The case involved defendant Wallace's motion to suppress evidence obtained after law enforcement stopped him at a Charleston, West Virginia bus terminal based on a confidential informant's tip that two Black males carrying heroin or pills would arrive on a Greyhound bus from Detroit. The court conducted an evidentiary hearing, reviewed facts including the informant's reliability and officers' observations of the defendant's behavior, and applied Fourth Amendment standards for a Terry stop. It concluded that the stop was justified under an objective analysis of the circumstances, regardless of any subjective motives, and that reasonable force could be used to effect the stop. The court also distinguished the facts from other cases like United States v. Massenburg and found no basis to suppress the evidence.
This case is a pharmaceutical products liability action in which plaintiff Rosemary Keffer alleges that she developed breast cancer from taking defendants' hormone replacement therapy drugs Premarin, Prempro, and Provera, asserting claims for negligence, strict liability (design defect and failure to warn), and breach of implied warranties. Defendants moved for partial summary judgment on the implied warranty claims, arguing the drugs were fit for their ordinary purpose of treating menopausal symptoms, that plaintiff had only a general rather than particular purpose, and that she could not show reliance; they also moved on the design defect claims, asserting lack of specific causation and no valid alternative designs. The court denied the motion on the implied warranty claims, holding that under West Virginia law a plaintiff need not specify which factors of merchantability were breached and that overlap with the failure-to-warn claim does not require dismissal at the summary judgment stage. On the design defect motion, the court deemed conceded plaintiff's proposed alternative designs of lower doses, no therapy, or topical products due to lack of supporting evidence in opposition. The opinion applies the summary judgment standard requiring no genuine issue of material fact and draws all inferences in plaintiff's favor.
The case involves a West Virginia plaintiff who suffered injuries in a car accident after taking the sleep medication Zolpidem and sued the Michigan-based manufacturer and local pharmacy for failure to warn about side effects and for negligent design and marketing. The defendants removed the case to federal court on diversity grounds, arguing the pharmacy was fraudulently joined to defeat jurisdiction because state law and the learned intermediary doctrine barred claims against it. The court analyzed the fraudulent joinder standard, noting uncertainties in West Virginia precedent on pharmacist liability under W. Va. Code § 30-5-12(a) and the learned intermediary doctrine, including a recent state supreme court decision that could allow such claims. Resolving doubts in the plaintiff's favor, the court concluded there was a possibility of liability against the pharmacy and granted the motion to remand the case to state court.
This case is a deliberate intention lawsuit by former Kroger employee Jason Skaggs against his employer for foot injuries sustained when a malfunctioning pallet jack rolled over him at a West Virginia grocery store. Skaggs claimed Kroger created a specific unsafe working condition by assigning him to operate the equipment without formal training despite his repeated statements that he lacked experience and had reported prior malfunctions like unintended acceleration and brake failure. Kroger moved for summary judgment, asserting that Skaggs could not satisfy the five statutory elements of a deliberate intention claim under West Virginia Code § 23-4-2(d)(2)(ii) and that the negligence count was barred by workers' compensation immunity under § 23-2-6. The court examined whether genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the unsafe condition, Kroger's actual knowledge, and the other required elements, while noting OSHA regulations on powered industrial trucks and the distinction between signed verification forms and actual training provided.
The case involves a West Virginia coal mine employee who sued his employer for unpaid straight time and overtime wages under the West Virginia Wage Payment Collection Act and a federal wage and hour claim, alleging he performed lineman duties but was paid lower laborer rates under the union collective bargaining agreement. The defendant removed the case to federal court and moved to dismiss, contending the claims required interpretation of the CBA. The court granted the motion to dismiss without prejudice, holding that both the state and federal claims were governed by Section 301 of the LMRA because they depended on determining the proper job classification and pay rates under the CBA. The plaintiff had failed to exhaust the grievance procedures in the agreement, rendering the claims premature.
In Bragg v. United States, representatives of two miners killed in a 2006 fire at the Aracoma Alma Mine sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging that MSHA inspectors negligently failed to detect and correct numerous safety violations at the mine, which contributed to the fire and the miners' deaths from smoke and carbon monoxide. The plaintiffs claimed the agency breached a duty of care by not enforcing Mine Act standards during inspections and sought damages for negligence and wrongful death under West Virginia law. The court granted the government's motion to dismiss, holding that West Virginia negligence principles, including any potential good-samaritan liability, do not impose a duty on MSHA inspectors to protect individual miners from harm caused by the mine operator's violations. The decision rested on the absence of an undertaking that increased risk, assumed a duty owed by the operator, or induced reliance sufficient to create liability for the inspectors' alleged omissions.