The case involved a divorce in which the wife was awarded 45% of the husband's military retirement benefits. The husband appealed the award, noting that he had retired after 22 years of service, 14 of which overlapped with the marriage. Alabama Code § 30-2-51 permits a court to include vested retirement benefits in the marital estate but expressly prohibits including the value of benefits acquired before the marriage. The appellate court held that the trial court erred by failing to exclude the pre-marriage portion of the benefits before making the division. The judgment was therefore reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings to apply the statutory exclusion.
The case involved Addie L. Jackson, a 59-year-old employee terminated from her position as Chief of Imaging at a Jefferson County government hospital for misconduct including poor supervision and neglect of duties. Jackson appealed to the Jefferson County Personnel Board, which upheld her termination despite a hearing officer's recommendation for lesser discipline, and she then filed suit in circuit court alleging age discrimination under the ADEA along with a challenge to the board's decision. A three-judge panel affirmed the termination on the ground that substantial legal evidence supported the board's ruling, and the trial court later granted summary judgment to the defendants on the ADEA claim based on collateral estoppel and res judicata. On review via certiorari, the court affirmed the termination decision because the record showed ample evidence of violations after prior discipline, but reversed the summary judgment on the ADEA claim. It held that the limited scope of review available for personnel board appeals under state law did not bar a separate federal age discrimination action, following controlling precedent.
The case involved the Hale group, nearby landowners, seeking to intervene in a prior lawsuit (Ray v. Osborn Coal Enterprises, Inc.) and set aside a 1993 judgment that approved a settlement agreement between the Town of Brookside and Osborn Coal. The settlement resolved challenges to the town's annexation and zoning of Osborn's property for strip mining, with the agreement including payments from Osborn to the town and further annexations in exchange for favorable zoning. The trial court denied the motion to intervene and vacate the judgment under Rule 60(b). On appeal, the court reversed, holding that the settlement constituted illegal contract zoning because the town bargained away its legislative authority over zoning, making the judgment void; the Hale group had a sufficient interest as affected property owners; and their post-judgment motion was timely given the lack of prior notice of the agreement's terms.
Christopher Luckie sued the City of Montgomery and Corporal D.P. Griffin for malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, assault and battery, and outrage after his arrest and re-arrest on a DUI charge stemming from a minor traffic collision where field sobriety tests and breathalyzer results conflicted with the officer's observations. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants. On appeal, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the judgment for the City on the malicious prosecution and outrage claims but reversed it on the false arrest, false imprisonment, and assault and battery claims against both the City and Griffin. The court reasoned that Alabama municipal immunity statutes shield the City from intentional tort claims like malicious prosecution but not from false arrest claims, and that genuine issues of material fact existed as to probable cause because the officer's deposition contradicted his affidavit regarding Luckie's condition and the breath tests showed a .01 blood alcohol level.
James Casey and Stephen Murphree sued Marshall and Dana Clarke and two banks to quiet title to a 19-foot-wide strip of land bordering Interstate 65, also asserting trespass and an implied easement while seeking deed reformation; the Clarkes counterclaimed for trespass. The trial court found that the Clarkes owned the strip by adverse possession and revised the plaintiffs' deed. On appeal, the court held that the Clarkes failed to prove exclusive possession for the required ten-year period because the plaintiffs continued using the strip until the Clarkes erected a fence in 1996, which was less than ten years before the suit. The plaintiffs' deed included the disputed strip and they paid taxes on it, while the Clarkes' deed did not, so the plaintiffs held superior title. The appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded for entry of judgment quieting title in the plaintiffs.
Benny M. Green sued his employer, Scott Sanders, seeking workers' compensation benefits after a tree fell on him during work in 1994, fracturing vertebrae and a disc and allegedly causing permanent total disability. The trial court awarded benefits, calculated based on Green's average weekly earnings of $300, and taxed costs of about $11,500 against the employer for experts and depositions. The employer appealed, arguing errors in the costs award, wage proof under § 25-5-57(b), expert opinion predicates, and the disability finding. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that substantial evidence supported the trial court's factual findings, the court acted within its discretion on costs under §§ 25-5-89 and 12-21-144, and no reversible errors occurred in the evidence or vocational analysis.