The case involved a breach-of-contract lawsuit by officials and a member of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local Union 702 against the City of Poplar Bluff, Missouri. The plaintiffs claimed the City violated its Water-Sewer Department Collective Bargaining Agreement by hiring Daniel Sparks, rather than union member Quinton Tillman, for an open Water Plant Operator position. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the City. The court reasoned that Sparks qualified as "any employee" covered by the agreement because he had previously worked under it as a backup operator, the agreement imposed no full-time assignment requirement or automatic preference for Water-Sewer Department applicants, and the City retained management rights to select the more qualified candidate without breaching its terms.
The case involved relators Rudy Tapia and Douglas Rogers, defendants in a civil lawsuit originally filed in Miller County, who sought a writ of prohibition to bar Judge Derek Ankrom in Greene County from denying their application for a change of judge under Rule 51.05 after the case was transferred there. The underlying suit by Midwest Roofing alleged breach of contract and other claims, with venue transferred to Greene County by agreement after the defendants moved to transfer for improper venue under Rule 51.045. The circuit judge denied the change-of-judge request, relying on Rules 51.02 and 51.06(a) to conclude that the venue transfer request acted as a stipulation or change that barred any further change without cause. The Court of Appeals made its preliminary writ permanent, holding that a motion to transfer venue for improper venue is distinct from a “change of venue” under Rule 51.03, so Rule 51.06(a)’s restrictions do not apply and the relators retained their right to a change of judge as a matter of right.
The case involved a dispute between Lands’ End Properties, LLC (LEP), the developer of the Grand Meridian Condominium project, and the condominium owners’ association over whether LEP retained development rights under the project’s declaration and whether it owed unpaid assessments on two units. Following a bench trial, the circuit court ruled for LEP on the development-rights claim but for the association on the assessments claim, applying a five-year statute of limitations under § 516.120 and limiting liability to amounts accruing after March 28, 2013. The association appealed, raising thirteen points that challenged the trial court’s legal conclusions on the declaration, its application of the statute of limitations, an evidentiary ruling, and several factual findings as being against the weight of the evidence. The Missouri Court of Appeals reviewed the judgment under the Murphy v. Carron standard, construed the condominium declaration strictly, deferred to the trial court’s credibility determinations, and concluded that none of the points had merit. It therefore affirmed the trial court’s judgment in full.
This case concerns a Missouri probate proceeding in which J-Pia Spruill petitioned to be appointed guardian and conservator for her mother, Kyong Spruill, who was alleged to have dementia and lack capacity to manage her affairs; Kyong’s son, Arthur Spruill, intervened, filed cross-petitions seeking the same appointment for himself, and presented recently executed powers of attorney naming him as agent. The trial court found Kyong incapacitated by stipulation, set aside the powers of attorney and related deed, and ultimately appointed J-Pia as permanent guardian and conservator. On appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. The court held that one of Arthur’s five points was moot and that none of the points had been preserved for review because he failed to present the alleged errors to the trial court and obtain adverse rulings, as required by Rule 78.09; it therefore treated the trial court’s presumed-correct judgment as conclusive.
In this case, Keith Thompson was convicted by a jury as a prior and persistent offender of first-degree statutory rape, third-degree child molestation, and sexual misconduct involving a child by indecent exposure, based on evidence that he took a 12-year-old victim to his apartment, sexually assaulted her, and exposed his genitals during the incident; he received consecutive sentences totaling 52 years. On appeal, Thompson challenged the trial court's denial of a mistrial after a witness referred to him as a felon and raised three sufficiency and double-jeopardy claims regarding the sexual-misconduct count, arguing that any genital exposure was not knowing, was merely incidental to the rape, and violated protections against multiple punishments for the same act. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable juror to find Thompson knowingly exposed himself to a child under fifteen knowing the conduct would likely cause affront or alarm and was done for sexual gratification, that this exposure constituted a separate and distinct act from the rape elements, and that the offenses required proof of different facts so no double-jeopardy violation occurred. The court also found no abuse of discretion or plain error in denying the mistrial.
Shane Keathley was convicted by a jury in Wayne County Circuit Court of the class D felony of making a terroristic threat in the first degree after he told a deputy sheriff that if the sheriff’s office would not address alleged “torturing” in local churches, he would “go to the school and take care of the kids” himself, then drove toward the nearby elementary school. On appeal, Keathley argued that his statements were not “true threats” protected by the First Amendment, that the evidence was insufficient to prove he knowingly communicated a threat involving danger to life, and that the evidence failed to show he acted with the purpose of frightening ten or more people. The Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, affirmed the conviction, holding that the constitutional “true threat” claim was waived because it was not raised in a pretrial motion to dismiss or preserved at trial, and that the remaining sufficiency challenges failed under the standard that views all evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the verdict. The court concluded that the deputy’s testimony about the statements, Keathley’s demeanor, and his movement toward the school provided sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
This case involved an ejectment action filed by Debra Wax against Sarah Vickers concerning possession of a house in Rolla, Missouri. Wax alleged she and her husband owned the property via a 2019 warranty deed, that Vickers had failed to make required payments on a promissory note they all signed to buy it, and that Vickers was occupying the premises without right or title. After a bench trial, the circuit court entered judgment for Vickers, and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed. The appellate court held that Wax failed to meet her burden of proving a superior right to possession, as the evidence (viewed favorably to the judgment) showed no written purchase, rental, or ownership agreement, Vickers reasonably believed she was buying the home and that her name would appear on the deed, and the trial court was entitled to credit that account over Wax’s claims.
This Missouri Court of Appeals case involved competing petitions for guardianship of two sisters removed from their grandmother's home due to unsafe conditions, with foster parent B.L.C. seeking appointment as successor guardian and the children's maternal great aunt E.C. filing a competing petition. The probate division ruled that both were suitable caregivers but appointed the great aunt as guardian under § 475.045, finding her biological family status served the children's best interests, and also placed the children with her in the related juvenile cases. The appellate court dismissed the foster parent's appeal in its entirety. It held that she lacked standing because she did not qualify as an "interested person" under the definitions in § 475.010(12) and § 472.010(15), which require a property interest, claim against the estate, or specific familial relationship such as spouse, child, or parent, none of which applied to her.
The case involved a lawsuit by Thayer Farm Center/Meyer Feed against Don Bush Sr., Jalonne Bush, Don Bush Jr., and Sally Bush seeking payment for goods and services based on agreements allegedly made on February 6, 2015. The petition asserted two counts under an “account stated” theory of recovery, but at a bench trial the court overruled objections and allowed evidence of transactions from 2005–2012, then entered judgment for Thayer on an “action on account” theory in the amount of $61,520.66 plus interest. The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed and remanded with directions to enter judgment for the defendants. The court held that a plaintiff cannot recover on an unpleaded theory when the defendant properly objects, that Thayer had neither pleaded nor proved the account-stated claim, and that the trial court therefore misapplied the law by granting relief on the different, unpleaded theory.
In this Missouri case, Tyler Pendergraft sued James Rhett Mason and his son Jace Mason for assault and battery, alleging that Jace beat him with a wooden axe handle on his face and head while Rhett broke both of his legs with another wooden object. After a jury trial, the jury returned two separate verdicts awarding distinct damages for the injuries caused by each defendant; the trial court entered judgment accordingly and denied the defendants’ motion to merge the verdicts into one award to avoid double recovery. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling that the separate verdicts did not violate the doctrine of merger because the evidence and jury instructions supported independent assessments of damages based on each defendant’s distinct conduct and resulting injuries. The court found no abuse of discretion, noting that Plaintiff’s claims rested on different harms rather than a single monetary injury.
Annie Williams sued Hutcheson Enterprises, Inc. and Title Cash of Missouri, Inc. under the Missouri Human Rights Act, alleging unlawful discrimination and retaliation after her 2018 termination from a store manager position she had held since 2017. The trial court granted summary judgment to Hutcheson, and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held that Hutcheson showed there was no genuine dispute of material fact on the element of employer status, as the summary judgment record established that Williams’s employment agreement, tax forms, and W-2 were all with Title Cash, that Title Cash owned and operated the store, and that Hutcheson merely provided payroll and other administrative services to Title Cash without employing her. The court further noted that Williams’s alternative “joint employer” theory was not pleaded in her petition and was unsupported by the post-2017 MHRA definition of “employer.”
Michael C. Laws, Jr., and Malinda A. Salinger, the children of Michael Laws, Sr., sued to contest their father’s 2015 will, which left them half of his estate and the other half to their aunt. The estate’s personal representative moved for summary judgment, arguing the children lacked standing to contest the will because an earlier 2013 revocable trust would control if the 2015 will were invalidated and that trust excluded the children. The trial court agreed and entered summary judgment against the children. The Missouri Court of Appeals vacated the judgment and remanded, holding that the children have standing as “interested persons” under § 473.083.1 because an inheritance outside the trust corpus would pass to them by intestate succession if the 2015 will were set aside, giving them a financial benefit. The court also noted that a lack of standing requires dismissal without prejudice rather than summary judgment.
After Quentin Lee Jones died intestate in 2023, his son Adam Jones obtained letters of administration from the Polk County Probate Division and was appointed personal representative of the estate. Surviving spouse Mary Beth Jones then moved to replace Adam as personal representative and transfer the proceedings to Hickory County, arguing that the decedent had been domiciled in Hickory County and that she had statutory priority for appointment. The probate court denied the motion after a hearing, finding the decedent domiciled in Polk County based on evidence that he had moved there weeks before his death and lived with his father, and that Mary Beth was not “otherwise qualified” due to her delay in seeking appointment, inability to cover costs, and violation of orders regarding estate assets. On appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the probate division had properly exercised its discretion in selecting the personal representative and that any procedural delay in the hearing did not prejudice Mary Beth or require reversal.
In this case, Ryan Robert Houston was convicted after a jury trial of the Class B felony of second-degree assault against a special victim, based on a 2018 car crash in which he drove a stolen vehicle through a stop sign and struck another car, seriously injuring a 61-year-old driver; he was also convicted of first-degree tampering but did not challenge that count on appeal. Houston argued on appeal that the evidence was insufficient because the State failed to prove he knew or should have known the victim was a “special victim” under the statute. The Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, affirmed the conviction, holding that § 565.052.3 does not require proof of the defendant’s knowledge of the victim’s special status. The court explained that the statute specifies a reckless mental state only for causing serious physical injury and treats the victim’s age (60 or older) as a separate element for which no mental state is required under § 562.021.2; the evidence, including eyewitness accounts and the victim’s testimony, was therefore sufficient to support the verdict.
Jason Michael House appealed the denial of his Rule 29.15 motion seeking to vacate his convictions on eight counts, including first-degree murder, first-degree domestic assault, and armed criminal action, arising from a 2016 incident in which he shot and killed his estranged wife in front of their 11-year-old daughter and shot at her boyfriend. After a bench trial, House was convicted and received a mandatory life sentence without parole on the murder count plus additional terms; he claimed trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present mitigation evidence of his physical and mental health issues at sentencing. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the motion court’s denial of relief, holding that its findings were not clearly erroneous because House failed to prove prejudice, as the same judge who sentenced him had already reviewed and considered all the submitted medical and mental health records. The court also remanded solely to correct a clerical error in the written order regarding whether one assault sentence ran concurrent or consecutive to the others.
In this case, following a deadly 2018 duck boat accident on Table Rock Lake, the Governor directed the Missouri Attorney General to assist the Stone County Prosecutor with investigating and prosecuting possible charges under § 27.030. After charges were filed against three Ride the Ducks employees and later dismissed for lack of probable cause, the defendants sought discovery of internal communications among the AG, Prosecutor, and Governor relating to the decision to bring the charges. The trial court granted the motion to compel (with a narrow exception for counsel’s opinions or theories). The Court of Appeals issued a permanent writ of prohibition barring enforcement of that order. It held that the requested communications constitute protected work product under Rule 25.10(a) because they necessarily contain the State’s mental impressions, conclusions, and strategic decisions about instituting and pursuing the prosecution, and that compelled disclosure would cause irreparable harm not correctable on appeal.
The Binghams sued the Phelps County Public Water Supply District #4, seeking a declaratory judgment that a lien the District placed on their property for unpaid water and sewer charges was invalid. They alleged the charges constituted an unauthorized tax under the Hancock Amendment because the District had not obtained voter approval and their property was not connected to the District’s services. The trial court ruled the lien void on non-constitutional grounds but declined to decide whether the charges violated the Hancock Amendment, then denied the Binghams’ motion to amend the judgment to address that issue for purposes of attorneys’ fees. The Missouri Court of Appeals vacated the judgment and remanded the case, holding that the Binghams, as taxpayers, retained standing under section 23 of the Hancock Amendment to obtain a ruling on the constitutional claim, and that such a ruling was required because a successful claim would entitle them to costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. The appeals court concluded the trial court’s refusal to decide the issue was prejudicial because it prevented review of the fee request.
In this divorce case, Jeanette Pickens appealed a trial court judgment that dissolved her 20-year marriage to James Edward Pickens, divided marital property including a 401(k) plan, denied her request for maintenance, and allocated insurance proceeds for roof repairs. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in part but vacated the property division and maintenance ruling, remanding the case for further proceedings. The court held that the trial court erred by valuing the 401(k) at the date of separation rather than at trial, producing an inaccurate and outdated figure that required the marital property awards to be redone; because maintenance depends on the amount of property each spouse receives, that denial also had to be vacated, rendering the remaining issues moot. On remand, the trial court must receive updated evidence on asset values and reconsider the economic circumstances of both parties when redividing property and addressing maintenance.
In this Missouri dissolution modification case, Father John Patrick Haley appealed a June 2021 judgment ordering him to pay Mother Deanna Haley Brown $141,283.52 for his share of the children's uninsured medical expenses, extracurricular activities, and post-secondary college costs under prior 2008 and 2014 judgments that required each parent to pay 50% of such expenses, with college costs capped at the University of Missouri-Columbia rate. Father argued the trial court misapplied the law by enforcing vague, open-ended obligations without dollar limits and that the college-expense award was against the weight of the evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the parties' payment duties were established in the unappealed prior judgments, Mother’s evidence showed the requested college costs did not exceed the contractual cap, and Father waived challenges to the judgment’s specificity by failing to file a motion to amend under Rule 78.07(c).
Gabriel Wood appealed the denial of his Rule 29.15 post-conviction motion, which claimed his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain and introduce records from a joint bank account he held with his ex-girlfriend L.S. to support his defense against convictions for first-degree burglary, second-degree child molestation, and third-degree assault arising from an alleged unauthorized entry into her home. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the motion court’s denial of relief after an evidentiary hearing. The court reasoned that Wood had not shown prejudice under the Strickland standard because the bank records would, at best, have impeached L.S.’s testimony about the account but would not have disproved an element of burglary by establishing lawful entry or consent. Mere impeachment evidence, without negating an essential element of the charged offenses, does not establish a viable defense warranting post-conviction relief.