This case involved plaintiffs who purchased land in Solano County believing they had acquired two assessor parcels, but their title insurance policy from defendant Fidelity National Title Insurance Company used a metes and bounds legal description that covered only one parcel, despite references to both parcels in the preliminary report, escrow documents, and an attached map. When plaintiffs discovered they did not own the second parcel and filed a claim, the insurer denied coverage based on the policy's legal description. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant on the breach of contract and related claims. The appellate court reversed, holding that the policy's description was ambiguous to a layperson and that such ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the insured, consistent with prior precedent emphasizing the insurer's responsibility for the description and the insured's reasonable expectations of coverage.
The case involved David B. Reeves, a 56-year-old lawyer who applied for a staff attorney position at MV Transportation, Inc. but was not selected for an interview, while a 40-year-old candidate with relevant labor and employment experience was hired. Reeves sued the company for age discrimination. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. The court reasoned that Reeves had not raised triable issues of fact based on his claimed superior qualifications, allegedly inconsistent employer explanations, or evidence spoliation, because the selected candidate's background was at least comparable and the employer's stated reasons for the decision were consistent.
The case involved Watershed Enforcers, a nonprofit project, filing a writ of mandate against California's Department of Water Resources (DWR) to require it to obtain permit authority under the California Endangered Species Act (CESA) before its pumping operations could take three endangered or threatened fish species. Intervening local water agencies argued that DWR, as a state agency, was not a "person" subject to the prohibition in Fish and Game Code section 2080. The trial court granted the writ, and although DWR complied and dismissed its appeal, the interveners continued, raising a mootness issue that the appellate court addressed due to public interest. The Court of Appeal held that a state agency qualifies as a "person" under section 2080, based on CESA's broad definition of "person," legislative findings directing all state agencies to conserve endangered species, and the statute's overall structure allowing permits for public agencies.
In Alvarez v. Superior Court, defendant Alejandro Alvarez reached a plea agreement with the prosecution that was initially approved by one judge but then rejected by a second designated judge under a San Francisco Superior Court procedure assigning only two judges to handle post-trial-setting plea approvals. The defendant petitioned for a writ of mandate or prohibition, arguing that the assignment procedure was invalid because it was not adopted as a formal local rule and improperly limited judicial authority to accept pleas. The court denied the petition, holding that the procedure was a valid administrative assignment by the presiding judge under existing authority, that defendants have no right to have pleas approved by a judge of their choice, and that the process did not conflict with statutory or case law requirements for plea dispositions. The ruling emphasized that case assignments and pretrial procedures are within the court's discretion to promote efficiency and consistency.
In this juvenile dependency case, parents of a minor voluntarily relinquished their parental rights to the State Department of Social Services under Family Code section 8700, designating the mother's sister and her husband as the intended adoptive placement. The juvenile court later held a section 366.26 hearing, terminated parental rights, and designated the minor's foster parents as prospective adoptive parents. The parents appealed, arguing that the juvenile court's actions impermissibly interfered with their final voluntary relinquishment. The Court of Appeal reversed the orders, concluding that the court lacked authority to override the relinquishment and designated placement accepted by the state agency. The court also found that any ICWA notice issues were moot due to the voluntary relinquishment.
The case concerned a challenge to Senate Bill 1137, which amended the voter-approved Proposition 36 (the Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act of 2000) by permitting incarceration for certain probation violations and narrowing eligibility for drug treatment diversion instead of jail. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's injunction against enforcement of the bill's key provisions. It held that those sections could not reasonably be viewed as furthering Proposition 36's purposes of diverting nonviolent drug offenders to community treatment and reducing incarceration, as required for legislative amendments under the initiative. The court also ruled that the bill's fallback provision for submitting invalidated portions to voters was itself invalid.