Terri J. Stoneburner

The case involved a former wife seeking to foreclose a $5,000 lien on homestead property awarded in a 1983 divorce judgment after the property had been transferred multiple times to subsequent owners. The district court dismissed the action as time-barred under the 10-year statute of limitations for enforcing judgment liens. The appellate court reversed and remanded, concluding that marital liens awarded in dissolution proceedings are not judgment liens but a method of property division, so the 15-year statute of limitations for mortgage foreclosures applied where the original judgment provided no specific enforcement mechanism.

family lawpropertyprocedure

The case involved defendant Virginia Briard, who was charged with six counts of felony criminal contempt under Minn. Stat. § 588.20 for failing to appear as a witness pursuant to subpoenas in her husband's criminal trial. The certified questions concerned whether substitute service of the subpoenas—first by leaving one with her husband at their shared home and later by leaving one with her adult son at the same address—was valid under Minn. R. Crim. P. 22.03. The court answered both questions in the negative, holding that service on the husband was ineffective because he was not a person of suitable discretion and that service on the son was ineffective because he did not reside at the defendant's abode. The reasoning relied on the plain language of the rule requiring personal service or substitute service on a suitable person at the defendant's residence, along with precedent interpreting suitable age and discretion and the requirement of actual residence.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a legal malpractice claim brought by Ralph Schmitz and his company against the law firm Rinke Noonan over representation in a failed 2001 transaction to sell membership interests in LLCs owning low-income housing properties. Schmitz alleged that attorney John Babcock failed to properly advise him regarding an August 15 letter that was later deemed a contract repudiation and failed to warn about risks or recommend actions after receiving a response letter from the buyer's attorney on August 23. The district court granted the firm's motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of Schmitz's case and the appellate court affirmed that ruling while also reversing the denial of the firm's pretrial summary judgment motion. The court held that Schmitz failed to produce expert testimony establishing a breach of the standard of care or non-speculative evidence of but-for causation for the alleged malpractice, and that the expert affidavits submitted were insufficient as a matter of law to support the claim.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatoryprocedure

In Allen v. Burnet Realty, LLC, a former real estate sales associate sued his broker alleging that the company's Legal Assistance Program—which charged an annual fee for indemnification and defense in disputes up to $1 million—amounted to unauthorized insurance under Minn. Stat. § 60K.47, and that the broker's failure to disclose this violated the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act while unjustly enriching the company. The district court granted summary judgment to the broker on all claims, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court concluded the program was not insurance because it was tied to the principal purpose of the parties' real estate relationship, with the broker retaining responsibility for and control over the risk of losses rather than providing unrelated indemnity for hire.

business & regulatory

The case concerned Chris Pallas's challenge to the Minnesota Commissioner of Public Safety's refusal to reinstate his driver's license after an out-of-state lifetime revocation stemming from multiple drunk-driving convictions. The commissioner conditioned reinstatement on obtaining a clearance letter from Illinois, which was impossible due to the permanent revocation, and the district court upheld that denial. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, ruling that under the Driver's License Compact and Minnesota Statutes section 171.19, the commissioner must personally assess whether issuing a license would be unsafe rather than deferring to the other state's revocation status or requiring a clearance letter, and that failing to exercise that discretion rendered the decision arbitrary.

procedurecriminal law

The case concerned the City of Cohasset's lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to compel Minnesota Power to obtain a municipal franchise or permit before building a private natural gas pipeline within city limits to serve its Boswell Energy Center electric plant. The district court granted summary judgment for Minnesota Power, and the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held that Minnesota Power is not a natural gas public utility under Minn. Stat. § 216B.02 because it does not furnish natural gas service to the public, and therefore it is not subject to the city's franchise authority under Minn. Stat. § 216B.36. The decision rested on the statutory distinction between entities that provide utility services to the public and those that operate private facilities, noting that the pipeline's routing fell under the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission's permitting process instead.

business & regulatory

This case involves two defamation lawsuits filed by Denny Prescott, Dennis Oberloh, and Oberloh and Associates against Loren Johnson, treasurer of the Lower Sioux Indian Community, for newsletters he mailed to tribal members alleging improper past financial dealings involving a company called Municipal Capital Corporation and conflicts of interest. The district court denied Johnson's motion for summary judgment on sovereign immunity grounds, finding material factual issues about whether he acted within his authority. The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that Johnson was entitled to tribal sovereign immunity because the newsletters were sent in his official capacity on tribal letterhead as part of his duties regarding tribal financial transparency. The court reasoned that tribal sovereign immunity protects officials acting within the scope of their authority, and its application does not depend on the truth or motive of the statements made.

torts & liabilityfederal power

In this postconviction appeal, appellant Lance Odegard sought to vacate or modify his 2003 first-degree DWI guilty plea, arguing that a 2002 driver's license revocation used as an aggravating factor was invalid under the Minnesota Supreme Court's 2007 Wiltgen decision, which held that using an unreviewed revocation violates due process. The district court denied relief, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court first determined that Wiltgen announced a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure. Applying the Teague retroactivity framework, the court concluded that Wiltgen was not a watershed rule that alters fundamental fairness or bedrock procedural elements, so it does not apply retroactively to convictions that were already final when Wiltgen was decided.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved relator D.W., who was civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program as a sexual psychopathic personality and had advanced to a supervised integration phase allowing limited community contact. An end-of-confinement review committee assigned him a risk level of III under Minn. Stat. § 244.052, which he challenged on the grounds that he was not yet 'about to be released from confinement' and thus not subject to risk assessment. The administrative law judges affirmed the assignment, and the court upheld that decision. The court reasoned that the statute's language and purpose permit risk assessments at state treatment facilities when offenders begin phases involving community contact, as this aligns with the goal of protecting the public while community notification remains prohibited until actual discharge.

criminal law

This case arose from consolidated lawsuits by investors against Geoff and Nancy Thompson and others for an alleged large-scale real estate investment fraud scheme involving false promises of condominium purchases and high-return private loans, with claims including breach of contract, fraud, and violations of consumer protection and securities laws. The district court entered default judgments against the involved corporate entities, appointed a receiver, and pierced the corporate veils to impose personal liability on the Thompsons for those judgments. On appeal, the Thompsons challenged the veil-piercing as improper since they were not shareholders, along with aspects of the receivership administration and denial of summary judgment. The court affirmed, holding that the record supported findings that the Thompsons disregarded the corporate form and that the receiver acted within its authority to identify and secure assets, while declining to review the non-final summary judgment ruling.

business & regulatorytorts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a pre-enforcement challenge by the Coalition of Greater Minnesota Cities to a Minnesota Pollution Control Agency rule, Minn. R. 7053.0255, subp. 4, which imposes a 1 mg/L phosphorus effluent limit on new or expanding dischargers exceeding 1,800 pounds of phosphorus per year while providing limited exemptions. The coalition argued that the rule's exemption provisions granted the agency unbridled discretion, violating the state constitution's separation of powers, exceeding rulemaking authority, and breaching the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act. The court held that the coalition had standing to bring the challenge but concluded that the rule did not confer unbridled discretion, as the agency must exercise its authority consistently with statutory goals, existing variance provisions, and the regulatory policy favoring flexibility. It therefore declared the rule valid after reviewing the rulemaking record and the agency's explanations for the exemptions.

environmentbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

In State v. Hollins, the defendant was convicted of aiding and abetting a third-degree controlled-substance crime after a police informant purchased crack cocaine from a third party in the defendant's apartment following a phone call made by the defendant. The defendant appealed, claiming the district court erred by giving a jury instruction allowing inference of criminal intent from presence, companionship, and conduct, and by admitting testimony that the defendant was rolling a blunt at the time. The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the jury instruction was permissible under state law and did not violate due process, while the admission of the marijuana-related testimony, though erroneous, was not plain error and did not affect the defendant's substantial rights given the strength of the other evidence.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a divorced father's motion to reduce his child support payments after amendments to Minnesota's child support guidelines took effect. The child support magistrate and district court denied the motion, holding that a change in the guidelines alone does not constitute a substantial change in circumstances warranting modification. The Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the father was entitled to an irrebuttable presumption of changed circumstances under Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(b)(1) because applying the new guidelines resulted in more than a 20% reduction, and the statutory moratorium on using the new guidelines had expired. The court remanded for determination of whether the existing order is unreasonable and unfair.

family law

This case concerned the accrual date of a statute of limitations for an underinsured motorist (UIM) claim after settlement with a tortfeasor. The insured notified his UIM insurer of a settlement offer in March 2001, the insurer declined to substitute its check on April 2, 2001, and the insured signed a release on April 17, 2001, before suing the insurer for UIM benefits in April 2007. The court held that the six-year limitations period began running on the date the insured received notice that the insurer would not substitute its payment, making the 2007 action untimely. The decision rested on prior precedent establishing that a UIM claim accrues upon an enforceable settlement or recovery from the tortfeasor's insurer, which occurs when the settlement agreement becomes binding rather than upon execution of a release.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved appellant Nosak-here Holmes challenging his convictions for first-degree burglary and third-degree assault arising from an incident where he and others entered an apartment and assaulted A.W. and his daughter. The appellant argued that the district court erred by admitting photographs of the daughter's injuries (not inflicted by him) and a pole found at the scene, and that he could not be convicted and sentenced for both offenses based on a single assault. The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the photographs were relevant to provide context and corroborate testimony, the pole's admission was not plain error, and Minnesota statutes permit separate convictions for burglary and the underlying assault even when the assault is used to elevate the burglary charge.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute over an investment in paulownia tree operations in Panama, where appellant PPP, a Vanuatu corporation, sued Minnesota resident Rajamannan and related entities for fraud, unjust enrichment, conversion, and breach of contract after funds transferred for the project were allegedly misused. The district court dismissed the action on forum non conveniens grounds, finding Panama to be an available and adequate alternative forum. The appellate court reversed, holding that under Panamanian law Article 1421-J, Panama's courts will not accept jurisdiction over cases dismissed elsewhere for forum non conveniens, making Panama unavailable as a forum. As a result, the court did not reach the public- and private-interest factors and remanded for further proceedings.

procedurebusiness & regulatorytorts & liability

The case involved Tena Van Kampen’s claim for underinsured-motorist (UIM) benefits after a 2000 car accident in which she and her family were injured by an at-fault driver with $1.5 million in liability coverage. Van Kampen’s family members received the full liability limits in a pretrial settlement, while she received nothing and released her claims; she later sought UIM coverage from her own and her son-in-law’s insurers. The district court granted summary judgment dismissing her UIM claims, finding she had forfeited coverage by settling without protecting the insurers’ subrogation rights and by providing inadequate notice of the settlement. The Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding that settling without receiving payment did not automatically forfeit UIM coverage and that a genuine issue of material fact existed on whether the insurers were prejudiced by the notice, while affirming dismissal of the insurers’ third-party claims against the tortfeasors because the settlement extinguished subrogation rights as a matter of law.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved appellant Vernon Lee Pugh, who was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct against his step-daughter and, after remand for resentencing under Blakely and Taylor, received a 144-month prison term plus ten years of conditional release. The district court also reimposed a no-contact order with the victim. On appeal, the court affirmed the prison sentence and conditional release but vacated the no-contact order, reasoning that Minnesota statutes (including Minn. Stat. § 609.10 and § 609.342) enumerate the authorized components of felony sentences and do not permit courts to add a no-contact order absent express legislative authorization. The court further held that the sentence did not violate the single-behavioral-incident statute (Minn. Stat. § 609.035) because Pugh was sentenced on only one count after the other was dismissed as lesser-included.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved Daniel Reeves challenging the revocation of his driver's license after he failed an implied-consent blood test following a DWI arrest. Reeves argued there was no probable cause for the arrest because he passed the preliminary breath test with readings below 0.08, and that Hennepin County's Fast-Track scheduling program for implied-consent hearings violated statutory timelines and his due-process rights. The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's order sustaining the revocation. The court held that the officer had probable cause based on the totality of circumstances, including erratic driving, physical signs of intoxication, and field sobriety test performance, even though PBT results were under the limit. It further concluded that the hearing delay did not violate the driver's rights because the 60-day statutory deadline is directory rather than mandatory and Reeves suffered no prejudice beyond a brief period without driving privileges that was remedied by a stay.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a part-time police officer who suffered a disabling knee injury during a required training course to become a full-time officer and later sought continued health coverage under Minn. Stat. § 299A.465 after receiving a duty-related disability pension. The benefit-eligibility panel denied the claim, concluding that the officer did not qualify as a "peace officer" because of his part-time status at the time of the injury. The court reversed the panel's decision, holding that the statute's definition of "peace officer" in Minn. Stat. § 626.84, subd. 1(c) does not distinguish between part-time and full-time officers and contains no ambiguity that would permit the panel to consider employment status. The panel therefore exceeded its authority by denying coverage on that basis, and the officer was entitled to the statutory health benefits.

labor & employmenthealthcare