
Morey Fish Co. v. Rymer Foods, Inc.
Appellate Court of Illinois · 1992-12-04 · cited 8×
Morey Fish Co. filed suit in Illinois state court seeking to enjoin enforcement of a federal district court judgment that had been entered against it and in favor of Rymer Foods for breach of contract involving fish products. The company argued the federal judgment was void because it had never been served with process or participated in the federal litigation, and the federal court had improperly treated it as the functional equivalent of the named defendant Morey's Fish House. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the complaint, holding that the federal court's determination on the identity of the parties and jurisdiction was not subject to collateral attack in state court and was entitled to full faith and credit. The court reasoned that principles of finality and res judicata bar relitigating issues that were or could have been resolved in the federal proceeding.
procedure
McDermott v. Metropolitan Sanitary District
Appellate Court of Illinois · 1992-12-04 · cited 54×
The case involved plaintiff Michael McDermott, who suffered permanent quadriplegia after falling from his bicycle into a storm water drainage ditch on a dirt path in a vacant lot in Palatine, Illinois. McDermott sued the Village of Palatine, the Metropolitan Sanitary District, and the Salt Creek Rural Park District, alleging willful and wanton failure to maintain the ditch or warn of its hazards; a jury awarded $16 million in damages, allocating 67% liability to the Village and 33% to the MSD, while finding in favor of the Park District. The trial court approved a good-faith settlement between McDermott and the MSD, entered judgment accordingly, and denied the Village's post-trial motion for a new trial. On appeal, the Village challenged its property interest in the ditch, the existence of any tort duty, the weight of the evidence, evidentiary rulings, procedural due process, and the settlement's good faith. The appellate court found the Village's arguments insufficient and affirmed the trial court's judgment in all respects.
torts & liabilitypropertyprocedure
Sompolski v. Miller
Appellate Court of Illinois · 1992-12-03 · cited 37×
The case involved plaintiff Josephine Sompolski's appeal from the dismissal of a wrongful death count she added to a personal injury lawsuit originally filed by her father, Lucas Mele, who died after the suit was filed but before the amendment. The trial court had dismissed the wrongful death claim as barred by the two-year statute of limitations because it was filed more than two years after Mele's death. The appellate court reversed, holding that the claim related back to the timely original personal injury complaint under section 2-616(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The court reasoned that the new count grew out of the same automobile accident transaction or occurrence alleged in the initial pleading, and the plaintiff had already been substituted as Mele's representative without adding a new party.
proceduretorts & liability
Lundquist v. Nickels
Appellate Court of Illinois · 1992-11-25 · cited 49×
In Lundquist v. Nickels, plaintiff Margaret Lundquist sued defendant property owner for injuries sustained when the motorcycle she was riding went over a steep drop-off on his land, alleging negligent failure to warn or prevent access to the hazard; her husband joined with a loss-of-consortium claim. After a jury trial, verdicts were returned for the plaintiffs, awarding her $133,500 net after 50% comparative negligence reduction and him $5,000, which the trial court entered after setoffs. On appeal the defendant argued he owed no duty because plaintiff was a licensee, that the Recreational Use of Land and Water Areas Act provided immunity, that proximate cause was unproven, and that various evidentiary, instructional, and damages rulings were erroneous. The court affirmed the judgments, holding that the evidence supported a duty owed to the paying visitor, that the Act did not bar liability, that proximate cause was established, that the challenged trial rulings were not reversible error, and that the damages were within the range supported by the proof of serious facial fractures and related losses; it modified only the consortium award to reflect the same comparative reduction.
torts & liabilitypropertyprocedure
Compass Health Care Plans v. Board of Education
Appellate Court of Illinois · 1992-11-25 · cited 15×
The case involved Compass Health Care Plans suing the Chicago Board of Education to require competitive bidding under the Illinois School Code for contracts awarding HMO medical benefits to public school employees. The Board had reduced the number of offered HMOs and excluded Compass based on enrollment size without soliciting bids, claiming an exception for contracts involving professional skills. The trial court denied the Board's motion to dismiss and granted summary judgment to Compass. The appellate court affirmed, holding that HMO contracts are adapted to competitive bidding because the industry is competitive and the awards were not based on professional qualifications but on existing enrollment numbers, so they are not exempt from the Code's requirements.
business & regulatoryhealthcarelabor & employment
Guese v. Farmers Inter-Insurance Exchange
Appellate Court of Illinois · 1992-10-29 · cited 4×
The case involved Marston Guese, injured as a passenger in a car accident caused by Joseph Bluver, who settled with Bluver’s insurer for the remaining policy limits via a general release without obtaining prior consent from his own insurer, Farmers Inter-Insurance Exchange, and then sought underinsured motorist coverage under his policy. Farmers denied the claim and sought a declaratory judgment, asserting that the settlement without consent violated policy terms and prejudiced its subrogation rights; the trial court granted summary judgment to Farmers. On appeal, the court reversed and remanded, determining that the record did not establish as a matter of law that Farmers’ subrogation rights were prejudiced, because Farmers provided no evidence that Bluver or his insurer lacked knowledge of those rights and thus a genuine issue of material fact remained on the prejudice question.
torts & liability