Charles L. Becton

This case concerned whether underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage limits from two separate automobile insurance policies issued by Nationwide to Michael Smith could be stacked to compensate for the death of his daughter Crystal in an accident involving a Toyota she co-owned and that was insured only under one policy. The trial court granted summary judgment allowing stacking of the two $100,000 UIM coverages (minus a setoff), for a total of $150,000 available. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the policies were not stackable and only $50,000 in UIM coverage was available. The core reasoning was that Policy B contained a household-owned vehicle exclusion that barred UIM coverage for bodily injury occurring in a vehicle owned by a family member but not listed in that policy's declarations, following the precedent in Driscoll v. United States Liability Insurance Co.; although Policy A provided UIM coverage, the exclusion prevented aggregation with Policy B.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

In Hunter v. Spaulding, the plaintiffs sued defendant George Spaulding and others for fraud and unfair trade practices, alleging that Spaulding concealed his prior purchase of a house through his company before reselling it to them at a higher price. At trial, after Spaulding admitted he had not personally answered written interrogatories served on him, the court struck his answer, entered default judgment against him on the actual fraud claim, and awarded $10,000 in compensatory damages; the jury then awarded $1,100,000 in punitive damages. On appeal, the court affirmed the default judgment and compensatory damages award, holding that Rule 33 required the defendant to provide answers based on information available to him rather than disavowing them at trial. The court reversed the punitive damages award, however, because the defendant was not given an opportunity to present evidence on that issue before it was submitted to the jury, in violation of due process and Rule 55(b)(2), and remanded for a new trial on punitive damages.

proceduretorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

The case involved the Union County Department of Social Services petitioning to terminate the parental rights of James and Carolyn Taylor over their four children, citing ongoing neglect since 1985, the children's placement in foster care for over 18 months without reasonable progress by the parents, and failure to pay a portion of care costs. After a hearing, the trial court terminated the Taylors' parental rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. Sec. 7A-289.32, and the parents appealed on grounds of inadequate notice, lack of a separate preliminary hearing to define issues, and insufficient evidence supporting termination. The Court of Appeals affirmed the order, ruling that statutory notice requirements were satisfied by the initial scheduling and that clear, cogent, and convincing evidence supported findings of the parents' failure to make reasonable progress or respond positively to DSS efforts to strengthen the family.

family lawprocedure

The case involved plaintiff Ring Drug Company alleging that defendants, including Carolina Medicorp and its subsidiaries, engaged in unfair trade practices under N.C. Gen. Stat. ch. 75 by using preferential hospital drug pricing to unfairly compete for and cause the termination of plaintiff's exclusive contract to supply pharmaceuticals to Blumenthal Jewish Home for the Aged. The trial court dismissed the claims against Salem Health Services on statute of limitations grounds and granted summary judgment to Medicorp, Carolina Enterprises, and Forsyth Memorial Hospital on the basis that those entities had no involvement in the Blumenthal contract. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the four-year limitations period began to run on the contract's termination date of September 1, 1984, making the amended complaint untimely as to Salem Health, and that the record showed no genuine issue of material fact regarding the liability of the other corporate defendants since only Salem Health had dealings with Blumenthal.

business & regulatoryprocedurehealthcare

The case concerned whether John and Pearline Johnson had acquired a prescriptive easement over Wade Stanley's adjoining farmland in Johnston County, North Carolina, by using a pathway across his property for more than sixty years to reach their farm from a public highway. Stanley blocked the path in 1986 after tenants caused disturbances, prompting the Johnsons to sue for injunctive relief and damages on the ground that their long use had ripened into an easement. The trial court granted Stanley summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held that an essential element—hostile or adverse use under a claim of right—was missing because the Johnsons presented no evidence that they had repaired or maintained the path on Stanley's land, and mere continuous use is presumed permissive rather than hostile. Without notice to the owner of a claim of right, the use could not establish a prescriptive easement as a matter of law.

property

In State v. Harper, the defendant appealed his convictions for possession with intent to sell and deliver marijuana and sale and delivery of marijuana, arguing multiple trial errors including the admission of an undercover officer's written summaries of the transactions as hearsay, the allowance of certain spectator-related testimony, the exclusion of an exhibit, incomplete jury instructions, reputation evidence at sentencing, and the imposition of consecutive maximum sentences. The court affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding that although the officer's summaries constituted inadmissible hearsay under the public records exception in the North Carolina Rules of Evidence, their admission was not prejudicial given the officer's direct testimony identifying Harper as the seller. The court further reasoned that the trial judge's discretionary sentencing decisions were supported by statutory authority, did not violate the Eighth Amendment, and that other claimed errors did not warrant reversal.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Godwin, a jury convicted defendant Harold Godwin of first-degree rape, first-degree sexual offense, and second-degree kidnapping based on evidence that he abducted and sexually assaulted the victim at gunpoint. On appeal, the defendant challenged the presence of an alternate juror during jury deliberations, the trial judge's entry into the jury room without the defendant present, the judge's allowance of the defendant to represent himself without the required statutory inquiry, and certain jury instructions. The North Carolina Court of Appeals held that prejudicial error occurred when the alternate juror entered the jury room and when the defendant was permitted to proceed pro se without the mandatory inquiry under N.C. Gen. Stat. Sec. 15A-1242, and it therefore vacated the convictions and remanded for a new trial. The court reasoned that the procedures violated binding precedent requiring open-court inquiry into jury deliberations and a thorough judicial inquiry before self-representation, rendering the errors non-harmless given the life sentences imposed.

criminal lawprocedure

In McLaughlin v. Barclays American Corp., an at-will employee sued his employer and two supervisors after being fired following a workplace altercation in which he struck a subordinate while defending himself, asserting claims for breach of employment contract, wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, and malicious interference with contractual relations. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held that an at-will employee may be terminated without cause and that no public-policy exception exists for discharges stemming from an employee's use of self-defense. It further concluded that the evidence failed to raise a triable issue on the interference claim because the supervisors acted within their legitimate business interests and without malice.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

This case involved a commercial landlord's attempt to eject a tenant after the tenant sought to renew a lease for restaurant premises. The lease provided for renewal upon written notice at least 90 days before expiration and required notices to be sent by registered or certified mail, but the tenant sent its renewal notice by ordinary mail along with a rent check that the landlord negotiated. After a jury found that timely written notice had been given, the trial court entered judgment for the tenant, and the appellate court affirmed. The court reasoned that the registered-mail requirement was intended to ensure proof of receipt, which was established here by undisputed evidence of the rent check's negotiation and the jury's factual finding, with no prejudice shown to the landlord, so strict compliance with the mailing method was not required.

propertybusiness & regulatory

This case involved a personal injury claim by Thomas Gregory Payne against the North Carolina Department of Human Resources for injuries sustained at the North Carolina School for the Deaf. Payne was injured when a plug from a hydraulic lift struck his forehead after he attempted to loosen it during shop class, and he alleged negligence by his instructor in supervision and failure to warn. The Industrial Commission denied the claim, finding no negligence, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court reasoned that the instructor met the standard of care because it was not reasonably foreseeable that the student would interfere with the lift repair, and general safety instructions were adequate without needing warnings for every possible risk.

torts & liability

River Hills Country Club sued Queen City Automatic Sprinkler Corp. after a pipe in its dry sprinkler system froze and burst in 1985, causing about $28,250 in property damage to its clubhouse. A jury found Queen City negligent but also found River Hills contributorily negligent. The court reversed that finding, holding the evidence insufficient to show contributory negligence. The core reasoning was that River Hills, as a lay client, had no duty to know about or locate low points in the system; Queen City, as the professional sprinkler maintenance company, bore that duty under its service contract and could not shift it to the club.

torts & liabilityproperty

The case involved a personal injury lawsuit where Dorothy DeHaven was severely burned by hot cooking oil while visiting her neighbors, the Hoskins, as a social guest. The DeHavens sued both Betty and James Hoskins for negligence, alleging that Betty Hoskins was negligent in leaving the oil unattended on the stove. The trial court granted summary judgment to Betty Hoskins under premises liability rules applicable to licensees. On appeal, the court reversed, holding that the appeal was proper due to a substantial right to avoid inconsistent verdicts and that Betty Hoskins' conduct raised a jury question of active negligence under ordinary tort principles rather than premises liability.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case concerned whether a "charitable sales promotion" run by a professional solicitor on behalf of two charities—selling low-value items like combs and candy at inflated prices while offering "free" bingo cards and cash-prize bingo games—violated North Carolina's bingo statutes (N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 14-309.5 to 14-309.14). The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing the activities were lawful sales promotions rather than regulated bingo, or alternatively that the statutes were unconstitutionally vague. The trial court granted summary judgment to the State defendants, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the promotions constituted unlicensed bingo games operated partly for profit. The court reasoned that it must examine the substance of the activity rather than its form or labels, finding that the bingo element was not truly free and fell squarely within the statutory prohibitions on unauthorized bingo.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatory

The case involved plaintiffs suing two Georgia residents for injuries sustained in a North Carolina car accident, seeking to establish personal jurisdiction over defendant Winn via substituted service under the state's nonresident motorist statute. Winn moved for summary judgment, arguing he was not the owner of the vehicle at the time of the accident since he had sold it days earlier. The court affirmed the denial of summary judgment, holding that registration of the car in Winn's name created a rebuttable presumption of ownership and responsibility that his evidence—consisting of an incomplete title, receipts from his employer, and affidavits—did not conclusively overcome due to questions of credibility and consistency.

proceduretorts & liability

In State v. Fennell, the defendant was convicted under North Carolina law of possessing a sawed-off shotgun classified as a weapon of mass death and destruction after police found the disassembled firearm in his jacket following a report of a man carrying such a weapon. Fennell appealed, arguing that the statute violated his constitutional right to bear arms under the U.S. and North Carolina Constitutions, that the State failed to prove the weapon was operable, and that the jury should have been instructed accordingly. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the statute constitutes a reasonable regulation of firearms that does not infringe on the right to bear arms, which is subject to limits related to public safety. It further ruled that the State need not prove operability unless the defendant first presents evidence of inoperability, and that a disassembled sawed-off shotgun still qualifies as a prohibited weapon under the statute.

gunscriminal lawcivil rights

The case involved a developer's challenge to the Town of Boone Board of Adjustment's interpretation of a zoning ordinance requiring a 100-foot buffer zone between a high-density planned development housing project in an R-3 zone and an adjoining low-density R-1 residential district. The developer sought to locate part of the buffer on the R-1 lot to allow more units on its property, but the Board ruled that the buffer must be entirely within the PD-H zoning district. The trial court upheld the Board's decision, and the appellate court affirmed, reasoning that the ordinance's language, spirit, and goal were to protect lower-density districts from the impacts of high-density development, and the Board's interpretation aligned with the legislative intent to restrict the buffer to the high-density area.

propertybusiness & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves a dispute between brothers Howard and Bruce Stancil, equal shareholders in a close corporation, over management deadlock, alleged conversion of corporate assets, and Howard's request for dissolution or other relief. Bruce appealed a pretrial order requiring him to post a $150,000 secured bond to protect assets pending resolution, in lieu of appointing a receiver. The court dismissed the appeal, holding that the order was interlocutory because it did not finally resolve the parties' claims. The court reasoned that the bond order, authorized under statutes allowing flexible relief in shareholder actions, did not affect any substantial right that Bruce would lose without immediate appellate review, as the bonds would be canceled if no judgment was awarded against him.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a dispute over whether a father could be required to pay child support arrears from a 1974 Michigan divorce order, even though the action was filed in 1988, eight years after the children were adopted by their stepfather in 1980. The court held that the ten-year statute of limitations applied to the child support judgment, allowing recovery of payments due within the ten years prior to filing the action, specifically from June 1978 to February 1980. The reasoning was that each overdue support payment starts its own limitations period, and the adoption ended the ongoing obligation but did not extinguish vested rights to prior arrears or change the applicable limitations period.

family lawprocedure

The case concerned the interpretation of Jake G. Mayo's will, which left a farm to his wife for life and then to his 'living nieces and nephews.' Plaintiffs, the seven nieces and nephews alive at the life tenant's death in 1987, sought a declaratory judgment that only they held interests in the farm, while defendants were heirs of four deceased nieces and nephews. The Court of Appeals of North Carolina reversed the trial court's decision that all eleven nieces and nephews living at the testator's 1940 death took vested remainders, instead holding that the remainders were contingent on surviving the life tenant. The court reasoned that North Carolina law presumes words of survivorship like 'living' refer to the death of the life tenant unless the will clearly indicates otherwise, and that this reading was consistent with the testator's overall intent to keep the family farm within his paternal line.

propertyfamily law

In Hill v. Hill, a wife filed for absolute divorce and equitable distribution of marital property after a 26-year marriage, but the parties later signed property settlement agreements that the husband invoked to seek summary judgment barring further claims. The trial court granted summary judgment for the husband, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, finding no evidence that the wife's signatures were procured by fraud, duress, or undue influence, nor that the agreements were unconscionable. The court reasoned that the post-divorce agreements were negotiated with independent counsel on both sides, the wife had expressed satisfaction with the terms at the time, and any breach-of-contract defense was not preserved below.

family lawpropertyprocedure