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People Ex Rel. Cy
Colorado Court of Appeals · 2012-02-16
The case concerned an eleven-year-old boy with significant mental and developmental disabilities who was charged with sex-related delinquent acts equivalent to aggravated incest and other offenses; after he was found incompetent to proceed and unrestorable to competency, a magistrate included a psychosexual evaluation in the resulting management plan to assess community risk and appropriate supervision, but the district court reversed that requirement on constitutional grounds and the prosecution appealed. The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the district court and reinstated the evaluation requirement. It held that the order did not violate the privilege against self-incrimination because a statute expressly bars any statements made during the evaluation from being used in later criminal proceedings, and it did not violate due process by undermining the presumption of innocence. The court declined to address the argument that the evaluation results might later be used to restrict the juvenile’s liberty, deeming that claim premature.
criminal law
One Creative Place, LLC v. Jet Center Partners, LLC
Colorado Court of Appeals · 2011-05-26 · cited 8×
This case involved an intervenor's claim under the Colorado Consumer Protection Act (CCPA) alleging that JetAway engaged in deceptive trade practices by advertising fuel and related aircraft services it was not authorized to provide at Montrose Regional Airport. The central issue on appeal was whether the CCPA element requiring a significant public impact from the deceptive practice presents a question of law for the court or a question of fact for the trier of fact. The court held that it is a question of fact to be reviewed for clear error when facts are disputed, and it affirmed the trial court's finding that the intervenor had not proven significant public impact. The decision rested on the absence of evidence showing actual consumer deception or likely future harm, applying a balancing of relevant factors such as consumer sophistication and advertising reach rather than treating any single factor as dispositive.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Strunk v. Goldberg
Colorado Court of Appeals · 2011-05-26 · cited 4×
The case involved a plaintiff suing a defendant for negligence after a car accident, seeking damages for injuries, medical expenses, and lost income; the defendant admitted liability but disputed the damages amount. Before trial, the defendant made a $145,000 settlement offer that referenced including any subrogation interests or liens, which the plaintiff rejected. The jury awarded the plaintiff $98,000 plus interest, for a total judgment under the offer amount, prompting the trial court to award post-offer costs to the defendant under Colorado's section 13-17-202. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the offer's language about subrogation and liens did not impose invalid nonmonetary conditions but instead clarified its value to promote settlements, making the cost-shifting statute applicable.
proceduretorts & liability
People v. Cardenas
Colorado Court of Appeals · 2011-01-20 · cited 9×
In People v. Cardenas, the defendant, who had pleaded guilty to first degree criminal trespass and been ordered to pay $3,640 in restitution plus 12% annual postjudgment interest starting at sentencing, raised an as-applied constitutional challenge claiming the interest requirement constituted an excessive fine because his incarceration left him unable to earn wages. The trial court rejected the challenge, holding that restitution serves to make victims whole rather than to punish and must be imposed in full without regard to ability to pay. On de novo review, the appellate court affirmed, concluding that the statutory interest mechanism—designed to encourage prompt payment and compensate for delay—likewise does not offend the Eighth Amendment or Colorado Constitution article II, section 20, because it is not equivalent to a fine and does not violate proportionality principles even when applied to an indigent, incarcerated defendant. The court noted that current statutes require restitution orders and minimum payments during incarceration, distinguishing older precedent based on prior statutory language.
criminal lawprocedure
People v. Smith
Colorado Court of Appeals · 2011-01-06 · cited 10×
The case involved defendant Ronald Owen Smith, who was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to commit theft after being accused of assisting his codefendant in using stolen credit cards and checks from four victims' purses to make fraudulent purchases in Jefferson County. The trial court denied the defendant's request to continue the trial until after the codefendant's sentencing so she could testify without invoking her Fifth Amendment rights, and it allowed the codefendant to decline to testify at trial on self-incrimination grounds related to potential sentencing issues. On appeal, the court affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the continuance due to docket constraints and that the defendant was not prejudiced because a letter from the codefendant containing exculpatory statements was admitted into evidence for the jury's consideration. The core reasoning centered on the balance of scheduling needs, the codefendant's valid Fifth Amendment concerns given her pending sentencing, and the lack of actual prejudice from the rulings.
criminal lawprocedure
North Valley Bank v. McGloin, Davenport, Severson & Snow, Professional Corp.
Colorado Court of Appeals · 2010-12-09 · cited 3×
This case involved a dispute over the priority of liens on a judgment awarded to a contractor in a breach of contract lawsuit. The bank had a perfected security interest in the contractor's accounts receivable and proceeds under the UCC, while the attorneys who represented the contractor in the lawsuit claimed a statutory attorney's lien on the judgment for their fees. The court held that the attorney's lien took priority over the bank's security interest. It reasoned that the Colorado attorney's lien statute expressly establishes the lien as a "first lien," that the UCC does not govern such liens, and that the UCC therefore cannot be used to resolve the priority question between the two interests.
propertybusiness & regulatory