The case involved a breach-of-contract lawsuit by officials and a member of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local Union 702 against the City of Poplar Bluff, Missouri. The plaintiffs claimed the City violated its Water-Sewer Department Collective Bargaining Agreement by hiring Daniel Sparks, rather than union member Quinton Tillman, for an open Water Plant Operator position. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the City. The court reasoned that Sparks qualified as "any employee" covered by the agreement because he had previously worked under it as a backup operator, the agreement imposed no full-time assignment requirement or automatic preference for Water-Sewer Department applicants, and the City retained management rights to select the more qualified candidate without breaching its terms.
The case involved relators Rudy Tapia and Douglas Rogers, defendants in a civil lawsuit originally filed in Miller County, who sought a writ of prohibition to bar Judge Derek Ankrom in Greene County from denying their application for a change of judge under Rule 51.05 after the case was transferred there. The underlying suit by Midwest Roofing alleged breach of contract and other claims, with venue transferred to Greene County by agreement after the defendants moved to transfer for improper venue under Rule 51.045. The circuit judge denied the change-of-judge request, relying on Rules 51.02 and 51.06(a) to conclude that the venue transfer request acted as a stipulation or change that barred any further change without cause. The Court of Appeals made its preliminary writ permanent, holding that a motion to transfer venue for improper venue is distinct from a “change of venue” under Rule 51.03, so Rule 51.06(a)’s restrictions do not apply and the relators retained their right to a change of judge as a matter of right.
The case involved a dispute between Lands’ End Properties, LLC (LEP), the developer of the Grand Meridian Condominium project, and the condominium owners’ association over whether LEP retained development rights under the project’s declaration and whether it owed unpaid assessments on two units. Following a bench trial, the circuit court ruled for LEP on the development-rights claim but for the association on the assessments claim, applying a five-year statute of limitations under § 516.120 and limiting liability to amounts accruing after March 28, 2013. The association appealed, raising thirteen points that challenged the trial court’s legal conclusions on the declaration, its application of the statute of limitations, an evidentiary ruling, and several factual findings as being against the weight of the evidence. The Missouri Court of Appeals reviewed the judgment under the Murphy v. Carron standard, construed the condominium declaration strictly, deferred to the trial court’s credibility determinations, and concluded that none of the points had merit. It therefore affirmed the trial court’s judgment in full.
This case concerns a Missouri probate proceeding in which J-Pia Spruill petitioned to be appointed guardian and conservator for her mother, Kyong Spruill, who was alleged to have dementia and lack capacity to manage her affairs; Kyong’s son, Arthur Spruill, intervened, filed cross-petitions seeking the same appointment for himself, and presented recently executed powers of attorney naming him as agent. The trial court found Kyong incapacitated by stipulation, set aside the powers of attorney and related deed, and ultimately appointed J-Pia as permanent guardian and conservator. On appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. The court held that one of Arthur’s five points was moot and that none of the points had been preserved for review because he failed to present the alleged errors to the trial court and obtain adverse rulings, as required by Rule 78.09; it therefore treated the trial court’s presumed-correct judgment as conclusive.
In this case, Keith Thompson was convicted by a jury as a prior and persistent offender of first-degree statutory rape, third-degree child molestation, and sexual misconduct involving a child by indecent exposure, based on evidence that he took a 12-year-old victim to his apartment, sexually assaulted her, and exposed his genitals during the incident; he received consecutive sentences totaling 52 years. On appeal, Thompson challenged the trial court's denial of a mistrial after a witness referred to him as a felon and raised three sufficiency and double-jeopardy claims regarding the sexual-misconduct count, arguing that any genital exposure was not knowing, was merely incidental to the rape, and violated protections against multiple punishments for the same act. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable juror to find Thompson knowingly exposed himself to a child under fifteen knowing the conduct would likely cause affront or alarm and was done for sexual gratification, that this exposure constituted a separate and distinct act from the rape elements, and that the offenses required proof of different facts so no double-jeopardy violation occurred. The court also found no abuse of discretion or plain error in denying the mistrial.
Shane Keathley was convicted by a jury in Wayne County Circuit Court of the class D felony of making a terroristic threat in the first degree after he told a deputy sheriff that if the sheriff’s office would not address alleged “torturing” in local churches, he would “go to the school and take care of the kids” himself, then drove toward the nearby elementary school. On appeal, Keathley argued that his statements were not “true threats” protected by the First Amendment, that the evidence was insufficient to prove he knowingly communicated a threat involving danger to life, and that the evidence failed to show he acted with the purpose of frightening ten or more people. The Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, affirmed the conviction, holding that the constitutional “true threat” claim was waived because it was not raised in a pretrial motion to dismiss or preserved at trial, and that the remaining sufficiency challenges failed under the standard that views all evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the verdict. The court concluded that the deputy’s testimony about the statements, Keathley’s demeanor, and his movement toward the school provided sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.