Mary Ann McMorrow

Morey Fish Co. filed suit in Illinois state court seeking to enjoin enforcement of a federal district court judgment that had been entered against it and in favor of Rymer Foods for breach of contract involving fish products. The company argued the federal judgment was void because it had never been served with process or participated in the federal litigation, and the federal court had improperly treated it as the functional equivalent of the named defendant Morey's Fish House. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the complaint, holding that the federal court's determination on the identity of the parties and jurisdiction was not subject to collateral attack in state court and was entitled to full faith and credit. The court reasoned that principles of finality and res judicata bar relitigating issues that were or could have been resolved in the federal proceeding.

procedure

The case involved plaintiff Michael McDermott, who suffered permanent quadriplegia after falling from his bicycle into a storm water drainage ditch on a dirt path in a vacant lot in Palatine, Illinois. McDermott sued the Village of Palatine, the Metropolitan Sanitary District, and the Salt Creek Rural Park District, alleging willful and wanton failure to maintain the ditch or warn of its hazards; a jury awarded $16 million in damages, allocating 67% liability to the Village and 33% to the MSD, while finding in favor of the Park District. The trial court approved a good-faith settlement between McDermott and the MSD, entered judgment accordingly, and denied the Village's post-trial motion for a new trial. On appeal, the Village challenged its property interest in the ditch, the existence of any tort duty, the weight of the evidence, evidentiary rulings, procedural due process, and the settlement's good faith. The appellate court found the Village's arguments insufficient and affirmed the trial court's judgment in all respects.

torts & liabilitypropertyprocedure

The case involved plaintiff Josephine Sompolski's appeal from the dismissal of a wrongful death count she added to a personal injury lawsuit originally filed by her father, Lucas Mele, who died after the suit was filed but before the amendment. The trial court had dismissed the wrongful death claim as barred by the two-year statute of limitations because it was filed more than two years after Mele's death. The appellate court reversed, holding that the claim related back to the timely original personal injury complaint under section 2-616(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The court reasoned that the new count grew out of the same automobile accident transaction or occurrence alleged in the initial pleading, and the plaintiff had already been substituted as Mele's representative without adding a new party.

proceduretorts & liability

In Lundquist v. Nickels, plaintiff Margaret Lundquist sued defendant property owner for injuries sustained when the motorcycle she was riding went over a steep drop-off on his land, alleging negligent failure to warn or prevent access to the hazard; her husband joined with a loss-of-consortium claim. After a jury trial, verdicts were returned for the plaintiffs, awarding her $133,500 net after 50% comparative negligence reduction and him $5,000, which the trial court entered after setoffs. On appeal the defendant argued he owed no duty because plaintiff was a licensee, that the Recreational Use of Land and Water Areas Act provided immunity, that proximate cause was unproven, and that various evidentiary, instructional, and damages rulings were erroneous. The court affirmed the judgments, holding that the evidence supported a duty owed to the paying visitor, that the Act did not bar liability, that proximate cause was established, that the challenged trial rulings were not reversible error, and that the damages were within the range supported by the proof of serious facial fractures and related losses; it modified only the consortium award to reflect the same comparative reduction.

torts & liabilitypropertyprocedure

The case involved Compass Health Care Plans suing the Chicago Board of Education to require competitive bidding under the Illinois School Code for contracts awarding HMO medical benefits to public school employees. The Board had reduced the number of offered HMOs and excluded Compass based on enrollment size without soliciting bids, claiming an exception for contracts involving professional skills. The trial court denied the Board's motion to dismiss and granted summary judgment to Compass. The appellate court affirmed, holding that HMO contracts are adapted to competitive bidding because the industry is competitive and the awards were not based on professional qualifications but on existing enrollment numbers, so they are not exempt from the Code's requirements.

business & regulatoryhealthcarelabor & employment

The case involved Marston Guese, injured as a passenger in a car accident caused by Joseph Bluver, who settled with Bluver’s insurer for the remaining policy limits via a general release without obtaining prior consent from his own insurer, Farmers Inter-Insurance Exchange, and then sought underinsured motorist coverage under his policy. Farmers denied the claim and sought a declaratory judgment, asserting that the settlement without consent violated policy terms and prejudiced its subrogation rights; the trial court granted summary judgment to Farmers. On appeal, the court reversed and remanded, determining that the record did not establish as a matter of law that Farmers’ subrogation rights were prejudiced, because Farmers provided no evidence that Bluver or his insurer lacked knowledge of those rights and thus a genuine issue of material fact remained on the prejudice question.

torts & liability

Joel Zien, a Chicago paramedic and firefighter, applied for duty-related disability benefits after injuring his back on August 20, 1987, while carrying a patient down stairs during an on-duty call. The Retirement Board denied the application, finding insufficient evidence that the injury was permanently disabling and work-related. The court reviewed medical records from multiple physicians, including evidence of a compression fracture, chronic strain, and ongoing pain that prevented Zien from resuming paramedic duties, along with testimony confirming the causal link to the 1987 incident. The court held that the Board's decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence and reversed it, remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with awarding the benefits.

labor & employment

In Bass v. South Cook County Mosquito Abatement District, a taxpayer sued the district, its trustees, and the county treasurer on behalf of himself and other taxpayers, alleging that the district over-appropriated and overtaxed property owners by roughly $1.5 million to build an illegal surplus that was spent on unauthorized items; the complaint sought a declaration that the actions violated the law plus injunctions to place surplus funds in trust, halt disbursements without court approval, and refund excess levies. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, and the appellate court affirmed. The court held that the voluntary payment doctrine prevents recovery of taxes paid without protest unless a statute authorizes it, that the Revenue Act of 1939 supplies an adequate legal remedy through its payment-under-protest and objection procedures, and that the plaintiff had not shown he qualified for any recognized exception allowing equitable relief, because the tax was authorized by law, the district's budgets and levies were publicly available, and any excess had already been applied to reduce later tax bills.

taxesprocedure

This case involved plaintiff Douglas Milz suing defendant M.J. Meadows, Inc., a general contractor, for personal injuries and property damage after his motorcycle collided with a flatbed trailer parked on a public street in front of the defendant's construction site. The trailer was owned and placed by a subcontractor hired by the defendant for grading and landscaping work. The trial court dismissed count III of the complaint under section 2-619, finding no duty owed by the defendant. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the defendant neither owned, controlled, nor possessed the trailer, did not supervise the subcontractor's work or its vehicle placement, and that no condition on the defendant's property contributed to the accident or created any statutory or common-law duty; the court also rejected arguments that the defendant voluntarily assumed a duty through periodic site inspections or that a village ordinance imposed liability in these circumstances.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a challenge to the will of Grace Maher, who died in 1990 and left her entire estate to her niece, Mary Anne King, as sole beneficiary and executor. Petitioner Edward Maher, the nephew of Grace's late husband, alleged that the will was invalid due to Grace's lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence by the respondent, and the existence of prior mutual and reciprocal wills from 1987 that were irrevocable under an oral contract between Grace and her husband. The trial court dismissed the undue influence and mutual wills counts for failure to state a claim. On appeal, the court reversed the dismissal of the undue influence count, finding sufficient facts alleged to raise a presumption of undue influence based on the respondent's dominance and procurement of the will, but affirmed the dismissal of the mutual wills count because the petition lacked specific facts establishing an agreement not to revoke the 1987 wills.

propertyfamily lawprocedure

The case involved the conviction of defendant Renteria for aggravated battery of a child after a bench trial, stemming from injuries sustained by a two-and-a-half-month-old infant in October 1989. The court upheld the conviction, finding the evidence sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally or knowingly caused great bodily harm by violently shaking the child and throwing him against an object, based on the defendant's admissions, medical expert testimony regarding shaken baby syndrome, and inconsistencies in the defense. However, the court vacated the six-year sentence and remanded for resentencing because the trial court had improperly applied statutory amendments effective after the offense that increased the felony classification and minimum term.

criminal law

The case involved a personal injury lawsuit filed by a minor plaintiff against the Chicago Park District after she fell from a balance beam during a gymnastics class, alleging negligence in supervision and failure to provide mats. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant based on the plaintiff's deposition and denied her motion to amend the complaint to include claims about defective mats and willful misconduct. On appeal, the court reversed, holding that the motion to amend was timely filed, did not prejudice the defendant, and that the liberal pleading rules required allowing the amendment to permit the plaintiff to present her claims.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The plaintiff, a fencing and guardrail contractor organized as a partnership, filed a declaratory judgment action against the Illinois Department of Labor seeking a ruling that it was not subject to the Prevailing Wage Act because its workers were partners rather than employees. The trial court dismissed the complaint as premature. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the plaintiff was required to exhaust the Act’s administrative hearing and review procedures before seeking judicial relief. The court reasoned that the administrative process provided an opportunity to present evidence and arguments on the partnership issue, that a declaratory judgment would improperly preempt the agency’s enforcement role, and that the same arguments could be raised in the administrative forum.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves an appeal from the denial of an amended petition for attorney fees filed by Clinton Krislov on behalf of original counsel Sidney Karasik in a 1983 Chicago taxpayer lawsuit against the City and various entities over improper exemptions from water and sewer charges. The underlying action resulted in settlements that recovered over $10 million for the City, and the trial court awarded Karasik approximately $99,000 in fees from the common fund using a lodestar with a multiplier, plus an incentive award to the plaintiffs that was later vacated. Krislov's amended petition sought much higher fees, including a percentage of recoveries, an increased hourly rate, and compensation for time spent preparing and litigating the fee petition itself, which the trial court disallowed. The appellate court affirmed the denial, holding there is no legal basis to award fees for fee litigation because such efforts do not benefit the class or preserve the fund and instead reduce it, unlike the original services that justified Karasik's award under equitable principles.

procedure

The case involved defendant Upton, who was convicted by a jury of attempted murder, aggravated battery, and armed violence after firing shots at two men repossessing his car from a parking lot, believing it was being stolen. The trial court refused to instruct the jury on reckless conduct as a lesser-included offense and excluded the defendant's testimony about his state of mind during the incident. On appeal, the court reversed the convictions and remanded the case, holding that the evidence presented, including witness accounts of the defendant's actions and beliefs, supported giving the reckless conduct instruction and that the jury should decide issues of intent and credibility rather than the trial court. The core reasoning emphasized that defendants are entitled to jury instructions on their theory of defense when supported by evidence and that excluding relevant state-of-mind testimony improperly usurped the jury's role.

criminal lawprocedure

In People v. Morris, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of armed robbery, residential burglary, possession of a stolen motor vehicle, and aggravated unlawful restraint arising from a 1986 home invasion and robbery of a Chicago couple, and was sentenced to 25 years in prison on the armed robbery count. On appeal, he raised multiple claims including ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to challenge his arrest, object to certain evidence, exclude other-crimes references, timely present alibi witnesses, or object to the handling of jury notes; improper excusal of a court reporter for voir dire; exclusion of alibi witnesses; prosecutorial misconduct during cross-examination; erroneous responses to jury questions; cumulative error; and an excessive sentence compared to a codefendant. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentence, holding that many of the asserted grounds were not error and that any remaining issues were not prejudicial in light of the substantial evidence of guilt, while the sentence fell within statutory limits and reflected no abuse of discretion given the defendant's age and motive.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved parents of economically disadvantaged Chicago public school students and community advocacy groups suing the Chicago Board of Education and Illinois State Board of Education over the allocation of Title I funds intended for such students, claiming violations of the Illinois Constitution's education and equal protection clauses, the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act, and federal civil rights statutes including 42 U.S.C. §1983. The trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice under section 2-615 for lack of standing. The appellate court reversed and remanded, ruling that the parent plaintiffs had standing because they alleged injury in fact to a legally cognizable interest and that Illinois law does not impose an additional "private cause of action" requirement akin to a zone-of-interest test; it further held that defendants had not met their burden to show the advocacy groups lacked standing, and that other sufficiency arguments should be addressed on remand.

civil rightsprocedure

The case concerned a biological mother's attempt to vacate her consent to the adoption of her child, T.I.S., on the ground that the consent was invalid under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) because it was not executed before a judge. The mother, a member of the West Bay Band Chippewa tribe located in Canada, argued that the ICWA's definition of "Indian tribe" violated equal protection by excluding her tribe. The trial court dismissed the petition, finding the ICWA inapplicable because the tribe was not recognized as eligible for federal services, and later entered a final adoption order. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the ICWA's requirements apply only to tribes with the requisite federal recognition and that the exclusion of this tribe did not violate equal protection, as the tribe lacked the unique relationship with the U.S. government that the statute addresses; the amicus argument regarding potential eligibility was waived.

family lawcivil rightsfederal power

The case involved a lawsuit by Janice Cravens against social hosts David and Rita Inman after her minor daughter was killed in a car accident caused by an intoxicated minor driver, Rita Lenzi, who had been served alcohol at a party hosted by the Inmans. The plaintiff alleged common law negligence in counts II and III of the complaint, claiming the defendants knowingly served alcohol to minors without supervision and allowed an intoxicated Lenzi to drive away. The trial court dismissed those counts for failure to state a claim, but the Illinois Appellate Court reversed, holding that the allegations sufficiently stated viable negligence claims under common law principles. The court reasoned that social host liability for providing alcohol to minors is not preempted by the Dramshop Act, requires proof of fault rather than imposing strict liability, and can be limited by comparative fault and contribution rules.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The Village of Oak Lawn appealed the dismissal of its counterclaim against Poulos Brothers Construction Co. alleging breach of a 1988 construction contract for a public safety facility by failing to procure liability insurance naming the Village as an additional insured and to indemnify the Village against claims by injured worker Joseph Duffy. The trial court had dismissed the breach-of-contract count after Poulos argued the provisions were unenforceable under the Indemnity Act, but the appellate court reversed in part. The court held that the insurance-procurement clause was valid and enforceable because it did not explicitly require coverage for the Village’s own negligence, while the indemnification clause was void as against public policy under section 1 of the Indemnity Act since it purported to shift liability for the Village’s own negligence without qualification.

business & regulatorylabor & employmenttorts & liability