of Appeals held that the proffered reason was valid, that no similarly situated juror of a different race had been seated, and that seating the challenged juror on the convicting jury required reversal and remand for a new trial.
criminal lawprocedurecivil rights
Collins v. Frasier
Court of Appeals of South Carolina · 2008-05-06 · cited 2×
This case involves a lawsuit by Calvin and Faye Collins against Mark Frasier for injuries and loss of consortium stemming from a car accident in which Frasier's vehicle crossed the centerline. The jury returned a verdict for Frasier based on his defense of sudden, unforeseeable incapacity to operate the vehicle. The Collinses appealed the trial court's denial of their motions for directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, new trial, and to alter or amend the verdict. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Frasier presented sufficient evidence—including his own testimony and expert medical testimony regarding hypoglycemia—to create a jury question on the defense, consistent with precedent in Boyleston v. Baxley. The court noted that issues of credibility and weight of evidence are for the jury to resolve.
torts & liabilityprocedure
Thomas v. Dootson
Court of Appeals of South Carolina · 2008-03-13 · cited 10×
This case involved a medical malpractice claim by Kelvin Thomas against Dr. Jeffrey Dootson after Thomas suffered a severe burn to his mouth from an allegedly defective surgical drill during oral surgery. The trial court granted a directed verdict for Dr. Dootson at the close of Thomas's case, finding insufficient evidence on whether the doctor had notice of the drill's defect. The South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, holding that testimony from surgical staff established a jury issue on notice because witnesses stated Dr. Dootson had been warned the drill was overheating and had used it anyway, and the doctor's own concessions at trial eliminated any need for expert testimony on the standard of care. The court also ruled that certain statements about prior warnings were improperly excluded as hearsay since they were offered only to prove notice, not the truth of the defect. The case was remanded for a new trial.
torts & liabilityhealthcareprocedure
Watters v. TERMINIX SERVICE, INC.
Court of Appeals of South Carolina · 2008-02-25
This case involves a 2002 lawsuit by Timothy Watters against home seller John Furlow and Terminix Service, Inc., alleging fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and related claims for failing to disclose moisture damage to a home purchased in 1997, after Terminix provided a termite inspection report at closing noting inactive fungi and recommending further structural evaluation. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants on statute of limitations grounds, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Under South Carolina law, actions for damage to real property must be filed within three years, subject to the discovery rule that starts the clock when the plaintiff knew or should have known of a potential claim through reasonable diligence. The court held that Watters had sufficient notice by May 1997 (after his attorney's letter referencing unreported damage) or at latest August 1998 (after his expert's report on the moisture issues), making the 2002 filing untimely regardless of any estoppel arguments.
propertyproceduretorts & liability
Lowcountry Open Land Trust v. Charleston Southern University
Court of Appeals of South Carolina · 2008-01-16 · cited 17×
This case involved a contract between Charleston Southern University and Lowcountry Open Land Trust for the purchase of approximately 63 acres of real property in Dorchester County, South Carolina, where the University held only an undivided 61.7% interest and numerous other owners held the remainder. After the projected closing date passed without a closing due to unresolved title issues with the other owners, the University attempted to terminate the contract, prompting the Buyer to file suit seeking specific performance. The master-in-equity granted specific performance and ordered the parties to renegotiate an extension agreement, but on appeal the court affirmed only the specific performance as to the University's interest and reversed the renegotiation requirement. The core reasoning was that the contract expressly permitted the Buyer to accept a deed for the University's undivided interest alone if full title could not be obtained, the agreement lacked a "time is of the essence" provision, and courts cannot impose new contract terms on the parties.
property