Joseph Birkett

The case concerned a breach-of-contract dispute in which plaintiff Bruel and Kjaer sought payment or damages from the Suburban O'Hare Commission under a 1999 agreement for noise-monitoring and radar equipment and related upgrades, services, and software customization priced at a single $227,000 payment. The trial court dismissed the complaint as time-barred under the four-year UCC statute of limitations for sales of goods, and the appellate court affirmed. The court reasoned that the contract's predominant purpose was the sale of goods rather than services because the parties were labeled seller and buyer, the bulk of the agreement addressed equipment specifications and performance, title passed via bill of sale upon payment, and the service elements were incidental; therefore the ten-year general contract limitations period did not apply. The court further held that an affidavit submitted by the plaintiff did not raise a genuine issue of material fact on the predominant-purpose question.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved defendant Michael Kohler, who was charged with driving under the influence under ordinances of the Village of Long Grove and convicted following a stipulated bench trial. Kohler appealed, arguing that the Village failed to bring him to trial within the 160-day speedy-trial period required by section 103-5(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure after he filed a demand on September 28, 2008. The Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, agreed with Kohler and vacated the convictions. The court reasoned that 219 days had elapsed from the speedy-trial demand without trial, various continuances did not toll the period in a manner that excused the delay, and Kohler's excused absences from court did not constitute a waiver of his speedy-trial rights under the statute.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved an appeal by Undre Hooker after a jury found him to be a sexually violent person under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, based on his prior convictions for aggravated criminal sexual abuse and other offenses, along with expert diagnoses of paraphilia and personality disorders that made reoffending substantially probable. Hooker challenged the trial court's admission of testimony by the State's two expert psychologists regarding additional past misconduct drawn from police reports and other records that were not part of his convictions, arguing lack of foundation and failure to balance prejudice against probative value. The appellate court affirmed the adjudication, holding that the experts properly relied on such records as the type of information customarily used in their field to form opinions under the applicable evidentiary standards. The court further concluded that any error in admitting the testimony was harmless because the remaining evidence of Hooker's qualifying convictions, mental disorders, and risk of recidivism was overwhelming and unrebutted.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved challenges by plaintiff Glen Weber to the nominating petitions of David Gill and Joseph Bruscato for the position of Winnebago County State's Attorney. The court affirmed the denial of the objection against Gill, finding that his statement of candidacy complied with the Election Code by following the model form provided in the statute, despite not explicitly stating licensure as an attorney. It also affirmed the striking of the objection against Bruscato because the petition incorrectly identified his party affiliation, which was deemed a substantial error rather than a minor one. The reasoning centered on statutory interpretation, noting ambiguities between required content and the prescribed form in section 7-10 of the Election Code.

elections

In this case, defendant Daniel Schlabach appealed the dismissal of his section 2-1401 petition seeking to vacate his 2002 guilty plea conviction for aggravated DUI, which was part of a plea agreement also covering an intimidation charge for which he received a nine-year sentence. The court held that the costs-only sentence for the aggravated DUI was void because it violated statutory requirements for consecutive sentencing and that the overall plea agreement was therefore defective and unenforceable as structured. It rejected the defendant's request to vacate the conviction on due process grounds but concluded that any remedy for the void sentence must address the failed plea agreement as a whole, which could involve a new agreement or allowing withdrawal of the pleas. The court reversed the dismissal of the petition and remanded for the trial court to properly admonish the defendant and permit him to seek correction of the sentences or withdrawal of the pleas, subject to potential prejudice concerns. The topics addressed are criminal law and procedure.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, defendant Ralphfield Hudson appealed the dismissal of his post-conviction petition challenging his 1996 guilty plea to aggravated driving under the influence, which resulted in a five-year sentence under a plea agreement. The sentencing range had been based on a statute later invalidated on single-subject grounds, making the maximum lawful sentence three years instead. The appellate court rejected the defendant's argument that the conviction was void due to the illegal sentence and instead corrected the sentence to three years while affirming the dismissal of the petition. The court reasoned that an illegally long sentence does not void the underlying conviction or plea, that the proper remedy is to adjust the sentence to what the law permits, and that this approach is consistent with prior precedent such as People v. Brown, even if the defendant had already completed the original sentence.

criminal lawprocedure

In People v. Nichols, defendant Rickie T. Nichols was convicted after a jury trial of two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault for his role in an attack on victim K.H. and was sentenced to the statutory minimum of 32 years in prison. On appeal, he challenged the denial of his motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence seized from a backyard shed at his codefendant's home, arguing lack of standing or improper search, and contended that the mandatory consecutive sentencing violated the proportionate penalties and due process clauses of the Illinois Constitution. The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding that the search was valid under the circumstances and that the sentence was constitutional because it was the minimum allowed, permitted rehabilitation, and was designed to deter successive assaults on a victim in which the defendant was actively involved.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved defendant Roy E. Hubbard's 2010 petition under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure to vacate his 1998 guilty plea conviction for predatory criminal sexual assault of a child. Hubbard argued that the conviction was void because the trial court had misadvised him about the sentencing range, making his plea involuntary and exempt from the two-year limitations period. The State moved to dismiss on timeliness grounds, asserting that a judgment is void only if entered without jurisdiction. The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed the dismissal, holding that under Illinois law a judgment is void solely for lack of jurisdiction and that involuntariness of a guilty plea does not implicate jurisdiction or render the conviction void, so the limitations period applied. The court noted that a contrary statement in an earlier supreme court case was non-binding obiter dictum.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved plaintiffs, the estate and family members of a deceased shareholder of RPF Holdings, Inc., suing attorney M. Thomas Suits and his law firm for alleged errors in reinstating the corporation after its administrative dissolution in 2006. The plaintiffs claimed damages arising from the attorney's handling of the reinstatement and sought to hold him liable for negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and the Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed. The court held that the attorney owed no duty of care to the individual plaintiffs, as he had been retained only to represent the corporation itself, and Illinois precedent does not extend an attorney's duty to nonclient third parties absent a specific voluntary undertaking. Because no duty existed, the negligence claim could not proceed regardless of other factual disputes.

proceduretorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

This case involved a negligence lawsuit brought by Carolyn Barnett after her 17-year-old son Darius Smith drowned in a swimming pool at an apartment complex owned and managed by defendants Ludwig and Company and Lake Towers Associates. The plaintiff alleged that defendants breached their duty by failing to provide a lifeguard, allowing dangerous activities by minors, and violating the Swimming Facility Act along with related administrative code provisions and their own pool policies. The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to defendants and denial of plaintiff's motion, holding that defendants owed no duty to provide a lifeguard at this pool because the regulation allowed posting a specified notice in lieu of one, which defendants did, and that no voluntary undertaking of additional duties occurred.

torts & liabilitypropertybusiness & regulatory

The case involved defendant Maurice McRae, who entered a negotiated guilty plea to one count of first-degree murder for a 27-year sentence after being charged with the 2007 shooting death of Larry Starks; he later moved to withdraw the plea on grounds that it was involuntary due to erroneous advice from counsel about the admissibility of a confiscated letter he had written to his attorney. The appellate court held that the entire plea agreement was void because the agreed sentence fell below the statutory minimum of 45 years required by the firearm enhancement in 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii). It further determined that the letter remained protected by the attorney-client privilege, which extends to incarcerated clients' written communications regardless of whether the envelope was marked "legal mail," and remanded the case to permit the defendant to withdraw his plea and proceed to trial if he chooses.

criminal lawprocedure

In People v. Shipp, the defendant was convicted of possession of more than 1 gram but less than 15 grams of cocaine with intent to deliver within 1,000 feet of a church, a Class X felony under Illinois law. He appealed, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek dismissal on speedy-trial grounds after the State amended the information to correct the statutory citation from the Class 1 felony provision to the Class X provision. The Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, affirmed the conviction, holding that the amendment was merely formal to fix a miswriting in the citation and did not charge a new offense because the factual allegations in the information had always described the higher amount of cocaine. The court reasoned that speedy-trial protections were not triggered by such a formal change and that the defendant could not claim surprise given the consistent facts alleged.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, the State appealed an order from the trial court that purported to acquit defendant Esteban Martinez of charges of aggravated battery and mob action after denying the State's request for a continuance on the day of trial due to unavailable witnesses. The Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, first addressed and rejected the defendant's claim that the court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. It then concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing the continuance, considering the extensive procedural history of agreed delays, the defendant's absences, and the State's prior efforts to locate witnesses and proceed to trial. The court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

In People v. Rosenbalm, the defendant was convicted after a stipulated bench trial of aggravated driving under the influence for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and without possessing a driver's license, which had expired while held as bond in another case and could not be renewed due to unpaid fines. The trial court denied his motion to dismiss, rejecting the argument that the statute required only possession of an expired license rather than a valid one. On appeal, the Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed the conviction, first noting that the defendant's statutory interpretation claim was forfeited because it was not raised in a timely posttrial motion, but also rejecting it on the merits. The court reasoned that the statute's reference to possessing a driver's license must mean a valid license to avoid absurd results and align with the legislative scheme regulating driving privileges.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, defendant Braulio B. Guadarrama, who had been convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled substance and later sentenced to prison after violating supervision, sought $5-per-day credit for 194 days spent in pretrial custody against various court-imposed assessments, including a $200 DNA analysis fee. The court held that the DNA analysis fee is a fee rather than a fine and thus not subject to the statutory credit under section 110-14(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, while affirming that other assessments like the Crime Stoppers fine and street-value fine qualify for the credit. The reasoning rested on the distinction that a fee compensates for actual costs of services such as DNA collection and analysis to maintain a criminal database, whereas a fine serves a punitive purpose; the court relied on statutory language, prior precedent like People v. Marshall, and the fact that the fee applies only when DNA testing occurs. The judgment was affirmed as modified to reflect satisfaction of the creditable fines.

criminal lawprocedure

In People v. Scott, after a bench trial the defendant was convicted of armed violence for possessing cannabis with intent to deliver while a shotgun was nearby in the apartment where police executed a search warrant. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, finding the evidence sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was armed with a dangerous weapon during the felony. The court reasoned that the defendant had been lying on a couch within easy reach of the shotgun concealed under an adjacent love seat, creating the potential for violence that the armed violence statute was designed to deter, even though he did not attempt to access the weapon.

criminal lawguns

This case involved a class action by residents of a Lake County subdivision against the County, seeking to block the issuance of revenue bonds to fund construction of a new public water system, where repayment would come solely from surcharges on the system's customers. The trial court dismissed two counts of the complaint and granted summary judgment to the County on the remaining counts. The appellate court affirmed, holding that section 5-15017 of the Counties Code expressly authorizes non-home-rule counties to issue such revenue bonds payable only from the income and revenues of the specific waterworks system being improved or constructed. The court reasoned that the statute's plain language, including its definition of 'waterworks system,' permits this targeted funding mechanism without needing to rely on additional contractual or municipal code provisions.

environmentbusiness & regulatory

In People v. Lee, defendant Kun Lee faced separate charges of aggravated criminal sexual assault and unlawful restraint in one case and residential arson in another; after his convictions on the assault charges were reversed on appeal for denial of his right to proceed pro se, the state reindicted him for arson. Defendant moved to dismiss the new arson indictment, claiming prosecutorial vindictiveness in retaliation for his successful appeal, and the trial court granted the motion after finding the state failed to rebut a presumption of vindictiveness. The appellate court reversed, holding that no such presumption applies when the reindicted offense is a distinct crime arising from different facts and a different date than the original convictions, particularly in a pretrial context, and that defendant offered no evidence of actual vindictiveness.

criminal lawprocedure

This case is an appeal by defendant David W. Komes from the second-stage dismissal of his post-conviction petition challenging his convictions for predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and resulting life sentence. After the trial court appointed counsel, counsel moved to withdraw under People v. Greer, and the court granted the motion before dismissing the petition on the State's request. The appellate court held that the record failed to show counsel's compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c), particularly the duty to consult with the defendant to ascertain his constitutional claims, and that the withdrawal motion itself was insufficient. The court therefore vacated both the grant of leave to withdraw and the petition's dismissal, remanding for further proceedings to ensure proper Rule 651(c) compliance.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, the State appealed trial court orders quashing defendant Jonathan Dittmar's arrest for DUI, suppressing evidence, granting leave to file a late petition to rescind his statutory summary suspension, and rescinding the suspension. The appellate court reversed all three orders and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that the arresting officer's stop of the vehicle—after observing it pull over slowly with its turn signal on—was justified community caretaking activity to check for mechanical problems or occupant issues, even though activating emergency lights effected a seizure; this did not violate the Fourth Amendment under precedents like Luedemann. The court further ruled that the petition to rescind was untimely under the 90-day statutory limit and that, on the merits, the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the defendant was under the influence based on the video and stipulated facts.

criminal lawprocedure