In this case, plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that a 1998 promissory note, personal guarantees, and deed of trust securing real estate were unenforceable because the six-year statute of limitations had expired in 2004 with no payments made. Defendant Bevan Properties counterclaimed to enforce the note and foreclose on the deed of trust, arguing that the plaintiffs' filing revived the claims under Colorado's counterclaim revival statute, section 13-80-109, and that oral acknowledgments of the debt created a factual issue. The district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs. The appellate court affirmed, holding as a matter of first impression that an action for declaratory judgment of nonliability based on the statute of limitations does not trigger the revival statute, and that the defendant's affidavit failed to show a written acknowledgment required to raise a genuine issue of material fact under related statutes.
In this case, defendant Leotis Durwin Greer was convicted by a jury of sexual assault on a child, sexual assault as part of a pattern of sexual abuse, and multiple counts of unlawful sexual contact arising from incidents involving two teenage employees at a fast-food restaurant he managed. The trial court merged the unlawful sexual contact convictions into one count. On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the merged unlawful sexual contact convictions but affirmed the remaining convictions and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that the defendant's double jeopardy claim was unpreserved and reviewed only for plain error, concluding that the sexual assault convictions did not violate double jeopardy because the unit of prosecution allowed multiple charges based on distinct volitional acts separated by time and intervening events. The court also rejected claims regarding untimely disclosure of an expert witness, finding no prejudice or due process violation.
This case involved two groups of plaintiffs who were injured in car accidents and held American Family auto insurance policies that provided only basic personal injury protection (PIP) benefits rather than the enhanced PIP coverage required under the former Colorado Auto Accident Reparations Act (CAARA). The plaintiffs sued for breach of contract, bad faith, and related claims, alleging that American Family had failed to timely disclose and provide the enhanced benefits despite knowing of its noncompliance since 2000; prior class actions (French, Marshall, and Hicks) had addressed similar issues, with Hicks resulting in policy reformation in 2005. The trial courts granted summary judgment to American Family, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that the three-year statute of limitations had expired before the 2008 filings. The court reasoned that the claims accrued when plaintiffs knew the material facts about their policies and benefits paid, not when they learned of the legal requirement for enhanced coverage or the reformation order, and that neither the prior class actions nor the Hicks proceedings tolled the limitations period sufficiently to preserve the claims.
The case concerned Leggett & Platt and The Gap's claim for a refund of Thornton sales taxes paid on store fixtures manufactured in Thornton and loaded onto The Gap's own or hired carriers for delivery to stores outside the city. The court affirmed denial of the refund, holding that the taxable retail sales occurred in Thornton when the buyer took possession at the seller's loading dock. It reasoned that the city code required the seller or its agent to make delivery for the interstate or intrastate exemptions to apply, that the transactions were not in interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause, and that no due process violation occurred because the sales took place within the city.
Chad Carter purchased a defective 2006 Mustang from Brighton Ford and sued the dealer for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability and revocation of acceptance under the Colorado Uniform Commercial Code after the vehicle required repeated repairs and was inoperable for over thirty days. The trial court granted summary judgment to Brighton Ford, dismissing the claims under the innocent seller statute, which bars product liability actions against sellers who are not manufacturers. The appellate court reversed and remanded, reasoning that the claims were contractual in nature and sought only economic damages for defects affecting the product's value, not tort-based recovery for personal injury, death, or damage from an unreasonably dangerous product, so the innocent seller statute did not apply.
A real estate developer sued a water and sanitation district for breach of contract and promissory estoppel after the district stopped reserving water taps based on availability-of-service charges and instead required outright purchase. The developer sought specific performance to compel the district to reserve the taps for its property development, along with money damages. The trial court granted summary judgment dismissing the specific performance claim, treating undisputed facts as supporting judgment as a matter of law. On appeal, the court affirmed, holding that sovereign immunity principles bar specific performance against governmental entities in contract actions, as it would improperly allow judicial compulsion of executive functions, consistent with precedents distinguishing damages claims from equitable relief.