The case concerned an employment dispute between plaintiff Bell, an insurance agent, and defendants including Prudential Insurance Company that proceeded to binding arbitration under a Form U-4 agreement governed by the Federal Arbitration Act. After mediation failed, defense counsel who had served as a neutral mediator represented the defendants in arbitration; the plaintiff sought to disqualify counsel, but the panel denied that request while granting extra discovery as a remedy and ultimately issued an award. The trial court found no statutory grounds to vacate the award under 9 USC 10, no prejudice to the plaintiff, and no causal effect from counsel's conduct, yet vacated the award on public-policy grounds to protect confidence in alternative dispute resolution. The appellate court reversed and reinstated the award, holding that a court may not vacate an arbitral award absent the narrow FAA grounds or any demonstrated impact on the outcome.
This case involved a products liability claim by plaintiff Wayne Hall against General Motors for injuries he sustained in 1994 while working on a 1975 Camaro in North Carolina. After moving to Michigan, Hall sued GM there in 1996, prompting a dispute over whether Michigan or North Carolina law should apply under Michigan's choice-of-law rules. The Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff's residency at the time of injury controls the analysis, so North Carolina law governed; because the vehicle had been sold more than six years earlier, North Carolina's statute of repose barred the suit. The court reasoned that North Carolina had a substantial interest in applying its law given that the injury, plaintiff's residence, the vehicle's registration, and medical treatment all occurred there, while Michigan's only connection was the plaintiff's post-injury relocation. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's denial of GM's motion to dismiss and remanded for dismissal.
The case involved defendant Alphonzo R. Jones, who was convicted by jury of assault with intent to commit murder and felony-firearm possession, then pleaded guilty as a habitual offender and received sentences including fifteen to forty years. On appeal, Jones argued that Michigan's 180-day rule had been violated because his trial began on the 186th day after he became a state prisoner. The court held an evidentiary hearing and concluded there was no violation, as the prosecution demonstrated good-faith efforts to proceed within the period, a seven-day adjournment was granted at the defendant's request, and time spent on another of his cases did not count against the deadline under precedents like People v. Hendershot. The court agreed the 180-day rule was satisfied but reversed the convictions on other grounds.
This case was an environmental cleanup dispute in which commercial landlord Forest City and its insurer sued former gas station tenant Leemon Oil over subsurface contamination from a 1983 gasoline spill and other sources, asserting common-law claims such as breach of lease, waste, nuisance, and trespass plus a statutory claim under the Michigan Environmental Response Act (MERA). The jury found no liability on most claims and attributed the bulk of damages to Forest City's own negligence, while the trial court ruled the nuisance claim time-barred and limited Leemon Oil's MERA contribution to roughly $6,927; the Court of Appeals affirmed all rulings. The court reasoned that the different contaminants were divisible, that Forest City had failed to prove joint and several liability, and that the trial court had correctly applied statutes of limitations and mediation sanctions without procedural error.
This case involved an appeal by an employer and its insurer from a Worker’s Compensation Appellate Commission decision that the Silicosis, Dust Disease, and Logging Industry Compensation Fund was not responsible for paying benefits to the estate of a worker who died from peritoneal mesothelioma caused by asbestos exposure on the job. The court affirmed the commission’s ruling, holding that the fund had no liability because the employer failed to prove that the disease posed a general threat to the industry. The core reasoning relied on precedents requiring the employer to show that a dust disease is so common and widespread as to threaten the industry, a burden the employer did not meet here, and the magistrate made no finding that the worker suffered from one of the specifically recognized diseases like pneumoconiosis.
This case involved a dispute over ownership of a small parcel of land adjacent to a condominium project. Plaintiffs acquired title after the state took the property for unpaid taxes and sold it to them, while defendant, the prior owner, claimed it had never received proper notice of the tax proceedings. The trial court granted summary disposition to plaintiffs, finding that notice sent by certified mail to defendant's last known address and recorded with the register of deeds satisfied statutory requirements. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the notice was inadequate under the Due Process Clause and the General Property Tax Act because it was not sent to defendant's updated address on file with the state, rendering the tax sale proceedings void as to defendant and entitling it to summary disposition on the complaint.