The case involved a negligence lawsuit brought by Adam Garner against Buford Langford after Garner struck Langford's horse with his car in 2003, resulting in Garner's paralysis and eventual death; Garner's mother was substituted as plaintiff. After multiple delays, including the sudden illness of plaintiff's counsel and difficulties serving key witnesses such as the investigating trooper and a veterinarian, the trial court denied several motions for continuance despite both parties' agreement and the short preparation time for substitute counsel. The jury found for the defendant, leading to a final judgment in his favor. The appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial, holding that the denial of a continuance constituted an abuse of discretion because it created an injustice under the unique circumstances of counsel's unavailability and witness issues, outweighing the interest in resolving the aged case.
In Alkhoury v. Alkhoury, the former husband moved to dissolve a permanent injunction against domestic violence that had been issued in favor of the former wife based on prior graphic testimony of abuse. The trial court granted the dissolution motion without elaboration. On appeal, the court reversed, ruling that the husband had not met his burden to show changed circumstances making the injunction no longer necessary under Florida Statutes section 741.30 and related case law requiring evidence that the underlying scenario no longer exists. The appellate court determined that the original justification for the injunction remained valid and the wife maintained a reasonable continuing fear, leading to remand with instructions to reinstate the injunction.
The case involved a paternity and child support action brought by the mother, in which the Department of Revenue had intervened because she received public assistance. The trial court established paternity, ordered joint custody, waived child support as de minimis, and directed DOR to split the mother's TANF benefits equally with the father. The appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court lacked authority to determine TANF eligibility or allocate benefits, as those determinations are reserved to the Department of Children and Families under chapter 414, Florida Statutes. The order also violated due process because DOR received no notice or opportunity to be heard on the public assistance issue, and it conflicted with statutory rules barring shared-custody parents from both qualifying for benefits.
This case involved the dissolution of marriage between Marshall Ross Jones, Jr. and Stephanie L. Jones, focusing on the equitable distribution of assets and liabilities. The central dispute concerned a promissory note for $225,000 that the husband executed in favor of his mother, which the wife claimed was inauthentic or unenforceable. The trial court classified the note as a marital obligation, valued it at $112,500 for distribution purposes, accounted for the husband's dissipation of marital assets, and denied the wife's request for attorney fees. On appeal, the court affirmed these rulings, holding that the note's actual value fell between its face amount and zero due to conflicting evidence about its creation, timing, and enforceability, and that the trial court acted within its discretion to achieve an equitable result under Florida statutes.
In this medical malpractice case, petitioners Michael and Stephanie Baldwin sought certiorari review of a trial court order denying their motion to compel non-party Shands Teaching Hospital to produce its risk management incident report and peer review form concerning an adverse medical incident during Mr. Baldwin's intubation for an appendectomy. The court granted the petition, quashed the order, and directed Shands to produce all records of adverse medical incidents. The core reasoning was that Amendment 7 to the Florida Constitution grants patients access to any records made or received by a health care facility relating to an adverse medical incident—which is defined to include any act, neglect, or default that caused or could have caused injury to a patient and encompasses incidents reviewed by risk management or peer review committees—and the hospital could not avoid disclosure by unilaterally determining that the incident did not involve negligence.
The case involved Roy Howard Middleton, Jr., who was convicted of second-degree murder after his trial counsel failed to advise him of the option to move for a mistrial when a juror was removed during deliberations due to an undisclosed felony conviction. Middleton filed a post-conviction motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 alleging ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington. The trial court found that Middleton would have sought a mistrial if informed but denied relief, concluding he had not shown a different outcome at a new trial was likely. On appeal, the District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District, reversed, holding that the prejudice prong of Strickland was satisfied because counsel's deficiency denied Middleton a significant procedural right to a properly constituted jury, requiring the parties to be returned to their pre-trial positions without needing to demonstrate acquittal on retrial. The court noted that double jeopardy would not bar potential retrial on the original first-degree murder charge.