Smith v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance
Court of Appeals of North Carolina · 1990-02-20 · cited 8×
This case concerned whether underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage limits from two separate automobile insurance policies issued by Nationwide to Michael Smith could be stacked to compensate for the death of his daughter Crystal in an accident involving a Toyota she co-owned and that was insured only under one policy. The trial court granted summary judgment allowing stacking of the two $100,000 UIM coverages (minus a setoff), for a total of $150,000 available. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the policies were not stackable and only $50,000 in UIM coverage was available. The core reasoning was that Policy B contained a household-owned vehicle exclusion that barred UIM coverage for bodily injury occurring in a vehicle owned by a family member but not listed in that policy's declarations, following the precedent in Driscoll v. United States Liability Insurance Co.; although Policy A provided UIM coverage, the exclusion prevented aggregation with Policy B.
business & regulatorytorts & liability
Hunter v. Spaulding
Court of Appeals of North Carolina · 1990-02-20 · cited 18×
In Hunter v. Spaulding, the plaintiffs sued defendant George Spaulding and others for fraud and unfair trade practices, alleging that Spaulding concealed his prior purchase of a house through his company before reselling it to them at a higher price. At trial, after Spaulding admitted he had not personally answered written interrogatories served on him, the court struck his answer, entered default judgment against him on the actual fraud claim, and awarded $10,000 in compensatory damages; the jury then awarded $1,100,000 in punitive damages. On appeal, the court affirmed the default judgment and compensatory damages award, holding that Rule 33 required the defendant to provide answers based on information available to him rather than disavowing them at trial. The court reversed the punitive damages award, however, because the defendant was not given an opportunity to present evidence on that issue before it was submitted to the jury, in violation of due process and Rule 55(b)(2), and remanded for a new trial on punitive damages.
proceduretorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory
Taylor v. Taylor
Court of Appeals of North Carolina · 1990-01-16 · cited 89×
The case involved the Union County Department of Social Services petitioning to terminate the parental rights of James and Carolyn Taylor over their four children, citing ongoing neglect since 1985, the children's placement in foster care for over 18 months without reasonable progress by the parents, and failure to pay a portion of care costs. After a hearing, the trial court terminated the Taylors' parental rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. Sec. 7A-289.32, and the parents appealed on grounds of inadequate notice, lack of a separate preliminary hearing to define issues, and insufficient evidence supporting termination. The Court of Appeals affirmed the order, ruling that statutory notice requirements were satisfied by the initial scheduling and that clear, cogent, and convincing evidence supported findings of the parents' failure to make reasonable progress or respond positively to DSS efforts to strengthen the family.
family lawprocedure
Ring Drug Co. v. Carolina Medicorp Enterprises, Inc.
Court of Appeals of North Carolina · 1989-11-21 · cited 17×
The case involved plaintiff Ring Drug Company alleging that defendants, including Carolina Medicorp and its subsidiaries, engaged in unfair trade practices under N.C. Gen. Stat. ch. 75 by using preferential hospital drug pricing to unfairly compete for and cause the termination of plaintiff's exclusive contract to supply pharmaceuticals to Blumenthal Jewish Home for the Aged. The trial court dismissed the claims against Salem Health Services on statute of limitations grounds and granted summary judgment to Medicorp, Carolina Enterprises, and Forsyth Memorial Hospital on the basis that those entities had no involvement in the Blumenthal contract. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the four-year limitations period began to run on the contract's termination date of September 1, 1984, making the amended complaint untimely as to Salem Health, and that the record showed no genuine issue of material fact regarding the liability of the other corporate defendants since only Salem Health had dealings with Blumenthal.
business & regulatoryprocedurehealthcare
Johnson v. Stanley
Court of Appeals of North Carolina · 1989-10-17 · cited 16×
The case concerned whether John and Pearline Johnson had acquired a prescriptive easement over Wade Stanley's adjoining farmland in Johnston County, North Carolina, by using a pathway across his property for more than sixty years to reach their farm from a public highway. Stanley blocked the path in 1986 after tenants caused disturbances, prompting the Johnsons to sue for injunctive relief and damages on the ground that their long use had ripened into an easement. The trial court granted Stanley summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held that an essential element—hostile or adverse use under a claim of right—was missing because the Johnsons presented no evidence that they had repaired or maintained the path on Stanley's land, and mere continuous use is presumed permissive rather than hostile. Without notice to the owner of a claim of right, the use could not establish a prescriptive easement as a matter of law.
property
State v. Harper
Court of Appeals of North Carolina · 1989-10-17 · cited 11×
In State v. Harper, the defendant appealed his convictions for possession with intent to sell and deliver marijuana and sale and delivery of marijuana, arguing multiple trial errors including the admission of an undercover officer's written summaries of the transactions as hearsay, the allowance of certain spectator-related testimony, the exclusion of an exhibit, incomplete jury instructions, reputation evidence at sentencing, and the imposition of consecutive maximum sentences. The court affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding that although the officer's summaries constituted inadmissible hearsay under the public records exception in the North Carolina Rules of Evidence, their admission was not prejudicial given the officer's direct testimony identifying Harper as the seller. The court further reasoned that the trial judge's discretionary sentencing decisions were supported by statutory authority, did not violate the Eighth Amendment, and that other claimed errors did not warrant reversal.
criminal lawprocedure