Terri J. Stoneburner

The case involved a former wife seeking to foreclose a $5,000 lien on homestead property awarded in a 1983 divorce judgment after the property had been transferred multiple times to subsequent owners. The district court dismissed the action as time-barred under the 10-year statute of limitations for enforcing judgment liens. The appellate court reversed and remanded, concluding that marital liens awarded in dissolution proceedings are not judgment liens but a method of property division, so the 15-year statute of limitations for mortgage foreclosures applied where the original judgment provided no specific enforcement mechanism.

family lawpropertyprocedure

The case involved defendant Virginia Briard, who was charged with six counts of felony criminal contempt under Minn. Stat. § 588.20 for failing to appear as a witness pursuant to subpoenas in her husband's criminal trial. The certified questions concerned whether substitute service of the subpoenas—first by leaving one with her husband at their shared home and later by leaving one with her adult son at the same address—was valid under Minn. R. Crim. P. 22.03. The court answered both questions in the negative, holding that service on the husband was ineffective because he was not a person of suitable discretion and that service on the son was ineffective because he did not reside at the defendant's abode. The reasoning relied on the plain language of the rule requiring personal service or substitute service on a suitable person at the defendant's residence, along with precedent interpreting suitable age and discretion and the requirement of actual residence.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a legal malpractice claim brought by Ralph Schmitz and his company against the law firm Rinke Noonan over representation in a failed 2001 transaction to sell membership interests in LLCs owning low-income housing properties. Schmitz alleged that attorney John Babcock failed to properly advise him regarding an August 15 letter that was later deemed a contract repudiation and failed to warn about risks or recommend actions after receiving a response letter from the buyer's attorney on August 23. The district court granted the firm's motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of Schmitz's case and the appellate court affirmed that ruling while also reversing the denial of the firm's pretrial summary judgment motion. The court held that Schmitz failed to produce expert testimony establishing a breach of the standard of care or non-speculative evidence of but-for causation for the alleged malpractice, and that the expert affidavits submitted were insufficient as a matter of law to support the claim.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatoryprocedure

In Allen v. Burnet Realty, LLC, a former real estate sales associate sued his broker alleging that the company's Legal Assistance Program—which charged an annual fee for indemnification and defense in disputes up to $1 million—amounted to unauthorized insurance under Minn. Stat. § 60K.47, and that the broker's failure to disclose this violated the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act while unjustly enriching the company. The district court granted summary judgment to the broker on all claims, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court concluded the program was not insurance because it was tied to the principal purpose of the parties' real estate relationship, with the broker retaining responsibility for and control over the risk of losses rather than providing unrelated indemnity for hire.

business & regulatory

The case concerned Chris Pallas's challenge to the Minnesota Commissioner of Public Safety's refusal to reinstate his driver's license after an out-of-state lifetime revocation stemming from multiple drunk-driving convictions. The commissioner conditioned reinstatement on obtaining a clearance letter from Illinois, which was impossible due to the permanent revocation, and the district court upheld that denial. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, ruling that under the Driver's License Compact and Minnesota Statutes section 171.19, the commissioner must personally assess whether issuing a license would be unsafe rather than deferring to the other state's revocation status or requiring a clearance letter, and that failing to exercise that discretion rendered the decision arbitrary.

procedurecriminal law

The case concerned the City of Cohasset's lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to compel Minnesota Power to obtain a municipal franchise or permit before building a private natural gas pipeline within city limits to serve its Boswell Energy Center electric plant. The district court granted summary judgment for Minnesota Power, and the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held that Minnesota Power is not a natural gas public utility under Minn. Stat. § 216B.02 because it does not furnish natural gas service to the public, and therefore it is not subject to the city's franchise authority under Minn. Stat. § 216B.36. The decision rested on the statutory distinction between entities that provide utility services to the public and those that operate private facilities, noting that the pipeline's routing fell under the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission's permitting process instead.

business & regulatory