James J. Marchiano

This case involved plaintiffs who purchased land in Solano County believing they had acquired two assessor parcels, but their title insurance policy from defendant Fidelity National Title Insurance Company used a metes and bounds legal description that covered only one parcel, despite references to both parcels in the preliminary report, escrow documents, and an attached map. When plaintiffs discovered they did not own the second parcel and filed a claim, the insurer denied coverage based on the policy's legal description. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant on the breach of contract and related claims. The appellate court reversed, holding that the policy's description was ambiguous to a layperson and that such ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the insured, consistent with prior precedent emphasizing the insurer's responsibility for the description and the insured's reasonable expectations of coverage.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case involved David B. Reeves, a 56-year-old lawyer who applied for a staff attorney position at MV Transportation, Inc. but was not selected for an interview, while a 40-year-old candidate with relevant labor and employment experience was hired. Reeves sued the company for age discrimination. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. The court reasoned that Reeves had not raised triable issues of fact based on his claimed superior qualifications, allegedly inconsistent employer explanations, or evidence spoliation, because the selected candidate's background was at least comparable and the employer's stated reasons for the decision were consistent.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case involved Watershed Enforcers, a nonprofit project, filing a writ of mandate against California's Department of Water Resources (DWR) to require it to obtain permit authority under the California Endangered Species Act (CESA) before its pumping operations could take three endangered or threatened fish species. Intervening local water agencies argued that DWR, as a state agency, was not a "person" subject to the prohibition in Fish and Game Code section 2080. The trial court granted the writ, and although DWR complied and dismissed its appeal, the interveners continued, raising a mootness issue that the appellate court addressed due to public interest. The Court of Appeal held that a state agency qualifies as a "person" under section 2080, based on CESA's broad definition of "person," legislative findings directing all state agencies to conserve endangered species, and the statute's overall structure allowing permits for public agencies.

environment

In Alvarez v. Superior Court, defendant Alejandro Alvarez reached a plea agreement with the prosecution that was initially approved by one judge but then rejected by a second designated judge under a San Francisco Superior Court procedure assigning only two judges to handle post-trial-setting plea approvals. The defendant petitioned for a writ of mandate or prohibition, arguing that the assignment procedure was invalid because it was not adopted as a formal local rule and improperly limited judicial authority to accept pleas. The court denied the petition, holding that the procedure was a valid administrative assignment by the presiding judge under existing authority, that defendants have no right to have pleas approved by a judge of their choice, and that the process did not conflict with statutory or case law requirements for plea dispositions. The ruling emphasized that case assignments and pretrial procedures are within the court's discretion to promote efficiency and consistency.

criminal lawprocedure

In this juvenile dependency case, parents of a minor voluntarily relinquished their parental rights to the State Department of Social Services under Family Code section 8700, designating the mother's sister and her husband as the intended adoptive placement. The juvenile court later held a section 366.26 hearing, terminated parental rights, and designated the minor's foster parents as prospective adoptive parents. The parents appealed, arguing that the juvenile court's actions impermissibly interfered with their final voluntary relinquishment. The Court of Appeal reversed the orders, concluding that the court lacked authority to override the relinquishment and designated placement accepted by the state agency. The court also found that any ICWA notice issues were moot due to the voluntary relinquishment.

family lawprocedure

The case concerned a challenge to Senate Bill 1137, which amended the voter-approved Proposition 36 (the Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act of 2000) by permitting incarceration for certain probation violations and narrowing eligibility for drug treatment diversion instead of jail. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's injunction against enforcement of the bill's key provisions. It held that those sections could not reasonably be viewed as furthering Proposition 36's purposes of diverting nonviolent drug offenders to community treatment and reducing incarceration, as required for legislative amendments under the initiative. The court also ruled that the bill's fallback provision for submitting invalidated portions to voters was itself invalid.

criminal lawelections

This case concerned liability for over $237,000 in hospital costs incurred by a man arrested by Oakland police for probation and parole violations and held in the city jail. After a court revoked his probation, city officers attempted to transfer him to the Alameda County jail, but county staff refused admission due to his illness and directed the officers to take him to ValleyCare hospital instead; the city then released him on his own recognizance to remain there for treatment. The trial court granted summary judgment holding the City of Oakland liable under Penal Code sections 4011 and 4011.5. The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that the County of Alameda was responsible for the costs based on the applicable statutes governing medical care for prisoners in county versus city custody and the circumstances of the transfer and refusal of admission.

criminal lawprocedure

This case arose when a debt collection company repeatedly contacted and pursued a plaintiff for a consumer credit card debt she did not owe, based on mistaken identity with another person who had the same name on the account. A jury found the defendant liable for violations of the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and for intentional infliction of emotional distress, leading to an award of damages and attorney fees. On appeal, the court decided that the litigation privilege does not apply to shield conduct violating the Act, that the continuing violation doctrine allows recovery for acts outside the limitations period, and that a multiplier may be used in fee awards under the Act, but it also held that the privilege bars the emotional distress claim and that an improper factor was used in the fee multiplier. The core reasoning focused on statutory interpretation of the Act's prohibitions on abusive practices, the scope of the litigation privilege, and procedural rules for limitations and fees in the context of debt collection efforts involving mistaken identity.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

The case concerned whether four categories of electronic materials from Diebold DRE voting machines—redundant vote data, chain-of-custody logs, audit logs, and logic-and-accuracy test results—were relevant and therefore required to be examined during a recount of Berkeley Measure R under Elections Code section 15630 after the November 2004 election. The trial court granted summary adjudication to the plaintiffs on their Elections Code claims, declared the materials relevant based on undisputed expert evidence that they could confirm or cast doubt on vote accuracy, and issued a permanent injunction; it also awarded attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment and injunction on the Elections Code causes of action (with the injunction narrowly limited to DRE machines no longer in use by the county), reversed dismissal of the constitutional claims for further proceedings, and reversed the fee award in part for reconsideration of the multiplier. The core reasoning was that the undisputed facts showed the requested materials contained information about machine function, access, and vote tallies that could verify electronic results in the absence of paper ballots.

electionsprocedure

The case involved Gigi Marie Somers, born in California but residing in Kansas, who petitioned under Health and Safety Code section 103425 to obtain a new California birth certificate reflecting her gender change after surgery. The superior court denied the petition solely because the statute requires filing in the petitioner's county of residence, and Somers had no such residence in California while Kansas law barred the relief. The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for consideration on the merits, holding that the residency requirement violates equal protection by denying California-born transgender individuals living outside the state the same rights as those residing in California. The court found the statute provided subject matter jurisdiction over the birth certificate of a person born in the state and that the filing restriction impermissibly discriminated against nonresidents.

civil rightsprocedure

This case concerned the lawfulness of Costco Wholesale Corporation’s formula for calculating overtime compensation on semiannual bonuses paid to qualifying long-term hourly employees. The trial court ruled that Costco’s formula violated California law and ordered use of a different calculation method. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment, holding that Costco’s approach—dividing the maximum base bonus by the 1,000 paid hours required for eligibility to determine a regular hourly bonus rate, then multiplying overtime hours by one-half that rate—complies with both California Labor Code section 510 and federal regulations on retroactive overtime for bonuses earned over multiple weeks. The court reasoned that the formula properly incorporates the bonus into the regular rate without requiring the alternative method advocated by the plaintiffs.

labor & employment

In Eder v. Department of Fish & Game, Oregon Dungeness crab fishermen challenged the revocation of their California fishing permits by the California Fish and Game Commission for violating Fish and Game Code section 8279.1, subdivision (c), which enforces a 30-day waiting period after delayed crab seasons to prevent early fishing in one area and then another. The plaintiffs argued that the statute improperly regulated conduct lawful in Oregon and violated the dormant commerce clause and privileges and immunities clause. The court upheld the constitutionality of the statute, finding it regulates conduct within California to support a tristate agreement among California, Oregon, and Washington for managing the Dungeness crab fishery without violating constitutional provisions, and affirmed the trial court's denial of writ and declaratory relief.

environmentbusiness & regulatory

This case concerns a dispute between adjacent property owners over a view easement benefiting Zanelli's land at 66 Clarendon Avenue and burdening McGrath's land at 60 Clarendon Avenue. Zanelli sued for declaratory and injunctive relief to enforce the 1981 easement after McGrath purchased 60 Clarendon and planned construction, while McGrath cross-complained to quiet title. Following a trial, the court entered judgment for McGrath, finding the easement had been extinguished. The appellate court affirmed on the ground that the easement merged and was extinguished when Sommer and Dunham acquired both parcels in common ownership in 1994, with no intent shown to preserve it separately; the court did not reach the alternative holding regarding release in a later deed.

property

This case involved a dispute between the City of Cloverdale and the California Department of Transportation over responsibility for a drainage channel built as part of a highway bypass project, which allegedly caused flooding leading to lawsuits by nearby property owners. The City settled with the plaintiffs and sought indemnity from the Department, but the trial court ruled that title to the channel had been relinquished to the City and denied the City's indemnity claim. The appellate court affirmed the relinquishment ruling on the grounds that the City failed to exhaust its administrative remedies by not protesting the relinquishment notice within the required 90-day period, reversed the indemnity ruling for retrial, and affirmed the dismissal of other claims.

procedurepropertytorts & liability

In People v. Barrios, defendant Kevin Lee Barrios was convicted by juries of threatening a public official under Penal Code section 76(a) after he threatened to shoot his defense attorney during a domestic violence trial, and of misdemeanor battery on a cohabitant. The trial court sentenced him to four years in prison for the threat and a concurrent six months for the battery. On appeal, Barrios argued that the threat conviction required proof he intended to carry out the threat and that the court erred by admitting the unavailable victim's preliminary hearing testimony in the domestic violence case. The Court of Appeal rejected both contentions, holding that section 76 requires only specific intent that the statement be taken as a threat along with apparent ability to carry it out, not actual intent to execute it, and that the preliminary hearing testimony was properly admitted under Evidence Code section 1291 as the witness was unavailable and the defense had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine. The court affirmed both convictions.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved defendant Horace Bordelon, who was convicted of second-degree robbery after robbing the same bank branch he had targeted years earlier, just one week after his parole release following a prior incarceration for a similar offense. Bordelon argued that due to institutionalization—a psychological dependence on prison life—he took the money intending only to be caught and returned to custody, lacking the specific intent to permanently deprive the bank of its property. The trial court instructed the jury on motive and related issues, admitted some expert testimony on institutionalization but excluded other defense evidence, and the jury rejected the defense and convicted him, leading to an 11-year sentence including strike and prior conviction enhancements. On appeal, the court addressed claims of instructional error, evidentiary exclusions, and prosecutorial misconduct but concluded that any errors were harmless in light of the evidence and did not affect the outcome. The appellate court affirmed the judgment.

criminal law

This case involved Consolidated Management Group and related entities appealing a trial court judgment that upheld a Department of Corporations desist-and-refrain order prohibiting the offer and sale of joint venture interests in two Kansas oil-and-gas partnerships (Hugoton and Anadarko) without qualification under California law. The petitioners argued that federal securities law (NSMIA) preempted the Department's authority because they had filed Form D notices for Regulation D offerings, and that the joint-venture interests were not securities. The Court of Appeal held that federal law does not preempt state authority to regulate the transactions and that substantial evidence supported the Department's finding that the interests qualified as securities under the Williamson test, because investors' expected profits were derived primarily from the efforts of others. The court therefore affirmed the denial of the petition for administrative mandamus.

business & regulatoryfederal power

In Good v. Superior Court, the petitioner, convicted of misdemeanor indecent exposure in 1996 requiring ongoing sex offender registration, challenged a post-Proposition 69 directive to submit a DNA sample, claiming the 2004 initiative did not apply retroactively to his pre-2004 conviction. The Court of Appeal denied relief and held that Proposition 69 requires all persons obligated to register as sex offenders, including misdemeanants, to provide DNA samples regardless of conviction date. The court reasoned that the statute's triggering event is the present registration requirement under Penal Code section 290 rather than the date of conviction, and that the initiative's expansive language and purpose of broadening the forensic database supported collection from existing registrants.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved an insurance dispute where Boston Old Colony Insurance Company and Glens Falls Insurance Company, after indemnifying Crowley Maritime Corporation for asbestos-related claims exceeding $6 million, sought equitable contribution from other Crowley insurers including West of England Ship Owners Mutual Insurance Association and The United Kingdom Mutual Steam Ship Assurance Association. The foreign insurers petitioned to compel arbitration of the contribution claim under their London arbitration agreements with Crowley, invoking the Federal Arbitration Act. The trial court denied the petition, ruling that the equitable contribution claim arises from equity rather than contract and that nonsignatories to the arbitration agreements cannot be compelled to arbitrate under California or federal law. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that no exceptions to the nonsignatory rule applied and the claim did not stem from the underlying insurance contracts.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved Doimonique Abernathy, charged with murder carrying a potential death penalty, who petitioned for a writ of mandate after the superior court denied her request for daily transcripts of the preliminary hearing. The magistrate and superior court interpreted Penal Code section 190.9, subdivision (a)(1) as requiring such transcripts only after the prosecutor formally announces intent to seek death and sets a trial date. The Court of Appeal held that the statute mandates daily transcripts in any case where a death sentence may be imposed, commencing with the preliminary hearing, regardless of whether the prosecutor has yet given notice, and directed issuance of a peremptory writ.

criminal lawprocedure