In this juvenile wardship case, police officers conducted a warrantless search of a minor's bedroom after obtaining consent from his mother, discovering stolen property that led to allegations of receiving stolen property against the 15-year-old appellant. The juvenile court denied the minor's motion to suppress the evidence, found the allegations true, and continued him as a ward on probation. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that a parent has authority to consent to a search of a minor child's bedroom and to override the child's objection, distinguishing this from adult co-tenant consent rules under Georgia v. Randolph because of the parent's custodial authority over the child. The court reasoned that parental rights and responsibilities allow such consent, even without the child's agreement, and found the search lawful on that basis.
The case involved a juvenile ward, D.G., who was placed on probation following a burglary conviction. The juvenile court imposed a probation condition restricting him from approaching school campuses other than his own. On appeal, the court held that the condition was unreasonable because it lacked connection to his offenses or rehabilitative needs, and modified it to align with statutory requirements for notifying school authorities before entering grounds, while upholding the probation order as adjusted.
The case involved a negligence lawsuit by Ana Silva Yanez against SOMA Environmental Engineering and related defendants for injuries from a 2005 car accident. A jury awarded Yanez $150,000 in damages, including $44,519.01 for past medical expenses based on the amounts billed by providers. The trial court later reduced the medical expense portion of the award to $18,368.24—the amount actually paid and accepted by the providers under contracts with Yanez's private insurers—and denied her post-offer costs and interest under Code of Civil Procedure section 998. The Court of Appeal reversed the reduction and remanded for entry of judgment restoring the original damages and for redetermination of costs and prejudgment interest. The core reasoning was that the reasonable value of medical services, as determined by the jury, controls damages in this context, and no statute or rule permitted the post-verdict deduction of amounts written off pursuant to private insurance agreements.
The case concerned a challenge to the validity of a 2007 will executed by Eugene Winans shortly before his death, which substantially changed the distribution of his estate by including his half brother and care custodian Elizabeth Timar while excluding his nieces and nephews who were beneficiaries under prior 2005 and 2006 wills. Appellants argued the new will resulted from undue influence by Timar and that Winans lacked testamentary capacity, and they also contested the adequacy of the certificate of independent review required under Probate Code section 21351 for the bequest to Timar. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Timar and dismissed the will contest. The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that triable issues of fact existed regarding the substantive adequacy and confidentiality of the attorney's counseling, the attorney's independence, Timar's alleged undue influence, and Winans's testamentary capacity.
The case involved a homeowners association that sued lot owners in a common interest development after their newly built home exceeded the association's height guideline by nine feet. The trial court found the owners knowingly violated the guideline despite warnings and ordered them to modify the home to comply. On appeal, the court affirmed, holding that the guideline was enforceable even without proof of its formal adoption because it had been consistently applied, and that injunctive relief was appropriate rather than damages because the violation was not innocent and enforcement was necessary to maintain uniform application of the association's rules. The court also found that the cost of compliance was not grossly disproportionate to the harm caused to neighbors.
The case concerned a juvenile wardship petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleging that minor S.C. violated Penal Code section 653k by possessing a switchblade knife found in his pocket during a search at a private residence. The juvenile court found the allegation true and placed the minor on probation as a ward of the court. On appeal, the minor argued that section 653k requires possession in a public place or place open to the public. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the statute's plain language creates three distinct violations and that the "public place" limitation applies only to the vehicle-possession clause, not the separate clause prohibiting carrying a switchblade on one's person. The court reached this conclusion through textual analysis of the statute's structure and clauses, supported by legislative history showing the public-place restriction was added solely for vehicular possession.