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Judge, Appellate Court of Illinois
BRUEL AND KJAER v. Village of Bensenville
Appellate Court of Illinois · 2012-04-26 · cited 6×
The case concerned a breach-of-contract dispute in which plaintiff Bruel and Kjaer sought payment or damages from the Suburban O'Hare Commission under a 1999 agreement for noise-monitoring and radar equipment and related upgrades, services, and software customization priced at a single $227,000 payment. The trial court dismissed the complaint as time-barred under the four-year UCC statute of limitations for sales of goods, and the appellate court affirmed. The court reasoned that the contract's predominant purpose was the sale of goods rather than services because the parties were labeled seller and buyer, the bulk of the agreement addressed equipment specifications and performance, title passed via bill of sale upon payment, and the service elements were incidental; therefore the ten-year general contract limitations period did not apply. The court further held that an affidavit submitted by the plaintiff did not raise a genuine issue of material fact on the predominant-purpose question.
business & regulatoryprocedure
People v. Kohler
Appellate Court of Illinois · 2012-04-12
The case involved defendant Michael Kohler, who was charged with driving under the influence under ordinances of the Village of Long Grove and convicted following a stipulated bench trial. Kohler appealed, arguing that the Village failed to bring him to trial within the 160-day speedy-trial period required by section 103-5(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure after he filed a demand on September 28, 2008. The Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, agreed with Kohler and vacated the convictions. The court reasoned that 219 days had elapsed from the speedy-trial demand without trial, various continuances did not toll the period in a manner that excused the delay, and Kohler's excused absences from court did not constitute a waiver of his speedy-trial rights under the statute.
criminal lawprocedure
In Re Commitment of Hooker
Appellate Court of Illinois · 2012-04-11 · cited 2×
The case involved an appeal by Undre Hooker after a jury found him to be a sexually violent person under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, based on his prior convictions for aggravated criminal sexual abuse and other offenses, along with expert diagnoses of paraphilia and personality disorders that made reoffending substantially probable. Hooker challenged the trial court's admission of testimony by the State's two expert psychologists regarding additional past misconduct drawn from police reports and other records that were not part of his convictions, arguing lack of foundation and failure to balance prejudice against probative value. The appellate court affirmed the adjudication, holding that the experts properly relied on such records as the type of information customarily used in their field to form opinions under the applicable evidentiary standards. The court further concluded that any error in admitting the testimony was harmless because the remaining evidence of Hooker's qualifying convictions, mental disorders, and risk of recidivism was overwhelming and unrebutted.
criminal lawprocedure
Weber v. COUNTY OFFICERS ELECTORAL BD.
Appellate Court of Illinois · 2012-02-24 · cited 2×
The case involved challenges by plaintiff Glen Weber to the nominating petitions of David Gill and Joseph Bruscato for the position of Winnebago County State's Attorney. The court affirmed the denial of the objection against Gill, finding that his statement of candidacy complied with the Election Code by following the model form provided in the statute, despite not explicitly stating licensure as an attorney. It also affirmed the striking of the objection against Bruscato because the petition incorrectly identified his party affiliation, which was deemed a substantial error rather than a minor one. The reasoning centered on statutory interpretation, noting ambiguities between required content and the prescribed form in section 7-10 of the Election Code.
elections
People v. SCHLABACH
Appellate Court of Illinois · 2012-01-31
In this case, defendant Daniel Schlabach appealed the dismissal of his section 2-1401 petition seeking to vacate his 2002 guilty plea conviction for aggravated DUI, which was part of a plea agreement also covering an intimidation charge for which he received a nine-year sentence. The court held that the costs-only sentence for the aggravated DUI was void because it violated statutory requirements for consecutive sentencing and that the overall plea agreement was therefore defective and unenforceable as structured. It rejected the defendant's request to vacate the conviction on due process grounds but concluded that any remedy for the void sentence must address the failed plea agreement as a whole, which could involve a new agreement or allowing withdrawal of the pleas. The court reversed the dismissal of the petition and remanded for the trial court to properly admonish the defendant and permit him to seek correction of the sentences or withdrawal of the pleas, subject to potential prejudice concerns. The topics addressed are criminal law and procedure.
criminal lawprocedure
People v. Hudson
Appellate Court of Illinois · 2012-01-27
In this case, defendant Ralphfield Hudson appealed the dismissal of his post-conviction petition challenging his 1996 guilty plea to aggravated driving under the influence, which resulted in a five-year sentence under a plea agreement. The sentencing range had been based on a statute later invalidated on single-subject grounds, making the maximum lawful sentence three years instead. The appellate court rejected the defendant's argument that the conviction was void due to the illegal sentence and instead corrected the sentence to three years while affirming the dismissal of the petition. The court reasoned that an illegally long sentence does not void the underlying conviction or plea, that the proper remedy is to adjust the sentence to what the law permits, and that this approach is consistent with prior precedent such as People v. Brown, even if the defendant had already completed the original sentence.
criminal lawprocedure