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Judge, Idaho Court of Appeals
On the bench with
State v. Kramer
Idaho Court of Appeals · 2012-04-25 · cited 7×
Michael Ian Kramer was convicted by a jury of misdemeanor driving under the influence after a breath test was admitted into evidence at trial. On appeal, he argued that the magistrate should have excluded Intoxilyzer 5000 certificates—documents showing the machine’s calibration and the simulator solution’s accuracy—because the State disclosed them only the day before trial, and that admitting the certificates without live testimony from the people who prepared them violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. It held that Kramer failed to show the late disclosure caused prejudice sufficient to affect the trial’s outcome, so the magistrate did not abuse its discretion by allowing the evidence. The court further ruled that the certificates were not “testimonial” statements created for the purpose of prosecuting Kramer, and therefore their admission did not implicate the Confrontation Clause.
criminal lawprocedure
State v. Coleman
Idaho Court of Appeals · 2012-03-13 · cited 11×
In State v. Coleman, Ronald Coleman was convicted by a jury of sexual abuse of a child under sixteen after a seven-year-old girl testified that he exposed his penis to her, made sexual comments, and touched her during an incident in an abandoned car. Before trial, the State introduced evidence under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) of two prior incidents a year earlier—one in which Coleman allegedly tried to remove the child’s pants and another in which he pressed her to discuss her stepfather—as proof of “grooming” behavior, along with expert testimony on grooming. The Idaho Court of Appeals held that this evidence was irrelevant to any permissible purpose under Rule 404(b), such as motive, intent, or plan, because the incidents did not establish a pattern connected to the charged conduct. The court further determined that the error was not harmless, given that the case turned almost entirely on the child’s testimony and the disputed issue of intent, creating a high risk that the jury would convict based on propensity despite a limiting instruction. The court therefore vacated the conviction and remanded for further proceedings.
criminal lawprocedure
State v. Stewart
Idaho Court of Appeals · 2012-02-27 · cited 8×
In State v. Stewart, Amber Dawn Stewart was stopped for failing to signal, arrested for driving without privileges and insurance, and had her vehicle impounded; an officer then conducted an inventory search that found marijuana and methamphetamine inside. Stewart moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the impoundment and search violated the Fourth Amendment, but the district court denied the motion and she entered conditional guilty pleas. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling that the impoundment was reasonable because Stewart could not lawfully drive the vehicle and the inventory search followed established department procedures to protect property and avoid false claims, without evidence it was a pretext for investigation. Minor noncompliance with policy on obtaining tow approval did not make the search unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
criminal lawprocedure
State v. Naranjo
Idaho Court of Appeals · 2011-07-21 · cited 1×
Eloy Naranjo was convicted of trafficking in methamphetamine of at least twenty-eight grams and failure to obtain a tax stamp after a controlled buy involving a confidential informant and an undercover officer. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of conviction and remanded the case to the district court. The court determined that the admission of evidence that Naranjo had previously sold methamphetamine to the informant was improper under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) as more prejudicial than probative, lacked timely notice, and was not harmless error given the circumstances of the buy and trial.
criminal lawprocedure
State v. Rollins
Idaho Court of Appeals · 2011-07-19 · cited 5×
In State v. Rollins, the defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for grand theft after pleading guilty to entering a welding business with an entrusted key, stealing equipment valued at about $7,750, and pawning it for drug money. He argued that the district court erred by failing to order a psychological evaluation before sentencing, despite references in the presentence investigation report, and by imposing an excessive sentence rather than granting a withheld judgment. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction and the unified five-year sentence with two years determinate, suspended with probation. The court reasoned that no proper motion for a psychological evaluation was presented under the rules, the presentence investigator did not recommend one, and the sentencing court acted within its discretion by considering the offense nature, the defendant's criminal history, breach of trust, and the need for a controlled environment.
criminal lawprocedure
State v. DICKSEN
Idaho Court of Appeals · 2011-05-23 · cited 1×
In State v. Dicksen, the Idaho Court of Appeals addressed a district court's handling of sentencing after an initial period of retained jurisdiction for a defendant convicted of felony injury to a child. The district court placed the defendant on probation for twenty-six hours with a condition that he obtain a specific recommendation while remaining in jail, then revoked probation the next day and imposed a second rider, later suspending the sentence and placing him on five years of probation. The State appealed, arguing this maneuver violated Idaho Code § 19-2601(4), which requires a legitimate intervening period of probation before a second period of retained jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals vacated the second rider and the subsequent probation order, holding that the brief probation was a sham designed to circumvent the statutory limit on consecutive riders and that jurisdiction had already transferred to the Department of Correction upon expiration of the first rider. The court reasoned that the district judge explicitly stated unwillingness to grant real probation or relinquish jurisdiction and imposed conditions that guaranteed violation without any actual probationary period or hearing.
criminal lawprocedure