David W. Gratton

Michael Ian Kramer was convicted by a jury of misdemeanor driving under the influence after a breath test was admitted into evidence at trial. On appeal, he argued that the magistrate should have excluded Intoxilyzer 5000 certificates—documents showing the machine’s calibration and the simulator solution’s accuracy—because the State disclosed them only the day before trial, and that admitting the certificates without live testimony from the people who prepared them violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. It held that Kramer failed to show the late disclosure caused prejudice sufficient to affect the trial’s outcome, so the magistrate did not abuse its discretion by allowing the evidence. The court further ruled that the certificates were not “testimonial” statements created for the purpose of prosecuting Kramer, and therefore their admission did not implicate the Confrontation Clause.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Coleman, Ronald Coleman was convicted by a jury of sexual abuse of a child under sixteen after a seven-year-old girl testified that he exposed his penis to her, made sexual comments, and touched her during an incident in an abandoned car. Before trial, the State introduced evidence under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) of two prior incidents a year earlier—one in which Coleman allegedly tried to remove the child’s pants and another in which he pressed her to discuss her stepfather—as proof of “grooming” behavior, along with expert testimony on grooming. The Idaho Court of Appeals held that this evidence was irrelevant to any permissible purpose under Rule 404(b), such as motive, intent, or plan, because the incidents did not establish a pattern connected to the charged conduct. The court further determined that the error was not harmless, given that the case turned almost entirely on the child’s testimony and the disputed issue of intent, creating a high risk that the jury would convict based on propensity despite a limiting instruction. The court therefore vacated the conviction and remanded for further proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Stewart, Amber Dawn Stewart was stopped for failing to signal, arrested for driving without privileges and insurance, and had her vehicle impounded; an officer then conducted an inventory search that found marijuana and methamphetamine inside. Stewart moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the impoundment and search violated the Fourth Amendment, but the district court denied the motion and she entered conditional guilty pleas. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling that the impoundment was reasonable because Stewart could not lawfully drive the vehicle and the inventory search followed established department procedures to protect property and avoid false claims, without evidence it was a pretext for investigation. Minor noncompliance with policy on obtaining tow approval did not make the search unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

criminal lawprocedure

Eloy Naranjo was convicted of trafficking in methamphetamine of at least twenty-eight grams and failure to obtain a tax stamp after a controlled buy involving a confidential informant and an undercover officer. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of conviction and remanded the case to the district court. The court determined that the admission of evidence that Naranjo had previously sold methamphetamine to the informant was improper under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) as more prejudicial than probative, lacked timely notice, and was not harmless error given the circumstances of the buy and trial.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Rollins, the defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for grand theft after pleading guilty to entering a welding business with an entrusted key, stealing equipment valued at about $7,750, and pawning it for drug money. He argued that the district court erred by failing to order a psychological evaluation before sentencing, despite references in the presentence investigation report, and by imposing an excessive sentence rather than granting a withheld judgment. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction and the unified five-year sentence with two years determinate, suspended with probation. The court reasoned that no proper motion for a psychological evaluation was presented under the rules, the presentence investigator did not recommend one, and the sentencing court acted within its discretion by considering the offense nature, the defendant's criminal history, breach of trust, and the need for a controlled environment.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Dicksen, the Idaho Court of Appeals addressed a district court's handling of sentencing after an initial period of retained jurisdiction for a defendant convicted of felony injury to a child. The district court placed the defendant on probation for twenty-six hours with a condition that he obtain a specific recommendation while remaining in jail, then revoked probation the next day and imposed a second rider, later suspending the sentence and placing him on five years of probation. The State appealed, arguing this maneuver violated Idaho Code § 19-2601(4), which requires a legitimate intervening period of probation before a second period of retained jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals vacated the second rider and the subsequent probation order, holding that the brief probation was a sham designed to circumvent the statutory limit on consecutive riders and that jurisdiction had already transferred to the Department of Correction upon expiration of the first rider. The court reasoned that the district judge explicitly stated unwillingness to grant real probation or relinquish jurisdiction and imposed conditions that guaranteed violation without any actual probationary period or hearing.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved Corey Skii Reid's appeal from his conviction for aiding and abetting two first-degree murders after a jury trial in which accomplices testified that Reid encouraged and assisted in planning and carrying out the killings at a remote campsite. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction and sentences. The court reasoned that the jury instructions were not erroneous, that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting certain crime-scene photographs of the victims over objection, and that the district court did not violate due process by considering a transcript of a jailhouse informant's statements at sentencing because the statements contained details consistent with facts later established at trial.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Sutton, Robert J. Sutton appealed his conviction for intimidating a witness under Idaho Code § 18-2604, stemming from an alleged break-in and threat to Sarah Phelps, who had informed police about methamphetamine sales by Sutton's uncle and was scheduled to testify at a preliminary hearing. The Court of Appeals of Idaho vacated the judgment of conviction and remanded the case, holding that the jury instructions were defective because they did not require the state to prove Sutton's actions were intended to prevent Phelps from testifying freely, fully, and truthfully. The court found this omission constituted plain error that violated Sutton's constitutional rights and was not harmless, given questions about Phelps's credibility and the possibility that any threat was motivated by retribution rather than an effort to influence testimony.

criminal law

In State v. Pierce, the defendant was charged with three felonies after spitting on and biting jailers while in custody. She reached a plea agreement under which the State would dismiss two counts of propelling bodily fluid in exchange for her guilty plea to a reduced misdemeanor battery charge, with a recommendation of a withheld judgment and probation. Before any plea was formally entered, the district court reduced the charge and remanded the case, but the prosecutor then moved to withdraw from the agreement and reinstate the original felony charges; the district court granted the motion. On appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a plea agreement remains executory and may be withdrawn by either party until a guilty plea is actually entered and accepted by the court, so the State was free to reinstate the charges in the absence of bad faith.

criminal lawprocedure

George Davidson sued his former daughter-in-law Jesyca, her boyfriend Benjamin, her mother Kathy, and her divorce attorney John Prior for intentional infliction of emotional distress, abuse of process, slander per se, conspiracy, and negligence, all arising from reports that Davidson had molested his granddaughter during a related child custody dispute. The district court dismissed the claims against Prior for defective service of process, granted summary judgment to Benjamin, and dismissed the remaining claims against Jesyca and Kathy following Davidson's voluntary dismissal. On appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissals and Benjamin's summary judgment but reversed the partial summary judgment for Jesyca, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether she made the report in bad faith.

family lawtorts & liabilityprocedure

In this case, defendant Dan S. Jacobson was arrested for misdemeanor DUI, failed a breath test at the jail, and was later convicted after the magistrate denied his motion to suppress the test results and his motion to dismiss. Jacobson argued that jailers violated his due process rights by limiting his phone access after he became agitated during a call to a bail bond company, thereby preventing him from obtaining alternative blood alcohol testing, and that a sixteen-month delay in preparing the appeal transcript warranted dismissal under Idaho Criminal Rule 48. The magistrate and district court rejected both claims, finding that Jacobson had been given phone access, that his placement in a holding cell resulted from his own agitation, that the transcript delay was caused by the court reporter's medical leave outside the state's control, and that Jacobson had not shown prejudice or requested expedited handling. On appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that no due process violation occurred and that the magistrate did not abuse its discretion in denying dismissal.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Ward, the defendant pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance, participated briefly in drug court before withdrawing, and received a sentence with a period of retained jurisdiction that expired by statute on November 10, 2009. The district court later entered an order relinquishing jurisdiction on November 19, 2009, and the defendant filed a notice of appeal on December 30, 2009, challenging the sentence as excessive. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, holding it untimely because Idaho Appellate Rule 14(a) requires the notice of appeal from the judgment of conviction to be filed within forty-two days after the statutory retained jurisdiction period ends, not after any subsequent court order. The court reasoned that the district court loses jurisdiction at the end of the statutory period under I.C. § 19-2601(4), so any later order does not extend the appeal deadline, and the defendant raised no issues regarding the relinquishment order itself.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned a defendant who was stopped for speeding, exhibited signs of intoxication, failed field sobriety tests, and was arrested for misdemeanor DUI after submitting to a breath test that showed an alcohol concentration above the legal limit. She moved to suppress the breath test evidence, claiming the officer coerced her by threatening a forced blood draw and thereby violated Idaho's implied consent statute and the Fourth Amendment. The magistrate denied the motion, the district court affirmed on appeal, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial. The court held that the defendant had given implied consent to the breath test as a matter of Idaho law and that the officer's statements, under the totality of circumstances, did not amount to coercion that would vitiate that consent.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Ball, the defendant was charged with raping a sixteen-year-old and entered a guilty plea under a Rule 11 plea agreement that included a maximum ten-year sentence cap, dismissal of other charges, and waiver of Fifth Amendment rights for psychosexual and polygraph evaluations. The district court rejected the plea agreement after reviewing the evaluations but permitted the defendant to withdraw his plea or proceed to sentencing, resulting in a unified twenty-year sentence with seven years determinate. On appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence, concluding that the district court was not bound by the plea agreement and did not abuse its discretion in imposing the sentence based on the nature of the ongoing non-consensual conduct involving threats. The court found that allowing withdrawal of the plea was an adequate remedy and that mitigating factors were outweighed by the need to protect society.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Locke, the defendant was charged with a DUI offense that the State sought to enhance to a felony under Idaho Code § 18-8005(5) after he accumulated two other DUI convictions within a ten-year period, even though those convictions occurred after the conduct giving rise to the third charge. Locke moved to dismiss the felony charge, arguing that the statute required the two prior convictions to predate the arrest for the offense being enhanced. The district court denied the motion, and Locke entered a conditional guilty plea preserving the issue for appeal. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the plain language of the statute triggers the felony enhancement upon two prior convictions by the time of the third conviction, regardless of the sequence of the underlying violations or arrests.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare's petition to terminate Jane Doe's parental rights to her infant daughter K.Q., who was born with medical issues and removed from Doe's care shortly after birth due to concerns about neglect and Doe's inability to provide basic care. The magistrate court approved a case plan, but after evidence showed Doe failed to progress in parenting skills over twenty months, granted the termination on grounds of neglect and the child's best interests. Doe appealed, arguing insufficient evidence of neglect or that termination served the child's best interests. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that substantial and competent evidence, including witness testimony on Doe's deficiencies and the child's contrasting well-being in foster care, supported the magistrate's findings under the clear and convincing evidence standard required by due process.

family lawcivil rights

In State v. Wagner, the defendant appealed the suspension of his driver’s license under Idaho Code § 18-8002 after he refused a breath test requested by an officer who had stopped his vehicle for swerving, observed signs of intoxication, and administered failed field sobriety tests. After the initial refusal, Wagner offered a blood draw that was unsuccessful due to difficulty finding a vein, and he then refused a second request for a breath test, leading the officer to seize his license. The magistrate sustained the suspension, the district court affirmed on intermediate appeal, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the statute allows the officer to select the test type and that a driver’s willingness to take an alternative test does not negate a refusal or bind the officer once the alternative fails to produce results. The court further determined that the statutory warning adequately informed Wagner of the consequences of failing to complete evidentiary testing.

criminal law

In State v. Shultz, Olivia Kay Shultz appealed her burglary conviction and sentence under Idaho Code § 18-1401 after pleading guilty to taking a restaurant owner's wallet; she challenged the district court's failure to order a psychological evaluation sua sponte, its decision to relinquish jurisdiction after two periods of retained jurisdiction, and its failure to reduce her sentence. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion. The court reasoned that the record, including the presentence investigation report, provided no reason to believe Shultz's mental condition would be a significant factor at sentencing, as her issues stemmed primarily from drug abuse rather than mental illness, and existing information satisfied relevant statutory requirements under I.C. § 19-2522. It further held that the decisions on jurisdiction and sentencing fell within the district court's discretion based on the full record of events before and after the original judgment.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Richard David Pokorney, who was convicted of five counts of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen based on allegations from his sons. Pokorney appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of his prior conviction for sexual conduct with a minor in Montana, including a letter he wrote and testimony from the victim, under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b). The Court of Appeals of Idaho vacated the conviction and remanded the case, finding that although the evidence was relevant to show consciousness of guilt, its probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice under Rule 403, and the error was not harmless.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, Vicki Jensen, who had been convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to a determinate life term in 2001, challenged a 2008 amended restitution order requiring her to pay $22,500 to the Idaho Industrial Commission. The district court entered the order after first vacating an earlier 2007 order that had been issued without notice or a hearing. On appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that the district court lacked authority under Idaho Code § 19-5304(6) to enter the amended order because the more than six-year delay after sentencing was not reasonably necessary for processing the restitution request. The court therefore vacated the amended order, while noting that the State had not properly preserved a challenge to the vacating of the initial order. The decision turned on statutory limits on the timing of restitution orders rather than on subject-matter jurisdiction.

criminal lawprocedure