This Title VII case involved plaintiff Sharon O'Hara's claims that her supervisors at the University of West Florida subjected her to sexual harassment through inappropriate comments and advances, creating a hostile work environment, and that the university retaliated by sending her home to work remotely and declining to renew her grant-funded contract after she complained to HR and the EEOC. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation and granted the university's motion for summary judgment on the retaliation claim, finding O'Hara failed to establish a prima facie case because she had not shown protected activity or causation linking any complaint to the non-renewal. The court denied summary judgment on the sexual harassment claim, concluding that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the alleged conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms of employment. The decision rested on review of deposition excerpts, affidavits, and other summary judgment evidence without resolving disputed facts at this stage.
The case concerned the constitutionality of Florida Statute § 843.17, which criminalizes publishing a law enforcement officer's residence address or telephone number with malicious intent to obstruct or intimidate the officer. Plaintiff Robert Brayshaw was arrested under the statute after posting truthful, publicly available contact information about a Tallahassee police officer on a website, though the charges were later dismissed on procedural grounds. He then sued the City of Tallahassee and the State Attorney seeking damages and injunctive relief, arguing the law violated the First Amendment. The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff, holding the statute invalid under the First and Fourteenth Amendments because it regulates protected speech in a content-based manner that is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. The court permanently enjoined enforcement of the statute and awarded the plaintiff $25,000 in damages against the City.
The case involved a plaintiff who sued the manufacturer of the generic drug phenytoin after developing Stevens-Johnson Syndrome following its use for epilepsy treatment. The plaintiff alleged negligence, strict liability, fraud, and other claims in an eight-count complaint. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding that the action was barred by Florida's four-year statute of limitations because the plaintiff discovered the likely cause of his injuries by September 2004 but did not file suit until October 2008. The court also concluded that the learned intermediary doctrine applied, as the prescribing physician did not rely on the drug labeling and was independently aware of the risks.
The case involved a plaintiff who alleged injury from taking a generic phenytoin drug manufactured by the defendants, resulting in a diagnosis of Stevens-Johnson Syndrome after use in 2004; the complaint asserted multiple claims including negligence, breach of warranty, fraud, unfair trade practices violations, and strict liability. The court ruled on defendants' partial motion to dismiss three counts under Rule 12(b)(6). It dismissed the breach of warranty count because Florida law requires privity of contract, which was not alleged. It also dismissed the unfair trade practices count because the relevant Florida statutes provide no private right of action and exclude personal injury claims. The court denied dismissal of the punitive damages count, finding that nine paragraphs of specific factual allegations in the complaint were sufficient to state a plausible claim under Florida law.
This case involved a dispute between commercial property owner 316, Inc. and its insurer Maryland Casualty Company over the amount of loss from Hurricane Ivan damage in 2004. After the parties disagreed on the total loss, Maryland invoked the policy's appraisal process, an umpire issued an award, and Maryland paid it in full within thirty days. 316 then sued under Florida Statute § 624.155 alleging bad faith for failing to pay within sixty days of a Civil Remedy Notice and for additional amounts such as interest, unpaid DSI bills, and public adjuster fees. The court granted Maryland's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint, holding that the appraisal award was binding, that Maryland satisfied its payment obligations under the policy and statute by paying promptly after the award, and that 316 could not recover additional damages or maintain claims not properly noticed.
The case involved a Florida public high school student who sued the local school board after the principal banned students from wearing or displaying t-shirts, armbands, stickers, or buttons with messages or symbols supporting acceptance and equal treatment of homosexuals, such as rainbows, pink triangles, and slogans like “Gay Pride” or “I Support My Gay Friends.” The court found that the principal had investigated and punished students for these expressions following an incident involving a lesbian student, including suspensions and directives to remove the items, which the student plaintiff claimed violated her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to free speech and against viewpoint discrimination. The court ruled that the school board's actions were unconstitutional, permanently enjoining the board from prohibiting such student expressions unless they materially and substantially disrupt school operations, and requiring notification to students and officials that the speech is permitted under reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. The core reasoning relied on precedents like Tinker v. Des Moines, holding that schools cannot suppress student speech based on its content or viewpoint without evidence of substantial disruption, and that the banned messages here did not cause such disruption.