Robert A. Zarnoch

In Kelly v. State, the defendant was convicted of drug offenses after a 2021 traffic stop in which police searched his vehicle based on the odor of cannabis, with the resulting evidence admitted at trial following denial of a suppression motion. While his appeal was pending, a 2023 Maryland statute took effect generally barring vehicle searches or stops based solely on cannabis odor and excluding evidence obtained in violation of the new law. The Appellate Court of Maryland held that the statute does not apply retroactively to this case. The court reasoned that the law's text, which renders inadmissible only evidence discovered "in violation of this section," demonstrates legislative intent for prospective application only, consistent with the presumption against retroactivity of statutes affecting substantive rights or remedies.

criminal law

The case involved a dispute between the estate of a deceased federal employee and her ex-husband over the proceeds of her Thrift Savings Plan account under the Federal Employees’ Retirement System Act. Although the ex-husband had waived his rights to the account in a divorce settlement agreement, the employee never changed the beneficiary designation, and the federal plan distributed the funds to him upon her death. The estate sued in state court for breach of contract and other claims to recover the proceeds. The appellate court held that the estate’s state-law claims were preempted by FERSA’s order-of-precedence rules, which require payment to the designated beneficiary and bar recovery by others, and therefore reversed the circuit court’s denial of the motion to dismiss. The core reasoning was that any conflicting state law or court action must yield to federal law under principles of preemption.

federal powerfamily lawproperty

In Adkins v. State, the defendant was convicted by a jury of driving while impaired by alcohol, driving without a required license, and driving on a revoked license under Maryland's Transportation Article. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the convictions, ruling that the trial court should have instructed the jury that the State must prove the defendant knew his license was revoked to convict under Transp. § 16-303(d), but the omission was harmless error given the defendant's stipulations on the revocation and notification. The court further held that denying a postponement was not an abuse of discretion because no prejudice was shown, and any challenge to seating a particular juror was waived by the defendant's acceptance of the jury and use of peremptory strikes.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved an appeal by Calvin Rodney Butler from the Circuit Court for Baltimore County's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel due to his attorney's late filing of a motion to modify his sentence under Maryland Rule 4-345. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision. The court reasoned that while failing to file the motion timely constitutes deficient performance, there was no prejudice because the circuit court would have denied the motion even if filed on time, as indicated by its views on the sentence. Therefore, the defendant did not lose a meaningful opportunity for sentence reconsideration.

criminal lawprocedure

In Dejarnette v. State, the defendant appealed his Somerset County jury convictions for driving under the influence per se and driving while impaired, challenging the trial court's admission of breath test results on grounds that the officer did not strictly follow a COMAR regulation requiring a twenty-minute observation period before testing. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court's judgment. The court held that the statutory exclusionary rule in Maryland Code § 10-309 applies only to noncompliance with the statute's own requirements and not to violations of COMAR regulations, which instead affect the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility. The court further explained that the observation period does not demand continuous unbroken eye contact and that administrative agencies lack authority to establish exclusionary rules binding on courts.

criminal lawprocedure

In Maddox v. State, the defendant entered Alford pleas to second-degree arson and was sentenced to probation with a condition to pay nearly $100,000 in restitution; after the initial probation period, the court extended probation under Maryland Code, Criminal Procedure Article § 6-222(b) and imposed additional conditions beyond restitution. Maddox moved to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that the statute authorizing extensions for restitution did not permit other conditions. The Court of Special Appeals held that a court extending probation solely for restitution may impose only conditions related to making restitution payments and complying with supervised probation requirements, but no other conditions, and may not revoke or sanction for unrelated violations. The core reasoning was statutory interpretation: the provision's purpose is to facilitate restitution, and a broader reading would lead to illogical or absurd results, such as indefinite probation or revocation unrelated to the extension's goal.

criminal lawprocedure