E-Pass Technologies sued its former attorneys for legal malpractice after they represented the company in unsuccessful federal patent infringement lawsuits involving U.S. Patent No. 5,276,311 for an electronic multi-function card. The trial court sustained a demurrer and dismissed the complaint, concluding that the action raised substantial issues of federal patent law and thus fell under exclusive federal jurisdiction. The appellate court reversed the judgment, holding that the state court has jurisdiction because E-Pass's malpractice allegations, as limited in its briefing and argument, do not require resolution of a substantial question of patent law. The court noted that the claim centers on the attorneys' conduct in the underlying litigation rather than a direct challenge to patent claim construction or infringement findings.
The case involved a juvenile wardship proceeding against E.R. for his role in a gang-related shooting that killed one youth and wounded another, where the court found true allegations of conspiracy to commit murder, first-degree murder, attempted murder, assault with a deadly weapon, personal firearm use, and gang enhancements, leading to a commitment to the Division of Juvenile Justice. On appeal, E.R. challenged the juvenile court's decision to change its initial finding of second-degree murder to first-degree murder after the prosecutor argued that the conspiracy finding required it under People v. Cortez, along with other claims about the firearm finding, sufficiency of evidence, and the disposition. The Court of Appeal held that the change was improper because Cortez does not compel a first-degree finding as a matter of law when a murder occurs during a conspiracy, and inconsistent verdicts are permitted to stand. It therefore ordered the murder finding corrected back to second degree and adjustments to the disposition, while affirming the remaining jurisdiction findings and order in other respects.
The case involved James Parris Powell's petition challenging the Board of Parole Hearings' 2009 determination that he remained unsuitable for parole due to posing a current risk of danger to society. Powell had been convicted in 1982 of two counts of second-degree murder and sentenced to 16 years to life. The court reversed the Board's decision and remanded the matter for a new parole-suitability hearing. The core reasoning was that the denial was not supported by some evidence of present dangerousness, considering Powell's prison record, completion of self-help and substance abuse programs, and positive psychological evaluations over the years.
The case concerned whether the Gualala Festivals Committee required a coastal development permit from the California Coastal Commission to launch fireworks over the Gualala River estuary as part of its annual Patriot Days event. The Commission issued a cease-and-desist order after determining that the displays constituted a development under the California Coastal Act due to potential adverse effects on nearby seabird nesting sites and marine habitats, as documented in monitoring reports showing nest abandonments following a 2007 display. The trial court denied the Festivals Committee's petition for a writ of mandate, and the appellate court affirmed that ruling. The court held that the Act's expansive definition of development encompasses the discharge of materials into coastal areas, consistent with the statute's goal of protecting ecological resources, even if the activity is temporary.
This case concerned whether Governor Schwarzenegger's 2008 executive order imposing two-day-per-month furloughs on state employees could apply to employees of the State Compensation Insurance Fund (SCIF). The Court of Appeal affirmed the San Francisco Superior Court's writ of mandate barring the furloughs for SCIF employees. The court rejected the Governor's claim that the action should have been stayed under exclusive concurrent jurisdiction, noting that the Sacramento proceedings did not address SCIF employees or the specific statutory issue raised here. It held that Insurance Code section 11873 exempts SCIF from the general provisions of the Government Code that might otherwise authorize the Governor to order furloughs, because SCIF operates as a public enterprise fund supported by premiums rather than General Fund appropriations.
In People v. Duong, the San Francisco district attorney appealed a trial court order setting restitution after the defendant pleaded guilty to assault causing great bodily injury; the victim received treatment at a Kaiser facility as a plan member without incurring out-of-pocket costs beyond the monthly premium. The trial court limited restitution to $1,900 for ambulance services and excluded the $4,459 in hospital charges, reasoning that the victim had not personally incurred those expenses and that Kaiser was not a direct victim entitled to restitution. The Court of Appeal held that Penal Code section 1202.4 requires restitution for the victim's economic loss measured by the amount the provider will accept as full payment—in this case the $1,538.20 lien amount after the 20 percent reduction—rather than the full billed charges, because any higher sum would exceed the actual loss incurred. The court therefore vacated the restitution order and remanded for entry of a new order including that amount.