Robert A. Zarnoch

In Kelly v. State, the defendant was convicted of drug offenses after a 2021 traffic stop in which police searched his vehicle based on the odor of cannabis, with the resulting evidence admitted at trial following denial of a suppression motion. While his appeal was pending, a 2023 Maryland statute took effect generally barring vehicle searches or stops based solely on cannabis odor and excluding evidence obtained in violation of the new law. The Appellate Court of Maryland held that the statute does not apply retroactively to this case. The court reasoned that the law's text, which renders inadmissible only evidence discovered "in violation of this section," demonstrates legislative intent for prospective application only, consistent with the presumption against retroactivity of statutes affecting substantive rights or remedies.

criminal law

The case involved a dispute between the estate of a deceased federal employee and her ex-husband over the proceeds of her Thrift Savings Plan account under the Federal Employees’ Retirement System Act. Although the ex-husband had waived his rights to the account in a divorce settlement agreement, the employee never changed the beneficiary designation, and the federal plan distributed the funds to him upon her death. The estate sued in state court for breach of contract and other claims to recover the proceeds. The appellate court held that the estate’s state-law claims were preempted by FERSA’s order-of-precedence rules, which require payment to the designated beneficiary and bar recovery by others, and therefore reversed the circuit court’s denial of the motion to dismiss. The core reasoning was that any conflicting state law or court action must yield to federal law under principles of preemption.

federal powerfamily lawproperty

In Adkins v. State, the defendant was convicted by a jury of driving while impaired by alcohol, driving without a required license, and driving on a revoked license under Maryland's Transportation Article. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the convictions, ruling that the trial court should have instructed the jury that the State must prove the defendant knew his license was revoked to convict under Transp. § 16-303(d), but the omission was harmless error given the defendant's stipulations on the revocation and notification. The court further held that denying a postponement was not an abuse of discretion because no prejudice was shown, and any challenge to seating a particular juror was waived by the defendant's acceptance of the jury and use of peremptory strikes.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved an appeal by Calvin Rodney Butler from the Circuit Court for Baltimore County's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel due to his attorney's late filing of a motion to modify his sentence under Maryland Rule 4-345. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision. The court reasoned that while failing to file the motion timely constitutes deficient performance, there was no prejudice because the circuit court would have denied the motion even if filed on time, as indicated by its views on the sentence. Therefore, the defendant did not lose a meaningful opportunity for sentence reconsideration.

criminal lawprocedure

In Dejarnette v. State, the defendant appealed his Somerset County jury convictions for driving under the influence per se and driving while impaired, challenging the trial court's admission of breath test results on grounds that the officer did not strictly follow a COMAR regulation requiring a twenty-minute observation period before testing. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court's judgment. The court held that the statutory exclusionary rule in Maryland Code § 10-309 applies only to noncompliance with the statute's own requirements and not to violations of COMAR regulations, which instead affect the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility. The court further explained that the observation period does not demand continuous unbroken eye contact and that administrative agencies lack authority to establish exclusionary rules binding on courts.

criminal lawprocedure

In Maddox v. State, the defendant entered Alford pleas to second-degree arson and was sentenced to probation with a condition to pay nearly $100,000 in restitution; after the initial probation period, the court extended probation under Maryland Code, Criminal Procedure Article § 6-222(b) and imposed additional conditions beyond restitution. Maddox moved to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that the statute authorizing extensions for restitution did not permit other conditions. The Court of Special Appeals held that a court extending probation solely for restitution may impose only conditions related to making restitution payments and complying with supervised probation requirements, but no other conditions, and may not revoke or sanction for unrelated violations. The core reasoning was statutory interpretation: the provision's purpose is to facilitate restitution, and a broader reading would lead to illogical or absurd results, such as indefinite probation or revocation unrelated to the extension's goal.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether Carbond, Inc.'s electronic gaming devices, which were refrigerator-sized machines with spinning wheels and lights licensed as coin-operated amusement devices and placed in bars and stores, were subject to Maryland's Admissions and Amusement Tax. Carbond had been assessed millions in unpaid taxes on the machines' gross receipts after an audit revealed illegal payouts to players, and it sought a refund arguing the devices did not qualify as 'games of entertainment' under the Tax-General Article. The Maryland Tax Court and Circuit Court for Baltimore City upheld the assessment, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The court reasoned that the 1979 statutory addition of 'game of entertainment' was intended to cover games requiring the use or rental of recreational equipment, that Carbond's machines inherently involved such equipment unlike simple pull-tab tickets, and that they were not exempt like specifically licensed Instant Bingo machines in certain counties.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

The case concerned a 2015 Montgomery County ordinance that restricted the use of certain pesticides for cosmetic lawn care purposes throughout the county. Lawn care businesses challenged the law, arguing it was preempted by Maryland's Agriculture Article under theories of express, conflict, or implied preemption. The Court of Special Appeals reversed the circuit court's ruling and held that the ordinance was not preempted in any of those ways. The court reasoned that state pesticide statutes lack the comprehensiveness needed for implied preemption, contain no direct conflict with local rules, and are accompanied by repeated legislative rejections of bills that would have barred county-level pesticide regulations. It further noted that the General Assembly had historically recognized local authority in this area.

environmentbusiness & regulatory

The case concerned whether a 2015 Montgomery County ordinance restricting the cosmetic use of certain pesticides was preempted by Maryland state law in the Agriculture Article. The Court of Special Appeals held that the ordinance was not preempted, reversing the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. The court analyzed and rejected express, conflict, and implied preemption, finding no specific statutory language barring local rules, no direct conflict with state permissions or prohibitions, and no comprehensive state scheme implying field occupation. Key factors included the General Assembly's repeated rejection of bills to preempt local pesticide regulations and its prior recognition of county authority in related areas. The decision emphasized that local governments retain power to regulate pesticides consistent with state law.

environmentbusiness & regulatory

The case concerned a challenge by the operators of Towson Nights hookah lounge to a Baltimore County ordinance that amended zoning regulations to require all hookah lounges to close between midnight and 6 a.m. The plaintiffs contended that the hour restriction exceeded the county's zoning authority, violated substantive due process, and denied equal protection by targeting hookah lounges but not similar late-night businesses. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court's rejection of these claims. It held that the restriction was a valid exercise of the county's police power, rationally related to public safety concerns such as arrests and crimes at late-night hookah lounges as well as health risks from tobacco smoke exposure.

business & regulatorycivil rights

In this case, the Montgomery County Office of Child Support Enforcement certified that Andrew Cohen was more than $2,500 in arrears on child support payments, leading the U.S. Secretary of State to deny his passport application under federal law. The circuit court ordered the agency to release the hold on Cohen's passport so he could travel and retained control over it upon his return. The Court of Special Appeals reversed this decision, holding that the plain language of federal and state laws mandated the passport denial, the circuit court's order violated separation of powers by encroaching on executive authority, Cohen failed to exhaust administrative remedies, and the appeal was not moot despite Cohen's return from travel.

family lawfederal powerprocedure

The case concerned an inmate's 2008 civil lawsuit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against prison officers, including Captain Phlonda Peay, alleging excessive force and related injuries from a 2006 cell incident. Peay did not respond, leading to a default judgment, which she moved to vacate more than six years later on grounds of defective service of process that deprived the court of personal jurisdiction. The circuit court denied the motion, emphasizing Peay's delay and lack of diligence. The Court of Special Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that defects in service constitute jurisdictional mistakes under Maryland Rule 2-535(b) that render a judgment void without regard to post-judgment diligence, and directing the lower court to instead assess whether Peay waived her personal jurisdiction challenge through her conduct or notice of the proceedings.

procedurecivil rightstorts & liability

This case involved a dispute over whether the Maryland Comptroller was required to pay interest on a sales tax refund to Jason Pharmaceuticals, Inc. The company had paid sales tax on leased printing equipment but later sought and received a refund claiming an exemption for manufacturing activities. The Tax Court and circuit court ruled that interest was due because the overpayment was attributable to the State. The Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding that the taxpayer's error in paying the tax was not caused by any state law, regulation, or policy, but rather was within the company's own knowledge and control, so no interest was owed under the relevant statute.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

The case concerned whether the Maryland Comptroller could suspend a cigarette retail license held by Two Farms, Inc., after the business was cited for selling tobacco products to minors in violation of state and local law. The Court of Special Appeals held that the Comptroller has implied authority under the Business Regulation Article to suspend such a license because illegal sales fall outside the scope of the license, but that authority is not derived from the specific provision allowing discipline for fraudulently or deceptively using a license. Because the agency had based its suspension decision solely on the fraud provision, the court affirmed the circuit court's ruling that the suspension could not stand. The opinion emphasized that an agency decision must be reviewed only on the grounds actually stated by the agency and construed the licensing statutes in light of legislative intent linking them to prohibitions on sales to minors.

business & regulatorycriminal lawprocedure

This case involved a subcontractor, C & B Construction, seeking to hold the officers of a general contractor, Temco Builders, personally liable under the Maryland Construction Trust Statute for unpaid work on six projects. The circuit court granted judgment for the officers after finding the statute inapplicable, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The court interpreted the statute's applicability provision in RP § 9-204(a) as limiting its reach exclusively to contracts covered by the Maryland Little Miller Act or the mechanics' lien statute under RP § 9-102. Relying on the statutory text, purpose, legislative history, and consequences, the court concluded that none of the projects met those criteria, so the officers could not be held personally liable under the trust statute.

business & regulatoryproperty

In Walker v. State, Danyelle Walker was charged with two counts of criminal contempt and four counts of failure to pay child support for his four minor children after repeatedly missing payments under court orders despite earning income during parts of the relevant period from 2013 to 2015. Following a jury trial, he was convicted on all counts and sentenced to three years with all but twelve months suspended. On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that the evidence of willful nonpayment—including periods of employment with no support paid—was sufficient to sustain both the contempt and statutory charges. The court also ruled that separate sentences were proper because the offenses serve distinct purposes and do not merge under the rule of lenity or other principles.

criminal lawfamily law

This case concerns Lionel Holloway's second petition for writ of error coram nobis seeking to vacate his 2000 guilty pleas to heroin distribution charges in Maryland circuit court, after those convictions led to a federal mandatory minimum sentence for a later firearm offense. The circuit court denied the petition on grounds that Holloway had waived his right to coram nobis relief. On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals held that the circuit court erred in finding waiver, given the retroactive effect of Criminal Procedure § 8-401, but affirmed the denial because the law of the case doctrine barred relitigation of the validity of the guilty pleas. The court reasoned that Holloway could have raised his new claim about not being advised of the presumption of innocence in his first appeal, where the panel had already upheld the pleas under a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, and no exceptions to the doctrine applied.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned the validity of two deeds conveying the same property owned by Dianne Hudson. In 1990, Hudson executed a deed granting herself a life estate while reserving broad powers to sell, mortgage, lease, or encumber the property, with the remainder interest going to Gouldmann, Mierzwinski, and Ciekot; in 2009, she executed a second deed granting the remainder to Grimes and Hellenbrand. After Hudson's death, the circuit court ruled the 2009 deed invalid, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The court held that the 1990 deed's language expressly limited Hudson's powers over the remaindermen's interest to sale, mortgage, lease, or other encumbrance and did not authorize a gift, relying on the deed's plain terms and precedent interpreting similar language. The judgment invalidating the 2009 deed was therefore affirmed.

property

The case concerned a dispute over whether Frederick Classical Charter School was entitled to receive a portion of transportation funding from the Frederick County Board of Education in its fiscal year 2014 allocation under the Public Charter School Act, even though the school did not provide transportation services to its students. The State Board of Education and the Circuit Court for Frederick County both upheld the local board's decision to exclude those funds, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The court reasoned that state education law and prior State Board rulings require funding allocations to be commensurate with services actually provided by the charter school, that the board was not required to fund services neither it nor the school offered, and that the charter's terms and the flexibility of charter schools supported withholding the unused transportation funds.

business & regulatory

The case concerned whether the Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights (LEOBR) permitted the Montgomery County Police Department to video record interrogations of officers facing internal disciplinary investigations. The statute requires a department to keep a “complete record” of such interrogations, which “may be written, taped, or transcribed.” The Fraternal Order of Police filed a show cause petition arguing that “taped” allowed only audio recording, and the circuit court enjoined video recording. The Court of Special Appeals reversed, ruling that nothing in the LEOBR bars video recording because it advances the complete-record requirement and the statute’s language is not limited to audio.

criminal lawlabor & employmentprocedure