Michael W. Farrell

This case arose from a failed business arrangement in which Washington Investment Partners (WIP) agreed to help a Kuwaiti investment firm and its affiliates acquire and manage the Transpoint Building in Washington, D.C., under two successive contracts: a Letter Agreement and a later Asset Management Agreement (AMA). After the AMA took effect, the appellees terminated WIP for nonperformance and an executive’s departure; they later sold the building profitably and refused to pay WIP further fees, prompting WIP to sue for hundreds of millions in damages on breach-of-contract, fiduciary-duty, and related claims while the appellees counterclaimed for fees already paid. The trial court granted summary judgment to the appellees on the Letter Agreement claim, and a jury found for the appellees on all remaining claims while awarding them $636,000 on the counterclaim plus prejudgment interest. On appeal, the D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the AMA’s integration clause plainly terminated the Letter Agreement, that WIP’s challenges to the AMA’s validity were without merit, and that the trial court committed no reversible error in its evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

The case involved Robert A. Russell's convictions for armed carjacking, armed robbery, possession of a firearm during a crime of violence, unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, and theft, stemming from an incident where a victim was robbed at gunpoint and his car stolen. The main issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred by not allowing expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identifications. The court reversed the convictions and remanded the case, reasoning that recent scientific developments and case law require a more thorough, case-specific analysis of factors like the current state of research, whether the information is beyond common juror knowledge, and the probative value to the specific identification in the case.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned Bar Counsel's request to revoke the probation of attorney Timothy Brown, which had been referred to a Hearing Committee of the Board on Professional Responsibility. After reviewing the Committee's report and recommendation along with the full record, the court granted the motion to revoke probation. It ordered Brown suspended from the practice of law for two years, with any reinstatement conditioned on a finding of fitness and reasonable progress toward repaying amounts owed to the Clients’ Security Fund. The suspension period does not begin until Brown files an affidavit complying with D.C. Bar Rule XI, § 14(g).

business & regulatory

This case concerns the probate of Anna Creech's estate and whether her 1992 will or a 1995 codicil should control distribution of her property. The trial court rejected a copy of the 1995 codicil due to uncertainty over the missing original and admitted the full 1992 will to probate. The D.C. Court of Appeals reversed, holding that even if the testator had revoked the codicil by destroying it, D.C. Code § 18-109(b) prevents automatic revival of the portions of the 1992 will that the codicil had expressly revoked; revival requires re-execution or a new codicil showing intent to revive. The court remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the codicil was in fact revoked.

property

This case involved a dispute between tenant Donna Sanders and landlord Berhanu Molla over whether a lease renewal provision allowed the tenant to unilaterally extend the term for five years or required mutual consent, after the landlord sought to raise rent and the tenant refused to pay. The trial court found the provision ambiguous, considered extrinsic evidence including testimony about the original lease negotiations, and ruled that renewal required both parties' agreement, leading to a judgment for the landlord on possession. The appellate court affirmed this interpretation, holding that the language was indeed ambiguous and that the trial court's factual finding based on extrinsic evidence was not clearly erroneous. The court dismissed the tenant's challenge to the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions for lack of jurisdiction because the order was nonfinal and had not determined the amount of the award.

propertyprocedure

In this case, a scholarship student at the University of the District of Columbia was attacked by two armed assailants in a campus parking garage and, along with her husband, sued the university for negligence in failing to provide adequate security. A jury awarded the plaintiffs $400,000 in damages, but the university appealed the denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the plaintiffs had not presented sufficient evidence to establish the university's liability. Under District of Columbia law, a defendant can be held liable for injuries from intervening criminal acts only upon a heightened showing of foreseeability that creates a duty to guard against such acts; the court found that evidence of prior crimes on campus was too general and unrelated to the specific attack to meet this standard.

torts & liability

This case involved disciplinary proceedings against D.C. Bar member Leslie Wayne Lickstein after his 2007 guilty plea to conspiracy to commit bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1344, stemming from a mortgage financing scheme in which he falsified a deed of trust as closing attorney, causing a $1.1 million loss to the first mortgage holder. Lickstein was sentenced to over a year in prison, supervised release, and restitution, and his Virginia law license was revoked by consent; he failed to report either the conviction or revocation to D.C. authorities as required by bar rules. The Board on Professional Responsibility recommended disbarment under D.C. Code § 11-2503(a) on the ground that the offense constituted a crime of moral turpitude per se, and Bar Counsel concurred. The court adopted the recommendation, holding that felony bank fraud and conspiracy to commit it are crimes of moral turpitude per se under established precedent, mandating disbarment, and dismissed the reciprocal discipline matter as moot. Disbarment was ordered effective from the date of Lickstein's compliant affidavit in December 2008.

criminal lawprocedure

In this attorney disciplinary case, the Board on Professional Responsibility recommended disbarring respondent Bruce A. Pelkey for violating multiple District of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct while engaged in international business ventures with complainant Linda Cavalli, including through entities involved in the U.S. Immigrant Investor Pilot Program. The court reviewed evidence of Pelkey's conduct, such as providing legal services to joint entities, making false statements to tribunals, pursuing frivolous and harassing proceedings, and engaging in dishonest or criminal acts that reflected on his honesty and trustworthiness. The court concluded that Bar Counsel had presented clear and convincing evidence supporting violations of Rules 8.4(b), 8.4(c), 8.4(d), 3.1, 3.2(a), 3.3(a)(1), and 4.4(a). It upheld the Board's recommendation of disbarment as the appropriate sanction, along with requirements for restitution to the Clients' Security Fund with interest and satisfaction of judgments in favor of Cavalli.

criminal lawprocedurebusiness & regulatory

In Beatty v. United States, the appellant was convicted of assault with a dangerous weapon, possession of a prohibited weapon, carrying a dangerous weapon, and felony threats after an incident in which he confronted his girlfriend's estranged husband with a gun. The main government witness was the husband, a lawful permanent resident whose citizenship application had been denied; prior to trial, Beatty filed a Brady demand seeking the reasons for the denial, alleging it might reveal bias linked to the couple's separation. The trial court denied Beatty's motion to compel production or an in camera inspection of the relevant attachment to the denial letter. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the witness testified the separation was unrelated to the denial, other impeachment evidence was available at trial, and nothing indicated the document contained Brady material.

criminal lawimmigrationprocedure

The case involved the District of Columbia Department of Public Works charging Angela Washington with a violation of the Litter Control Act for tall grass and weeds on her vacant lot, seeking a $300 fine. An administrative law judge found no substantive violation because the vegetation was naturally occurring or planted wildflowers rather than solid waste, but imposed a $300 late-response penalty because Washington's answer to the citation was untimely. Washington petitioned for review, arguing among other things that the statute does not authorize a penalty for lateness when no underlying violation has been established. The D.C. Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the relevant statutory provisions, read together, condition the lateness penalty on a finding of a substantive littering violation and that penal statutes must be strictly construed against the government. The court vacated the fine and ordered release of any lien.

environmentprocedureproperty

This case is a reciprocal disciplinary proceeding in which the D.C. Court of Appeals considered discipline against attorney William M. Sawyer after the Kentucky Supreme Court suspended him for three years based on his guilty plea to cocaine possession and related drug charges, which were later dismissed following pretrial diversion. The court imposed the identical sanction of a three-year suspension with reinstatement conditioned on proof of fitness, effective immediately but commencing for reinstatement purposes upon filing of the required affidavit. The core reasoning was that no exceptions were filed to the Board on Professional Responsibility's recommendation, the Kentucky proceeding involved no miscarriage of justice as Sawyer had participated and consented, and a rebuttable presumption favors identical reciprocal discipline for violations of D.C. Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(b) when it falls within the typical sanction range.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether a defendant who entered a guilty plea at age twenty-one but was sentenced after turning twenty-two remained eligible for sentencing under the District of Columbia Youth Rehabilitation Act. The trial court denied the request for YRA sentencing on the ground that the defendant had reached age twenty-two by the sentencing date, but the Court of Appeals reversed. The court held that the statutory definition of "conviction" refers to the judgment on a guilty plea and does not include the sentence, so eligibility turns on the defendant's age at the time of conviction rather than at sentencing; it reached this conclusion after examining the YRA's text, its contrast with the former federal Youth Corrections Act, and other D.C. Code provisions that treat conviction and sentencing as distinct events.

criminal law

This case involves a long-running dispute over the distribution of escrow proceeds from the sale of a residential property that was the sole asset of a general partnership formed in 1984. After the parties submitted their disagreements to binding arbitration, which adjusted the partners' capital accounts, the trial court sought clarification from the arbitrator and then ordered distribution of the funds according to those accounts while also awarding plaintiffs attorneys' fees to be paid from defendant Williams' share. On appeal, the court affirmed the distribution order based on the arbitration's determination of capital accounts and the trial court's authority to seek clarification without reopening the arbitration, but reversed the attorneys' fees award because the arbitrator had not decided that issue and remanded for further proceedings to properly calculate the accounts and fees.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

The case involved petitioner Samar Chatterjee's challenge to the dismissal of his administrative appeal from a denial of unemployment compensation benefits by the D.C. Department of Employment Services, which had found him ineligible due to discharge for misconduct. The Office of Administrative Hearings dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the request for hearing was filed after the ten-day deadline following the purported June 13, 2006 mailing of the determination notice. The D.C. Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the ALJ failed to resolve disputed factual issues about the actual date of mailing and receipt, despite crediting Chatterjee's testimony that he did not receive the notice until June 27. The court explained that the ten-day appeal period is jurisdictional but requires proper notice, the presumption of mailing can be rebutted by evidence, and additional findings were needed on whether the notice was timely mailed to establish jurisdiction.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case involves a reciprocal attorney disciplinary proceeding in the District of Columbia concerning respondent Robert L. Gailliard, who had been convicted in South Carolina of assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature after striking his teenage son with a truck and had been indefinitely suspended from practice there. The DC court accepted the Board of Professional Responsibility's recommendation to impose a three-year suspension with a requirement to demonstrate fitness for reinstatement, rather than holding a hearing on whether the conviction involved moral turpitude. The decision treats the sanction as functionally equivalent to the South Carolina indefinite suspension and defers any moral turpitude determination until a potential future reinstatement application, noting the respondent's long administrative suspension in DC and lack of engagement with the proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved an employment contract dispute where East Capitol View Community Development Corporation terminated Denean Robinson's one-year written employment contract early after its grant funding was revoked, prompting Robinson to sue for breach of contract. The trial court entered judgment for Robinson following a jury verdict that found an unexcused breach. On appeal, the court affirmed, reasoning that the employer was not entitled to a jury instruction on the impossibility of performance defense because the contract contained no language excusing performance for lack of funding, the defense requires evidence that the risk was not allocated by agreement and that performance was objectively impossible, and there was no record support for giving the instruction.

labor & employment

In Yazdani v. ACCESS ATM, the plaintiff claimed he was defrauded by a salesman purportedly acting for the defendant company after signing agreements and paying nearly $7,000 for an ATM machine that was never delivered, prompting claims for breach of contract, fraud, and RICO violations. The trial court dismissed the case, and the appellate court affirmed solely on the basis of a forum-selection clause in the integrated sales and service agreements that required venue for any action arising from the contract to be in Houston, Texas. The court held that forum-selection clauses are prima facie valid and enforceable unless the resisting party shows they are unreasonable, that the clause was unambiguous and covered all claims, and that it remained binding and severable even though the defendant disavowed the rest of the contract. The plaintiff's arguments about ambiguity, the clause's limited scope, and his attempt to pivot to an oral contract claim were rejected as untimely or unreasonable.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved John Robertson's appeal from the denial of his motion to vacate his criminal contempt convictions for violating a civil protection order (CPO) obtained by Ms. Watson after incidents of alleged abuse. Robertson argued that his plea agreement with the U.S. Attorney's Office barred the contempt proceedings, that his counsel was ineffective for not raising this issue, that the trial court misapplied self-defense law, and that he was entitled to a jury trial. The court affirmed the trial court's rulings, holding that the plea agreement did not prevent Ms. Watson from enforcing the CPO through contempt proceedings under D.C. law, that there was thus no ineffective assistance, that self-defense did not apply to the proven violations, and that no jury trial was required for these misdemeanor contempt charges. The core reasoning centered on the distinct nature of private CPO enforcement versus criminal prosecutions by the government, as well as statutory limits on jury trials and the evidence supporting the contempt findings.

criminal lawfamily lawprocedure

This case involved a petition to appoint a conservator for Antoine L. McMillan, an individual with cerebral palsy who received substantial settlement funds from a medical malpractice action. The trial court determined that McMillan was incapacitated and required a conservator to manage his property, appointing Darrel S. Parker to that role after evidentiary hearings. On appeal, the court affirmed the appointment, finding that McMillan's procedural rights were not violated, the evidence sufficiently supported the incapacity determination based on his cognitive limitations, and there was no showing of judicial bias. The decision to deny transfer of assets to Maryland was also upheld, but the court remanded for reconsideration of payment for an expert witness from McMillan's funds.

civil rightsfamily lawprocedure

In this case, real estate developers EastBanc and Georgetown Park Associates II, along with Herbert Miller, entered a 1998 agreement under which Miller would use his Right of First Offer to help EastBanc acquire the Georgetown Park Mall in exchange for an equity interest. After failed acquisition efforts, the parties signed a 2001 agreement modifying Miller's compensation to a waiver fee and noting disagreements about whether the original agreement remained in effect. EastBanc sued for breach when Miller later sought to exercise the ROFO for his own benefit, but the trial court dismissed the complaint as barred by the statute of limitations. The appellate court reversed, holding that the 2001 agreement did not trigger the limitations period because it did not amount to a repudiation of the 1998 contract and the parties had expressly preserved their positions on its ongoing validity.

propertybusiness & regulatoryprocedure