The case involves a lawsuit by Mary Webb against Raleigh County Sheriff's Department personnel after deputies shot and killed her husband, Robert Webb, in the early morning of July 4, 2006, while responding to a neighbor's complaint about loud music and gunfire at the Webb residence. The deputies approached on foot, observed Mr. Webb near his truck, announced their presence, and fired when he appeared to raise a firearm toward them, resulting in his death with a blood alcohol level of .22. Plaintiff disputed facts such as whether the deputies announced themselves and whether Mr. Webb raised the gun in a threatening manner. On motions for summary judgment filed by the individual deputies and the county defendants, the court granted the motions in part and denied them in part after reviewing the record on issues including qualified immunity, state law immunity, and the viability of federal and state claims.
The case involved a defendant charged with two counts of stalking under 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2), one for conduct affecting a former girlfriend (DS) and one for the same course of conduct affecting her husband (RS). The defendant moved to elect, arguing the counts were multiplicitous because the statute's unit of prosecution is the single course of conduct rather than each affected person. The court denied the motion, holding that the statute's plain language defines the offense in terms of the specific 'person' who suffers emotional distress or fear, including family members, so separate victims support separate charges. The decision affirmed the magistrate judge's ruling that the indictment did not violate multiplicity principles.
In United States v. Shrader, the defendant, facing stalking charges under 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2) for alleged conduct causing substantial emotional distress, sought a Rule 17(c) subpoena for the alleged victim's and her husband's psychological counseling records from Village Counseling Services to contest that element of the offense. The district court affirmed the magistrate judge's order quashing the subpoena. The court reasoned that the records were protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege under Jaffee v. Redmond, which was not waived by the victim's cooperation with law enforcement, and that the defendant's Sixth Amendment confrontation and defense preparation rights did not override the privilege or require production of records not held by the government. The subpoena was further found to be an impermissible fishing expedition based on speculation rather than demonstrated need.
This case involves criminal charges against physician Randy Brodnik and attorney Anthony Kritt for conspiring to defraud the United States of income taxes and for tax evasion from 1998 to 2003, along with obstructing tax administration, through an alleged offshore employee-leasing scheme tied to Brodnik's medical practice. The district court reviewed a magistrate judge's proposed findings and recommendations on multiple pretrial motions, including the defendants' motions to dismiss the indictment in part, to strike expert testimony, and for discovery, as well as the government's motion to disqualify Brodnik's counsel due to a conflict of interest. After noting that timely and specific objections are required for de novo review and that failure to object waives such review, the court conducted de novo review of the objected portions and addressed the underlying factual background of the charges. The core reasoning centered on the standards for reviewing magistrate recommendations under 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 59, along with evaluating the sufficiency of objections and potential conflicts in legal representation.
This case involved the sentencing of defendant Marcus Tramell Edwards following his guilty plea to one count of distributing cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The defendant objected to the presentence report's calculation of his base offense level, arguing that it improperly included 1.38 grams of a non-controlled substance as cocaine and that the advisory guidelines' 100:1 crack-to-powder cocaine ratio should not apply. The court sustained the objection regarding the drug weight but rejected both the guidelines' 100:1 ratio and the defendant's request for a 1:1 ratio, instead applying a 20:1 ratio on policy grounds drawn from concerns identified by the U.S. Sentencing Commission. Based on the revised calculations and the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the court imposed a below-guidelines sentence of 30 months' imprisonment.